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I. INTRODUCTION
With the possible exception of the great whales,' and perhaps also some spe-
cies of fur-bearing seals and otters, no group of marine animals has been so inten-
sively exploited as the various species of salmon and their relative the steelhead
trout. Both nature and humans make extreme demands on these anadromous
fish, 2 and for that reason they have been aptly called the world's most harassed
fish. 3
By any standard of measure, Pacific salmon and steelhead trout are an ideal
symbol of the bounty of nature: large, extravagantly numerous in their natural
state, perpetually self-renewing, and easily caught. Virtually every river on the
Pacific coast, from Monterey Bay up to the Bering Peninsula, once teemed with
salmonids on their way upriver to spawn. Early nineteenth century explorers
I On the economics, politics, and laws of whaling see M'Gonigle, The "'Economtzing" of Ecology. Why
Big, Rare Whales Still Die, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 120 (1980). See also K. ALLEN, CONSERVATION AND MANAGE-
MENT OF WHALES (1980).
2 "Anadromous" fish (from Greek, "running upward") are born in freshwater, spend part of their lives
in the ocean, and return to freshwater to spawn. Other anadromous fish are lampreys, shad, smelt, and
sturgeon. "Catadromous" fish, like the Atlantic eel, spend their adult lives in freshwater, moving into the
ocean to spawn.
Most animals are content to spend their lives near the place of their hatching or birth. Some, however,
undertake periodic migration, either in search of optimum climate, more food, or conditions necessary for
breeding. Among the latter are Pacific salmon which, though not the most wide-ranging of migratory
animals, are perhaps the most intensively studied and among the most commercially valuable. See gener-
ally, P. STREET, ANIMAL MIGRATION AND NAVIGATION (1976).
There are five species of anadromous Pacific salmonids. Oncorhyncus (0.) tsawytscha, the chinook or
king salmon; 0. nerka, the sockeye or red salmon; 0. kisutch, the coho or silver salmon; 0. keta, the chum
or dog salmon; and 0. gorbuscha, the pink or humpback salmon. The genus name "Oncorhynchus"
means "hooked snout." The species names are of Russian derivation because they were first described by a
naturalist on the Bering expedition in 1737. R. CHILDERHOSE & M. TRIM, PACIFIC SALMON 25-26 (1979).
The steelhead trout (a sea-run rainbow trout), Salmo gairdneri, is more closely related to the Atlantic
salmon, Salmo salar, than to the Pacific species.
3 A. NETBOy, SALMON: THE WORLD'S MOST HARASSED FISH (1980).
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and settlers were awestruck by the sheer numbers of fish in the rivers at certain
times of the year.4 Later in the century, old-timers would gather to swap tales of
those Arcadian times when one could walk across a river on the backs of migrat-
ing fish. 5 One version to be reckoned with comes from a crusty yarnspinner
named Hathaway Jones, a regional Mlinchausen of Oregon folklore who lived on
a remote stretch of the Rogue River in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In response to a campfire account of how fish covered the bottom of
the Rogue River and thousands could be seen leaping into the air during the
steelhead run of 1882, Jones outdid his companions by telling of a run he had
seen where the fish were so thick that the riverbed had no room for water.6
Today, however, salmon and steelhead runs are severely depleted in many of
the rivers of the Pacific Northwest. In only a few of the rivers of Alaska and
British Columbia can the fish still be seen in quantities that compare to the
fabled runs of the nineteenth century. Even in some of those rivers the future of
the runs is in doubt. Chinook salmon stocks are in the greatest trouble. Some
runs of the upper Columbia River-the mighty river that once produced more
salmon than any other river in the world-have been considered for protection as
endangered species. 7
A combination of circumstances makes these animals uniquely vulnerable to
over-exploitation, to habitat degradation, or simply to bad management. First,
freshly-caught salmon is one of the most delectable of the world's fish, a treat fit
for royalty.8 A strong consumer preference makes the salmon fishery one of the
world's most valuable, with a yearly catch of 400,000 metric tons. Second, all
salmonid species are prized sport fish. Commercial guides exact steep tariffs for
pursuit of tackle-busters like chinook or steelhead trout. In the Pacific Northwest
4 See in/a notes 23, 45, and 55.
5 The fanciful motif of crossing streams on the backs of fish has been analyzed thus: "[L]ike all folk
memories it has its truth. Nature has never practiced excess so dramatically as at the peaks of the great
salmon runs. Observers in the last century reported that the rivers would appear to boil, agitated to
overflowing by the bodies of the big fish." Johnson, Wild Rivers, Wild Salmon, OCEANS, Mar. 1983, at 67.
In 1926 a Russian observer on the Kamchatka peninsula of Siberia reported a massed salmon run nearly a
mile long, which made a roar "somewhat similar to the noise of boiling water in a gigantic cauldron." B.
BROWN, MOUNTAIN IN THE CLOUDS: A SEARCH FOR THE WILD SALMON 78 (1982). For a fanciful illus-
tration of this phenomenon see M. WOOD, SPIRITS, HEROES & HUNTERS FROM NORTH AMERICAN IN-
DIAN MYTHOLOGY 54-55 (1982).
6 TALL TALES FROM ROGUE RIVER: THE YARNS OF HATHAWAY JONES 149 (S. Beckham ed. 1974).
Jones easily defended his title as "the damnedest liar in Oregon."
7 In 1978 the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) began the process of review for inclusion of certain salmon runs on the list of threatened or endan-
gered species. 43 Fed. Reg. 45,628 (Oct. 3, 1978). The action was taken in response to the 1977 drought in
which a 100-year record low snowpack had disastrous effects on downstream migrating juvenile salmon in
the Columbia and Snake Rivers. Despite an emergency "fish flush"-a mass spillage of water running
down the river from dam to dam-undertaken by the river basin's water managers and fishery agencies,
95% of migrating juvenile salmon perished that year. See in/ja note 252.
Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543, and subsequent amendments, the
NMFS has responsibility for marine species and the FWS for all others. Being both freshwater and
marine, anadromous fish are jointly reviewed by both agencies for inclusion on the list. See generally Bodi,
Protecting Columbia River Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 10 ENVTL. L. 349 (1980). The proposal
expired two years after the date of original publication, according to the provisions of the 1978 amend-
ments to the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0(5). Under the Act, protection may be extended not only to "species"
in the strict taxonomic sense, but also to "subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct popula-
tion segment of any species. ... 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16). Presumably "stocks" or "runs" of anadromous
fish would thus qualify for protection. See infra note 33 on the meaning of "stocks" and "runs."
8 On their March, 1983 visit to California Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip were treated to a feast of
fresh Oregon chinook salmon. About 1,200 pounds of fish were shipped to southern California to grace
Her Majesty's banquet table. Portland Oregonian, Mar. I1, 1983, § F at 5.
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streamside angling for steelhead approaches the status of a cult religion in the
fervor and dedication of its practitioners. 9 Third, these are big fish, making them
all the more desirable for food and recreation. Twenty- or thirty-pound chinook
are not uncommon, and specimens weighing over 100 pounds have been
caught.10
Fourth, humans have used the fish's compelling migratory instinct to its detri-
ment. Migrating salmonids are not easily deflected from their course; if a net or
a trap is stretched in front of them on their way upriver they will not seek a way
around it. Instead, the fish will blunder right into a trap in their singleminded
determination to make their way upstream. One can also await the fish with a
dipnet just below a waterfall. With a little skill the fish can practically be in-
duced to leap into a bucket. I I Fifth, migrating salmonids just before spawning
tend to congregate in such concentrations that in former times they could be
scooped up almost a dozen at a time-an open invitation to excess. Salmon may
be harvested with the least cost and effort at the mouths of spawning rivers,
where schooling propensity is greatest, weight is at a maximum, and physical
condition is at prime quality. Characteristics like these make salmon remarkably
easy to catch during crucial phases of their life cycle.
Finally, the extraordinary migratory habits of these fish have worked against
them in another way; it is here that we move squarely into the realm of law.
Many salmon and steelhead range over thousands of miles during their four- or
five-year lifetimes, and all stubbornly persist in crossing with impunity whatever
jurisdictional boundaries humans can devise. Anadromous salmonids cannot be
confined like many other wildlife populations, and protection is for that reason
all the more troublesome. Ultimately, this wide-ranging migratory compulsion
makes it difficult to achieve effective management on anything less than an inter-
national scale, yet this is the very level of management coordination that is hard-
est to achieve.12 Because of this unique combination of high demand and the
salmon's disregard for federal, state, tribal, and international management
boundaries, the salmon fishery may be the most difficult of all fisheries to manage
effectively. The impossibility of trying to satisfy the demands of competing user
groups, the uncertainties of dealing with population dynamics and the effects of
habitat degradation, and the political and legal difficulties of allocating the re-
source across jurisdictional boundaries all combine to make the anadromous fish
manager's job almost staggeringly complicated.
These are the qualities that make anadromous fish so vulnerable to over-ex-
ploitation and habitat degradation. Tragically, the most intractable of these
qualities are shared with the great whales. Both salmon and the great whales
might now be enjoying full protection if somehow they could be persuaded to
restrict their wanderings to borders that we humans are willing to recognize.
9 See, e.g., B. LucH & F. AMATO, STEELHEAD DRIFT FISHING AND FLY FISHING (1970). Rudyard
Kipling angled for steelhead at Willamette Falls in 1889 and left a vivid account of the rituals necessary to
land one of those legendary fighters. Kipling, A Classic Fih Stor, THE AMERICAN ANGLER, Dec. 1917, at
415.
10 The world record 126-pounder with a length of nearly five feet was taken in British Columbia. W.
Clemens & G. Wilby, Fishes of the Pacifw Coast of Canada, FISH. RES. BD. CAN. BULL. 68 (1961).
1 1 See i n/a text accompanying note 53.
12 On international attempts at coordinated salmon management, see inhfa text accompanying notes
224-26 and 272-77.
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They are classic victims of the "tragedy of the commons," an inevitable but eco-
nomically irrational quandary in which those with open access to unfenced, com-
mon-pool resources lack sufficient economic incentive to conserve the resource
effectively. 13
To illustrate how migration of anadromous fish complicates or frustrates effec-
tive management, this Article will follow the life history of a chinook salmon
born on the Lochsa River in Idaho. It will follow our hypothetical fish on its
journey through different historical eras, and also through a great variety of man-
agement jurisdictions in our own era. We chose the chinook salmon as an illus-
tration for several reasons. It is the largest and most impressive of all Pacific
salmon species. It lives the longest, has the widest geographical range, and trav-
els the farthest. It is the only salmon species with numerical and commercial
importance in virtually every watershed on the west coast from the Sacramento
up to the Yukon. It is also the species in greatest danger of commercial extinc-
tion, and accordingly it is the species that has been particularly singled out for
enhancement efforts of various kinds. Indeed, the chinook salmon-no less than
the deep, misty old-growth forests or the waters of the bountiful Columbia
River-has become a symbol of the natural resource treasures of the Pacific
Northwest. 14
We chose a Lochsa River chinook for our hypothetical journeys for several
reasons. A small but visually spectacular river that rises just west of the continen-
tal divide in the Idaho panhandle, the Lochsa is relatively far up the part of the
Columbia River Basin that is still inhabited by salmon. Thus, a Lochsa River
salmon must travel through most of the structural obstacles and management
jurisdictions that are the subject of this Article. Furthermore, the Lochsa River
has an appropriate historical and symbolic dimension: Lewis and Clark camped
on its banks on September 14, 1805, not long after first tasting Pacific salmon, 15
and Bernard DeVoto-a person who knew and loved the American West as well
as anyone-chose to have his ashes scattered nearby. 16
Section II of this Article describes the life history of a Lochsa River chinook
salmon and the state of the salmon fishery during the era of subsistence fishing
from aboriginal times to the year 1866. It portrays the fishery during the era of
commercial abundance from 1866 to 1933, when canneries dominated the Co-
13 Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). See also the earlier and seminal analy-
sis by Gordon, The Economi Theory of a Common Property Resource.- The Fshery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
14 The chinook weighs between 15 and 40 pounds at maturity. Most chinook are four or five years old
when they return from the ocean to spawn, and their range is the widest of any anadromous fish; they are
found as far south as Monterey Bay and as far north as the Bering Sea. Although chinook may be found
migrating upstream during almost any month of the year, most prefer the spring or fall migrations, gravi-
tating to large rivers such as the Columbia or the Yukon. Before the construction of dams on the Colum-
bia it was not unusual for chinook to be found more than one thousand miles inland, having first made the
same journey downstream as a juvenile and having swum thousands of miles more from the mouth of the
Columbia northward into the Gulf of Alaska and back. See generally U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Anadro-
mous Fish Resources (1970); A. NETBOY, THE COLUMBIA RIVER SALMON AND STEELHEAD TROUT:
THEIR FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL 44 (1980). The latter remains the best general introduction to the salmon
fishery of the Pacific Northwest.
15 See infa text accompanying note 18. The Lewis and Clark camp was located at the present site of
the Powell Ranger Station.
16 The ashes of the late conservationist, historian, journalist, and editor of the Lewis and ClarkJournals
are scattered in a cedar grove four miles upstream of the September 14, 1805, Lewis and Clark camp. He
often camped there while seeking the route of the explorers' travels. D. CUTRIGHT, LEWIS AND CLARK:
PIONEERING NATURALISTS 201 (1969).
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lumbia River and regulatory provisions were rudimentary. Section II also deals
with the hydropower era from 1933 through 1973, when the construction of dams
represented the foremost challenge to conservation of the anadromous fish re-
source. Section III describes the state of the salmon fishery in our own time-the
era of attempted restoration-as it follows the life journey of our Lochsa River
chinook through seventeen distinct management jurisdictions, each with in-
dependent authority over allocation of the salmon harvest. Section IV ties to-
gether the various threads of our narrative by contrasting old ideas of salmon
management that prevailed during the hydropower era with new ideas that have
come to the forefront in the past decade or so. Finally, Section V suggests an
agenda for the future.
We will see that there is still hope for the much-abused chinook salmon, as
perhaps there is also for the great whales. Nations, states, and Indian tribes are
at last getting together for the chinook's protection. It may yet turn out that
human efforts are too little, too late for either the whales or the chinook, but
everywhere people have become aware of the magnitude of problems and are
trying to solve them.
II. THE LIFE JOURNEY OF A PACIFIC SALMON IN DIFFERENT HISTORICAL
ERAS
A. The Era of Subsistence Fisheries (c. 7000 B. C -1866)
Since 1866, when the first salmon cannery appeared on the Columbia, 17
change has come to the Pacific salmon fishery rapidly and in waves. But for
thousands of years before the expansion of white settlement into the Pacific
Northwest the life cycle of Lochsa River chinook was substantially the same from
century to century. The year 1805 provides a representative illustration of a chi-
nook salmon's life journey and how salmon coexisted with American Indian soci-
eties in those years before non-Indians populated the American West in
significant numbers.
On August 13, 1805, after several weeks of near starvation while seeking a
route over the continental divide, Captain Meriwether Lewis enjoyed an appetiz-
ing meal. Guests of a small band of Shoshoni Indians on the Lemhi River in
what is now Idaho, Lewis and Clark had been seeking evidence that they had
indeed crossed the Great Divide. It was Captain Lewis' supper that convinced
him: a piece of fresh roasted salmon, which he ate "with a very good relish." He
recorded that this was "the first salmon I had seen and [it] perfectly convinced
me that we were on the waters of the Pacific Ocean.""'
Seeking navigable waters to carry them to the Columbia River, the explorers
turned northward, recrossing the divide before turning westward once again. On
September 14 the party camped near an abandoned Indian fishing weir on the
north bank of the Lochsa River' 9 in preparation for an arduous and dysentery-
ridden trek through the mountains to the Forks of the Clearwater. There they
17See infta note 64.
16 THE JOURNALS OF LEWIS AND CLARK 194 (B. DeVoto ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as JOURNALS].
Lewis' Shoshoni host, improbably enough for a melodrama, turned out to be the long-lost brother of
Sacajawea, their Indian guide. The emotional reunion was duly recorded by Lewis. Id. at 203.
19 Ste supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
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remained until October 7, recovering from incapacitating illness and building
barks for the journey down the Snake and Columbia Rivers.20
For months after their first taste of salmon the explorers subsisted largely on
camas roots and dried salmon provided by trade with Indians. 2 1 They might not
have made it to the Pacific otherwise; the explorers were dependent on the gener-
osity of their hosts for practically every bite. Fortunately, salmon was plentiful at
that time of year. The summer run of Columbia River chinook was nearing its
end, and the fall run was approaching its maximum.22
On their journey down the Snake and Columbia, Lewis and Clark everywhere
saw evidence of the salmon economy on which the livelihood of Northwest In-
dian tribes was based. By the time the expedition reached the mouth of the
Columbia the party had had their fill of dried fish, most of the crew by then
preferring dog meat.23
Reaching the Columbia River on October 17, Clark recorded that the river
was "crouded with salmon." He wrote, "The number of dead Salmon on the
shores & floating in the river is incrediable to say. . . .The waters of this river is
clear, and a Salmon may be seen at the deabth of 15 to 20 feet."'24 Unfamiliar
with the life history of the salmon, Clark was mystified by this eerie scene. The
explorers had reached the Columbia at the very time of the upriver chinook's fall
climacteric. In the words of one historian:
They had never witnessed such a piscatorial spectacle before and would
never again. In fact, deplorably, no one will. Salmon runs of such magni-
tude no longer exist, have not for all too many years. It is an easy matter
when reading the journals of Lewis and Clark to become imbued with an
acute yearning for the signs and sounds of yesteryear. 25
In the early nineteenth century more salmon and steelhead trout frequented the
Columbia than any river system in North America. 26
We turn now to the task of tracing the life cycle of a Lochsa River chinook
salmon in 1805. During this era salmon were allowed to play out their life cycles
with comparatively little interference from humans. Our hypothetical chinook
hatches in a pristine stream bed and begins life as one of five thousand or so small
orange eggs that a spawning female buried under gravel in a specially con-
structed nest called a "redd," in a cold, swiftly-flowing freshwater stream. A
hatchling or "fry"-now an inch or so long-emerges from the gravel of the
streambed about fifty days after the egg was fertilized, the actual length of time
20JOURNALS, supra note 18, at 240-43.
211d. at 215.
22 On "runs" see thfra note 33. Lewis called the chinook the "common salmon," having encountered it
more often than any other species. The fish, he wrote, "extends itself into all the rivers and little creeks on
this side of the Continent, and to which the natives are so much indebted for their subsistence." D. Cu-
TRIGHT, supra note 16, at 269.
23 On October 17, Captain Clark recorded, "[T]he fish being out of season and dieing in great numbers
in the river, we did not think it proper to use them .... " JOURNALS, supra note 18, at 251. Three days
earlier Clark almost apologetically confided that "for the first time in three weeks past I had a good dinner
of Blue wing Teel." Id. at 249.
24d at 252.
25 D. CUTRIGHT, supra note 16, at 225.
26 R. CHILDERHOSE & M. TRIM, supra note 2, at 9. On current abundance and distribution of chinook
salmon, see L. FULTON, SPAWNING AREAS AND ABUNDANCE OF CHINOOK SALMON IN THE COLUMBIA
RIVER BASIN, U.S. BUR. OF FISHERIES SPEC. Sci. REP. (Fisheries) No. 571 (1978).
19831
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depending upon the water temperature.2 7 Some chinook fry may remain a year
or two in the river of hatching; those that begin migration immediately take up
to four months to negotiate their way downstream past a variety of predators-
larger fish, aquatic insects, crayfish, birds, and snakes. 28
The "fingerling"-now between two and six inches long-grows rapidly and
descends the river in stages, hiding under stones and in shaded areas by day,
swimming in search of food by night. Facing upstream where the current is swift,
it snaps at anything edible that drifts past, then turns and actively swims down-
stream where the current is slack. In 1805 the fingerling would have encountered
only a few natural barriers on its way to the ocean: several rapids and Celilo
Falls at the current site of The Dalles, Oregon. A healthy fingerling would have
had no difficulty navigating the downstream obstacles of the Lochsa, Clearwater,
Snake, and Columbia Rivers.
Having reached the estuary of the Columbia River where salt water mixes
with fresh, the fingerling spends perhaps a few weeks there, pausing long enough
to gorge on the abundance of zooplankton, production of which peaks in late
spring. 29 Here the juvenile fish becomes "imprinted" with chemical cues in the
water, so that it may "smell" its way home a few years later. 30 A physiological
and metabolic change called "smolting" adapts the fish to saltwater life, and the
fingerling will die if exposed to undiluted salt water before smolting is com-
plete.3 ' Our hypothetical chinook smolt is now among the small fraction of sur-
vivors that have successfully completed the downstream journey. 32
The smolt crosses the bar of the Columbia River and enters the Pacific Ocean.
Here natural predators become more numerous, and the first few months of
marine life are critical to the survival of a stock. 33 It may now turn southward,
27 Knowledge of the biology of Pacific salmon probably exceeds that for any other group of marine fish.
P. LARKIN, PACIFIC SALMON: SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 7 (Wash. Sea Grant Pub. No. 80-3, 1980).
For a vivid but concise review of anadromous salmonid biology, see R. CHILDERHOSE & M. TRIM, Supra
note 2, at 31-45. For an introductory book on the life cycle of a male sockeye salmon, see R. CARAS,
SOCKEYE: THE LIFE OF A PACIFIC SALMON (1975). For a more technical summary of homing studies and
the controversy surrounding them, see F. JONES, FISH MIGRATION 42-68 (1968). A salmon's age and the
relative amount of time it spends in fresh and salt water are both reliably recorded in growth rings in its
scales.
28 Spring run juvenile chinook (see infra note 33 on the meaning of "run") may hold over for the winter
its fresh water. The longer a juvenile spends in fresh water, the more intense is the competition for food
and space. Hence, some runs of juvenile salmon have developed territorial behavior to spread out the
young fish and to force less dominant individuals downstream. See infra note 248. Chinook generally
prefer to spawn in tributaries of large rivers.
29 Peterson, Brodeur & Pearcy, Food Hahits ofluvenile Salmon in the Oregon Coastal Zone, 80 FISHERY BULL.
841 (1982).
30 While in fresh water, juvenile salmon imprint the olfactory characteristics of their environment. The
most widely accepted hypothesis is that returning fish can remember these odors in the sequence in which
they were committed to memory. Salmonid fish can also sense direction from the sun and plane of polari-
zation of light in the sky. They may also be able to detect minuscule electrical gradients in ocean cur-
rents. P. LARKIN, PACIFIC SALMON: SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 9 (Wash. Sea Grant Pub. 80-3, 1980).
The olfactory hypothesis was proved in 1976. See Scholz, Horral, Cooper & Hasler, Imprinting to Chemical
Cues.- The Basis for Home Stream Selection in Salmon, 192 SCIENCE 1247 (1976); and Hasler, Scholz & Horral,
Olfactory Imprinting and Homing in Salmon, 66 AMER. SCIENTIST 347 (1978).
'31 See generally Hoar, Smolt Transformation.- Evoluton, Behavior, and Physology, 33 J. FISH. RES. BD. CAN.
1233 (1976).
32 It has been estimated that in recent years up to 90% of the fry and fingerlings hatched in the Snake
River watershed have not survived to reach the ocean. See in/a text accompanying note 252. For reasons
that will become apparent below in our discussion of dams, the survival rate was no doubt considerably
higher in 1805. See it/a text accompanying notes 249-69.
:33 The terms stock, run, population, or race are often used interchangeably. A stock is an isolated
reproductive unit that shares both a common environment and a common gene pool and is identified with
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travelling with only a few of its fellow survivors into the coastal waters off Oregon
and California, perhaps as far south as Point Conception. Or, more likely, it will
migrate northward with the majority. Some chinook juveniles remain in the
ocean relatively close to the mouth of the river of origin; most follow predeter-
mined migration routes far into the North Pacific, the procession joined en route
by stocks from more northerly rivers. Columbia River chinook have been cap-
tured and tagged as far north as Adak in the Aleutian Islands, and have returned
to spawn in the Columbia the following year.34
An adolescent chinook migrating northward will generally move in a broad
counterclockwise sweep, following the continental shelf in a narrow zone about
twenty-five miles offshore from Washington, Vancouver Island, and the panhan-
dle of Alaska, swimming out into the open ocean in a wide circle past Kodiak
Island. 35 The fish then disperse over their winter feeding grounds on the broad
continental shelf of the Gulf of Alaska, preferring to feed in deep water near the
bottom. Here they spend the greater part of their life cycles, far from the nation
of their origin. Some fish make several circuits around the feeding grounds of the
Gulf of Alaska. They are opportunistic feeders, pursuing almost anything that
does not pursue them. Chinook salmon rapidly mature into predators and are
particularly fond of other fish, squid, and microcrustaceans such as shrimp or
krill. Their preference for smaller fish makes them a principal target of ocean
trollers who set their lines to mimic the behavior of small fish such as herring and
anchovies. In turn chinook are preyed upon by larger fish such as tuna or sword-
fish, sharks, seals, and killer whales.
As the fish approaches maturity, according to an inner timetable not yet fully
understood, it begins to move back into coastal waters to the south,36 separating
from its companions as each seeks the mouth of its home river. 37
After a few years of pelagic feasting, the fish is now so fat that, according to
one hypothesis, it is forced by its buoyancy to seek fresh water of lesser density. 38
a specific season and watershed or stream. Hence, chinook salmon have spring, summer, or fall stocks or
runs, each identified with a particular home stream. A stock may also be divided into substocks, such as
early fall or late fall chinook. Seasonal fish runs are not necessarily taxinomically discrete, but the distinc-
tions are useful for management purposes. Wahle, Chaney, & Pearson, Areal Distribution of Marked Columbia
Rier Basin Spring Chinook Salmon, 43 MAR. FISH. REV. No. 12 (Dec. 1981) at 2. Although specimens within
a species are interfertile, there are significant behavioral and even physiological differences between stocks
from different rivers. F. JONES, supra note 27, at 59. Columbia River chinook are usually divided into four
"runs": spring, summer, and two types of fall chinook--the upriver "brights" and the lower river "tules."
Coho salmon are found mostly in the lower Columbia River, but some sockeye still migrate far upstream.
Pink and chum salmon are rare in the Columbia. Steelhead trout runs are classified winter, spring, and
summer.
34 Zirges, Those Unique Salmon, OREGON WILDLIFE (Oregon Dept. of Fish & Wildlife) Aug. 1983, at 7.
In 1981 a tagged steelhead released just over a year before at the Dworshak hatchery in Idaho was re-
trieved off Attu Island at the westernmost end of the Aleutians. Japanese Actrity Seen as Potential Danger to
Fishery, The Oregonian, Feb. 24, 1983, at D8.
35 For generalized diagrams on chinook migration patterns see PACIFIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUN-
CIL, PERSPECTIVE ON MANAGEMENT OF OCEAN CHINOOK AND COHO SALMON FISHERIES WITHIN THE
FISHERY CONSERVATION ZONE OFF CALIFORNIA, OREGON, AND WASHINGTON 4 (Mar. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as PFMC PERSPECTIVE], orJ. GULLAND, THE FISH RESOURCES OF THE OCEAN Fig. 2.4 (1971). See
also Neave, Ocean Mgrations of Pacifi Salmon, 21 J. FISH. RES. BD. CAN. 1227 (1964).
36 Timing of return can be remarkably precise even among salmon from widely separated localities in
the ocean. For one explanation of the "internal clock" see Neave, supra note 35.
37 One hypothesis is that the fish find their way by detecting minute changes in electrical voltages in
the water. Royce, Smith, & Hartt, Models of Oceanic Migrations of Pacific Salmon and Comments on Guidance
Mechanisms, 66 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE FISHERY BULLETIN 441 (1968).
38 B. CURTIS, THE LIFE STORY OF THE FISH 197-98 (1961). Pacific salmon cease feeding when they
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By this time our chinook, now an adult, has traveled several thousand miles of
the North Pacific before it finds the mouth of the Columbia once again. Enter-
ing the Columbia in precisely timed runs varying by no more than a few days,3 9
pursued by bear, sea lion, and osprey, our specimen chinook deftly maneuvers
over many obstacles, resting only long enough to regain strength to continue.
Astonishing as this feat of endurance is, the most perilous part of its life journey
still lies ahead.
The indigenous peoples of the Pacific Northwest were not unappreciative of
the majesty of this natural cycle. In the early nineteenth century they were as
dependent upon the salmon for their sustenance and way of life as were the
Plains Indians on the bison. Everywhere they devised ceremonies to assure the
continuance of the cycle, some tribes treating the first-caught salmon with all the
pomp and ceremony of a visiting chieftain. 40 Many Northwest tribes made su-
pernatural beings of the annually resurrected fish, endowing them with human
form; others attributed the salmon's return to the beneficence of Coyote, Raven,
or the equivalent culture hero.4 '
Indians harvested millions of pounds of salmon during this era.42 On their
begin migration to their spawning streams, and those that must travel the greatest distances need more
energy reserves stored in fatty tissue. Fish whose spawning streams lie relatively near the ocean need fewer
reserves, and their flesh is lower in oil content than the highly prized upriver stocks.
39 R. BROWNING, FISHERIES OF THE NORTH PACIFIC 50 (rev. ed. 1980). Different species and stocks
typically do not intermingle in the ocean, each seeking out preferred water temperatures and depths. (The
ocean is not uniform in its physical characteristics, but is composed of distinct water masses of varying
temperature, salinity, and food content. See generally SALMONID ECOSYSTEMS OF THE NORTH PACIFIC (J.
McNeil & D. Hinesworth eds. 1980).
40 On April 19, 1806, at Celilo Falls on his way home, Captain Clark gave the earliest description of the
"first salmon" ceremony:
ITihere was great joy with the natives last night in consequence of the arrival of the Salmon;
one of those fish was caught, this was the harbenger of good news to them. They informed
us that those fish would arive in great quantities in the course of about 5 days. This fish was
dressed and being divided into small pieces was given each child in the village. This custom
is founded on a supersticious opinion that it will hasten the arrival of the Salmon.
JOURNALS, supra note 18, at 358. At the places where Lewis and Clark had seen great stores of dried and
pounded salmon in the previous October, they now found the Indians near starvation because of the
unaccustomed lateness of the spring run.
41 Anthropologist Philip Drucker wrote, "[W]hat could be more logical than the concept that the
salmon ascended the streams to benefit mankind, died, and then returned to life?" Many Northwest tribes
held the belief that the salmon were:
a race of supernatural beings who dwelt in a great house under the sea. There they went
about in human form, feasting and dancing like people. When the time came for the "run,"
the Salmon-people dressed in garments of salmon flesh, that is, assumed the form of fish to
sacrifice themselves. Once dead, the spirit of each fish returned to the house beneath the sea.
If the bones were returned to the water, the being resumed his (human-like) form with no
discomfort, and could repeat the trip the next season. Since the Salmon-people's migration
was considered to be voluntarily undertaken, it followed that it behooved human beings to
take pains not to offend their benefactors. To return all the salmon bones to the water was
one of the procedures believed to be essential. If some bones were thrown away on land, on
resurrection the Salmon-person might lack an arm or a leg, or some other part, and he and
his tribe would become angry and refuse to run again in the stream in which they had been
so unappreciatively treated. All the Northwest Coast groups had long lists of regulations
and prohibitions referring to the Salmon-people in order to continue to maintain good rela-
tions with these important beings.
P. DRUCKER, INDIANS OF THE NORTHWEST COAST 155 (1963). To the Chinooks Coyote was responsible
for teaching the people how to catch and cook salmon. C. SMITH, SALMON FISHERS OF THE COLUMBIA 6-
13 (1979). To coastal peoples like the Tlingit it was Raven who first released the fish runs from a box
floating on the ocean. H. STEWART, INDIAN FISHING: EARLY METHODS ON THE NORTHWEST COAST 13
(1977).4 2 See ifia note 51.
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journey down the Columbia in 1805 Lewis and Clark passed more than a hun-
dred stations where they observed Indians fishing.43 In a single day they floated
past twenty-nine lodges where dried fish were pounded into pemmican and
packed into sacks lined with fish skins. In front of nearly every lodge were scaf-
folds on which fish lay drying in the open air, and on the ground nearby lay
stacks of freshly caught salmon. 4 4 On October 22 the explorers reached Celilo
Falls-two hundred miles from the mouth of the Columbia-where the most
active Indian fishery in the Columbia Basin flourished. Indians had been fishing
at Celilo Falls for more than 9,000 years. 45
Here lived the Chinook tribes, a mercantile people with a well-developed sense
of trade.46 The Washington side of the falls was controlled by the Wishram
band, the Oregon side by the Wasco. Many other tribes came to trade or to fish:
the Klikitat, the Yakima, the Palus, the Wanapum-even the Nez Perce occa-
sionally moved westward from their mountain homes to fish when the hunting
was poor. In 1805 the Columbia Basin held an estimated 50,000 people; half of
them belonged to Chinook tribes. 47
At the time of Lewis and Clark's passage, Celilo Falls and the narrows imme-
diately downriver were at the heart of the salmon-based society of the inland
tribes of the Northwest. During the height of the fishing season representatives of
tribes from all over the Columbia and Klamath basins would congregate at the
falls for fishing and barter. 48 It was reported that on some occasions as many as
3,000 people would gather in camps around the falls for a salmon run. 49 At one
nearby location Captain Clark counted 107 basketfuls of dried and stone ground
43 A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 13.
44 On October 17 Captain Clark was invited into a lodge where fish were being dried. He "found it
crouded with men women and children and near the entrance I saw maney squars [squaws] engaged [in]
splitting and drying Salmon." There he was presented with a boiled salmon that he pronounced "deli-
cious." JOURNALS, supra note 18, at 252.
45 L. CRESSMAN, PREHISTORY OF THE FAR WEST 1-2 (1977). By the time Lewis and Clark arrived
most of the Indian fishers had gone home, the peak of the run being past. Indian fishing was most intense
at natural barriers like Celilo Falls and the Cascades of the Columbia 50 miles downriver. Inland tribes
like the Nez Perce travelled great distances to fish at such locations, since further upriver fish were fewer in
number and their food value diminished. At these places migration of fish was delayed and the salmon
were easier to catch, being fatigued from their attempts to leap the barrier. Other fishing sites observed
and described by early nineteenth century travellers include Salmon Falls on the Snake River, Kettle Falls
on the upper Columbia near the Canadian border, and Willamette Falls southeast of the current site of
Portland. For other travelers' accounts see generally C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 5-14.
46 Ste generally R. RUBY & J. BROWN, THE CHINOOK INDIANS (1976).
47 C. SMITH, FISH OR CUT BAIT 10, Oregon State University Sea Grant Publication No. ORESU-T-
77-006 (1977). The aboriginal population was drastically reduced by disease in the decades following the
Lewis and Clark expedition. Sometime during the 1840s the white and Indian populations in the Colum-
bia Basin stood equal at 10,000. Id. See generally Craig & Hacker, The History and Development oftlhe Fi heries
of the Columbia River, 49 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF FISHERIES 133-216 (1940); and G. Hewes, Aborigi-
nal Use of Fishery Resources in Northwestern North America (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of
Anthropology, U. of Cal., Berkeley, 1947). Chinook gear and fishing practices are described at length in
Ray, Lower Chinook Ethnographic Notes, 7 U. OF WASH. PUBLICATIONS IN ANTHROPOLOGY No. 2 (1938) at
29-165.
48 Although at Celilo Falls the peaks of the runs came in spring and early autumn, salmon could be
caught for nine months out of the year. A. NETBOY, THE SALMON: THEIR FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL 270
(1973).
4 9 A. Ross, ADVENTURES OF THE FIRST SETTLERS ON THE OREGON OR COLUMBIA RIVER 117 (1849).
Visiting the Cascades of the Columbia in August 1811, Alexander Ross, an agent of the North West
Company, complained about the difficulty of obtaining salmon by barter: "For every fisherman there are
fifty idlers, and all fish caught were generally devoured on the spot; so that the natives of the place seldom
lay up their winter stock until the gambling season is over, and their troublesome visitors are gone." Id. at
118.
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salmon, of a total weight he estimated at 10,000 pounds. 50 These aboriginal soci-
eties used far greater quantities of salmon than is commonly realized: the annual
Indian harvest almost certainly exceeded the total amount of salmon now taken
from the river by all fishers combined.5 '
At Celilo Falls52 the Indian fishers practiced dipnetting, a daring and pic-
turesque fishing method that astonished early non-Indian observers. 53 From a
platform or a slippery rock overhanging an eddy in the current, a tribesman
would adroitly maneuver a long-handled net in a delicate balance that might
sometimes have sent him into the churning waters below, were he not tied to the
scaffold by a rope around his waist. Only men did the fishing; women were re-
sponsible for the preparation.
The net used to catch fish was sewn around a hoop some four feet in diameter
and was attached to a pole thirty feet long. The weight of a bagged salmon
would slide the net so as to close it around the struggling fish.
Sometimes the fisherman would be lowered down the sheer face of the rock in
a basket, there to wait motionless for long periods of time until suddenly lunging
for a leaping fish with spear in hand. He would sling impaled fish into his net
until it was full, and then would signal to be lifted back to the platform.5 4 An-
other would take his place, and fishing would stop when each had caught all that
could be cleaned that day. Skilled fishermen could catch upwards of twenty fish
in an hour. The surplus was, of course, used for barter. It takes no feat of imagi-
nation to picture how precarious might have been the position of a fisherman
hung in a reed basket from rickety platforms perched over rushing rapids, strug-
gling with a thirty-pound chinook at the end of a long-handled net or spear.5 5
50 D. CUTRIGHT, supra note 16, at 230.
51 At leisure for the winter at Fort Clatsop, Lewis speculated, "From the best estimate we were able to
make as we d[e]scended the Columbia we conceived that the natives inhabiting that noble stream, for
some miles above the great falls to the grand rappids inclusive annually prepare about 30,000 lbs. of
pounded sammon for market." Id. at 309. It was a serious underestimate. Based on a population of
50,000 and an average daily per capita consumption of one pound of fish, Craig and Hacker, supra note 47,
at 142, compute an annual catch of 18 million pounds--significantly more than is taken today by both
sport and commercial fishers. At Celilo Falls alone the annual catch must have been close to four or five
million pounds. SMITH, FISH OR CUT BAIT, supra note 43, at 12. By way of comparison, the 1980 com-
mercial catch of salmon and steelhead in the Columbia River was 6.8 million pounds. Sabella, The Wld
K1ng Salmon, PACIFIC FISHING, Mar. 1983, at 35.
52 Lewis and Clark measured the height of the falls at twenty feet and were skeptical of a fish's ability
to leap such an obstacle. They correctly deduced that seasonal flooding regularly reduced the height,
permitting the salmon to pass. Prodigious as their leaping ability is, salmon are in fact effectively blocked
by heights of ten to fifteen feet. D. CUTRIGHT, supra note 16, at 231.
53See z fia note 55.
54 A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 15.
55 Captain Charles Wilkes visited Willamette Falls in 1841 at the height of the Indian fishing season
and left us with this vivid description:
The salmon leap the fall; and it would be inconceivable, if not actually witnessed, how they
can force themselves up, and after a leap of from ten to twelve feet retain strength enough to
stem the force of the water above. About one in ten of those who jumped, would succeed in
getting by. They are seen to dart out of the foam beneath and reach about two thirds of the
height, at a single bound, those that thus passed the apex of the running water, succeed, but
all that fell short, were thrown back again into the foam. I never saw so many fish collected
together before, and the Indians are constantly employed in taking them. They rig out two
stout poles, long enough to project over the foaming cauldron, and secure their larger ends
to the rocks. On the outer end they make a platform for the fisherman to stand on, . . .
perched on it with a pole thirty feet long in hand, to which the net is fastened by a hoop four
feet in diameter. . . . The mode of using the net is peculiar: they throw it in the foam as
far up the stream as they can reach, and . . . the fish who are running up in a contrary
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Customary law among the tribes, and within each tribe, governed Indian
salmon fishing. The platform itself was a property right, inheritable, passed by
marriage, or even freely alienable. Each fishing site had an overseer in charge of
safeguarding the platforms; those with no property rights in the fishery could use
the platforms only with the overseer's permission.
56
Those fish able to avoid Indian fishermen at Celilo Falls and surmount that
natural barrier still had many hundreds of river miles ahead of them. The up-
stream journey took several weeks; on the last stretch of its trek the ocean-fat-
tened fish has just enough strength to make its way to the home stream. Extreme
acceleration of glandular activity causes rapid physical deterioration; the fish
ages a human equivalent of forty years in a mere two weeks. 5 7 A delay of no
more than a week may thus severely depress the vitality of an upriver stock for
years to come. 58
Eventually reaching the mouth of Lochsa, the home stream, the returning fish
congregate in a dense mass, apparently in a holding pattern as if they were some-
how "taking turns" entering the creek. 59 Ascending the home stream, the fish
may seek out the very gravel bar under which they were born. 6° In a spawning
procedure almost as ritualistic as the spectacular mating dances of certain birds,
the fish prepare the nests, lay and fertilize the eggs, and then die.6 1 The stream is
direction are caught. Sometimes twenty large fish are taken by a single person in an hour;
and it is only surprising that twice as many should not be caught.
4 C. WILKES, NARRATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES EXPLORING EXPEDITION DURING THE YEARS 1838,
1839, 1840, 1841 AND 1842, at 345 (1845). Wilkes has been styled "the American Captain Cook." See
generally W. STANTON, THE GREAT UNITED STATES EXPLORING EXPEDITION (1975). Indian fishing tech-
nology of the nineteenth century included substantially the same methods that are used today: trolling
with hook and line, harpoons, and seines. On the elaborate fishing techniques of the coastal Indians see
generally H. STEWART, supra note 41. Indians also used traps and weirs, now illegal everywhere. Next to
dipnetting, the fish weir probably drew the most comment from Lewis and Clark and other travellers. A
kind of "fish corral," the weir was a fence built of saplings placed across a river channel. It guided the fish
into a mesh basket from which it could not escape. For Captain Lewis' lengthy description of a weir on the
Lemhi River see D. CUTRIGHT, supra note 16, at 189-90.
56 D. Walker, Mutual Cross-Utilization of Economic Resources in the Plateau: An Example from the
Aboriginal Nez Perce Fishing Practices, Washington State University, Laboratory of Anthropology Report
of Investigations No. 41 (1967) at 14-15.
57 J. COUSTEAU, THE OCEAN WORLD 20-21 (1979). Captain Cousteau writes that the Pacific salmon
must go through one of the most painful death agonies in the natural world:
[The salmon's] arteries thicken, his liver gives out, his circulation weakens, he is subject to all
kinds of infection and infestation. By the time he has spawned he is, in Dr. Andrew A.
Benson's words, "a miserable shadow of the beautiful, silvery deep-ocean marine animal.
His flesh has turned from orange-pink to pale tan. He has developed his hump and hooked
jaw. His bones have become cartilaginous; his skin is peeling off. We even saw many with
their tails falling off. His liver is a livid olive green because of the decomposition products of
his hemoglobin. Only the heart of the salmon remains in good condition-and even this
suffers from thickening of the coronary artery walls." Exhausted from malnutrition and the
glandular ordeal, covered with fungus, the salmon has grown decrepit in a few days.
Id. at 20-21.
58 R. BROWNING, supra note 39, at 50.
59 For a spectacular aerial photograph of sockeye salmon lining up in "ranks" upon entering a stream,
see Sci. AM., July 1983, at 50.
60 A certain percentage of every run will take a wrong turn somewhere along the journey home. This is
one mechanism whereby genetic diversity is assured and empty streams are repopulated. Stray fish will
interbreed with resident fish or will take the place of depleted native runs.
61 All Pacific salmon die after spawning, unlike the steelhead trout or the Atlantic salmon, which may
survive for a second or even a third cycle. Some biologists have speculated that this difference evolved as a
result of low nutrient levels in west coast streams. Mass fish mortality serves to capture large quantities of
biologically essential nutrients at sea and return them to freshwater streams. B. BROWN, MOUNTAIN IN
THE CLOUDS: A SEARCH FOR THE WILD SALMON 22 (1982).
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littered with dead or dying fish, food for eager scavengers that await the event.
In the words of a modern nature writer:
We are affected when a dog travels hundreds of miles to go home; salmon
have travelled for [thousands of miles and] millions of years. That they
die after spawning makes the quest seem all the more heroic, and all the
more tragic the possibility that the quest will be thwarted by dams which
will silt up and become useless in a century or two. 6 2
B. The Time of the Free-for-All (1866-1933)
A history of Oregon, published in the mid-nineteenth century, provides an
illuminating account of the status of the salmon fishery at that time:
Doubtless there are rivers in the world which afford a greater variety of
fish, than this [the Columbia], but perhaps there are none that supply
greater quantities. Sturgeon are caught in abundance, but salmon is the
principal fish. Of these there are various kinds, but in this country they
are generally distinguished by the names spring-salmon and fall-salmon.
They literally fill the rivers of Oregon, in their season. And at all the falls
and cascades in the various rivers of the country, the quantities taken and
that might be taken, are beyond all calculation. As they penetrate far
into the interior, they afford almost inexhaustible supplies to the Indian
tribes of the country, as well as the whites, many of whom depend almost
entirely upon such supplies, for the first year, after settling in the
country.
63
This idyllic picture of nature's bounty was brought to a close in 1866 by an event,
based on the newly developed canning technology, that irrevocably changed the
salmon fishery from a subsistence industry into a worldwide commodity market.
That year, the operators of a cannery64 located on the already overfished Sacra-
mento River abandoned California in favor of the unspoiled and nearly unin-
habited lower Columbia. 65 During its first season the cannery put out some
4,000 cases of canned salmon. Each case consisted of fifty-eight one-pound cans
and sold for sixteen dollars. 66 The price was sufficiently attractive to draw com-
petitors: by 1883 forty canneries were operating on the Columbia River, packing
634,300 cases that year-fully two-thirds of the entire Pacific coast salmon
62 D. WALLACE, THE KLAMATH KNOT 59 (1982).
63 G. HINES, OREGON: ITS HISTORY, CONDITION AND PROSPECTS 331 (1851). For a colorful account
of the early years of the Columbia River salmon fishery see S. HOLBROOK, THE COLUMBIA 234-50 (2d ed.
1974).
64 The canning process was first introduced in France in 1809, and was brought to the United States a
decade later. By 1839 Delaware oysters were being preserved in cans. Salmon were canned in Scotland as
early as 1825. A. NETBOY,supra note 14, at 20; C. SMITH,supra note 41, at 16. Trade in salted and packed
salmon began in the Pacific Northwest in the 1820s, and by 1835 barrels of salted Columbia River salmon
were being shipped overseas. Id.
65 Of that first winter before the cannery was opened, R.D. Hume wrote: "We spent the winter making
cans and making nets having brought the material with us. It is a very lonely place there, the nearest
neighbor being three miles off. . . . It rained forty days and forty nights without interruption." C.
SMITH,supra note 47, at 9. Seegenerally G. DODDS, THE SALMON KING OF OREGON: R.D. HUME AND THE
PACIFIC FISHERIES (1959). The first cannery on the Columbia was located on Eagle Cliff, overlooking the
river in Wahkiakum County, Washington. It took the Hume brothers years to perfect the canning process
(they were troubled by exploding cans), but within twenty years they were operating twenty of the thirty-
five Columbia River canneries.
66C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 17.
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harvest. 67
Nearly all the salmon sold by means of the recently perfected canning technol-
ogy was the best quality chinook; it was available in such abundance that the
canners were not interested in lower quality fish. 68 The catch in 1883 on the
Columbia was forty-three million pounds, most of it taken by 1,650 gill netters in
sail-powered skiffs. 69 It was the peak year of the inland chinook fishery; never
since has the chinook catch been matched or exceeded.
In 1883 a Lochsa River chinook would migrate downstream under conditions
similar to those encountered by our hypothetical fish in 1805. But, upon reenter-
ing the Columbia in 1883 after a sojourn of several years of the Gulf of Alaska, an
adult fish would have encountered a bewildering array of Rube Goldberg con-
traptions and a potpourri of human types, all intent on catching that fish with
the quickest possible dispatch. During the fishing season, from April until Octo-
ber, port towns like Astoria were beehives of activity. 70 Entry into the fishing
fleet was easy; until 1888 the canneries, to encourage more fishing, provided both
the boat and the net in exchange for a percentage of the catch. For the rest, they
paid ready cash. 7' Indians and Scandinavians did most of the fishing, and dur-
ing peak periods of the runs everyone else joined them. 72 Even the town parson
would cancel Sunday services to go fishing with his flock.73
The fish hardly had a chance in the midst of this commercial free-for-all.
They were caught on harpoons and hooks, and in nets, traps and weirs-on occa-
sion they were even dynamited.7 4 The more enterprising fishers would build
large V-shaped traps of piles and netting, extending them far out into the estu-
ary. If the trap were placed suitably close to the river bar, its owner would get
the first chance at incoming fish and perhaps, if lucky, capture an entire run. In
Puget Sound around this time an entire run of sockeye salmon was obliterated
when tens of thousands of fish wedged themselves so tightly in a trap that they all
suffocated before the owner could release them.75
67 Id. at 20-21. For a description of cannery operations in the late nineteenth century see A. NETBOY,
supra note 14, at 25-30.
68 Large spring and summer chinook were the most desirable fish for canning. Fall chinook brought a
price only one-third as much. C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 45. In 1892 fall chinook constituted about 5% of
the total catch, increasing to 25% by 1912 and to 50% in 1919-1920. Id. at 75. Today the fall run is by far
the largest component of the chinook river catch and constitutes about half the entire commercial salmon
harvest. Id. See infra note 307.
6 C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 41. On gill netting, see infra note 78.
70 Founded in 1811 as a fur trading post, by the 1880s Astoria had become the world center of the
salmon industry, the "most wicked place of earth for its population" scolded a Portland newspaper. Ore-
gonian, Jan. 1, 1882, at 1. See generally E. MILLER, CLATSOP COUNTY, OREGON: ITS HISTORY, LEG-
ENDS AND INDUSTRIES (1958) for a detailed description of the salmon industry. See also J. HITTELL, THE
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES OF THE PACIFIC COAST OF NORTH AMERICA (1882) for chapters and figures
on the Columbia River fisheries. For a comprehensive historical summary of the salmon industry in the
age of the free-for-all, seeJ. COBB, PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES, BUREAU OF FISHERIES Doc. No. 1092 (3d
ed. 1930).
7' C. SMITH, OREGON FISH FIGHTS 7, Oregon State University Sea Grant Publication No. ORESU-T-
74-004 (1974).
72 A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 21. Everyone, that is, except the Chinese, who were forbidden to fish.
See :mfra note 79.
73 A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 25. At the time of the 1880 census almost one-fifth of the population of
Astoria and Clatsop Counties were fishers. C. SMITH, supra note 47, at 5.
74 For a survey of the fishing gear used on the Columbia, see A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 30-34. On
"fishing" with dynamite, see trfra note 90.
75 R. CHILDERHOSE & M. TRIM, supra note 2, at 24. Traps were introduced on the Columbia in 1879.
By 1890, 168 traps were used to harvest fish on the river and by 1927 more than 400 traps were in use. By
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An even more improbable device was the "fish wheel" that mechanically dip-
ped fish out of the river twenty-four hours a day. Tended by a single operator
and kept in constant motion by the current, one fish wheel, large and well-
placed, harvested more than 200 tons during the 1906 season. 76 Either on a sta-
tionary offshore platform or on a floating scow, these creaky mechanical harvest-
ers, resembling mobile Ferris wheels, ranged up and down the lower Columbia or
sat on stationary pilings in the river, an odd nineteenth century preview of to-
day's offshore oil platforms.
77
Gill netters were dominant on the lower Columbia, where they vied with
fishwheelers, fishtrappers, seiners, and Indian dipnetters in this laissez-faire
fishery.78  In 1883 an Astoria gill netter would bring as many fish as could be
caught to the cannery, where an assembly line of nimble-fingered Chinese work-
ers would strip, clean, and slice a forty-pound fish in less than a minute. 79 If the
nets caught species other than the prized chinook, the fish were hauled in anyway
and dumped overboard at dockside. If more chinook were brought in than could
be handled by the canneries, even they were summarily dumped back into the
river where the tide would eventually disperse their carcasses over the shoreline-
food for gulls, bears, and the typhoid bacillus. 80 If the weary fishers wanted to
escape the omnipresent stench of the cannery town on a Saturday night, they
initiative petition Oregon voters prohibited them in 1926, and Washington did the same in 1934. C.
SMITH, supra note 41, at 30.
7 6 C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 36. See generaly I. DONALDSON & F. CRAMER, FISHWHEELS OF THE
COLUMBIA (1971). Fish wheels were introduced on the Columbia in 1879.
77 C. SMITH, OREGON FISH FIGHTS, supra note 71, at 10. Oregon and Washington voters outlawed
them along with fish traps. See supra note 75. For a list of 21 ballot measures between 1908 and 1964 in
which Oregon electorate made major policy decisions on management of fisheries, see id. at 3.
78 The gill net was first used on the Columbia in 1853. C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 27. See also Bohn,
The Columbia River Gill-Net Fishery: A Hi tory, OREGON WILDLIFE, Or. State Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, Nov.
1983, at 8. Gill netting still dominates the lower river salmon fishery today. See infia note 305. A gill net is
a rectangular net weighted on the lower edge by leads, buoyed up on the upper edge by corks, and stretch-
ed across a section of a stream, where it is allowed to drift with the current. Used mostly at night or in
muddy water where the fish cannot see it, the net catches by the gills fish that attempt to pass through it.
Originally, gill nets were laid out in the river from small open rowboats, then by larger sailboats. Since the
1920s motorboats have dominated the gill net fishery.
During the first year of cannery operation only two gill net boats harvested most of the salmon put into
cans. During the period from 1889 to 1892 there were 1,240 gill nets, 240 traps, 40 seines, 45 fishwheels,
and 90 dipnets operating on the lower Columbia, each taking 54, 22, 9, 14, and 2% of the harvest respec-
tively. C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 39. Conflict among the various user groups was bitter and often violent.
Salmon seining was banned in Washington in 1934 and in Oregon in 1948 by initiative petitions.
Trolling for salmon, which now dominates the ocean fishery, became possible only in the early twenti-
eth century with the introduction of the gasoline engine. (A troller--sometimes erroneously spelled
"trawler" in confusion with a net fishing operation-is a boat that moves through the water slowly, drag-
ging behind it between four and eight wire lines suspended from poles attached to the sides of the boat. As
many as 12 hooks may be attached to each line at different depths.) With motorized vessels, fishers could
avoid season closures and could fish in the ocean where no regulation yet existed. C. SMITH, OREGON
FISH FIGHTS, supra note 71, at 10. See also J. Damron, The Emergence of Salmon Trolling on the Ameri-
can Northwest Coast: A Maritime Historical Geography (Sept. 1975) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis in the
University of Oregon library).
79 Chinese laborers were introduced in 1872 to work in canneries, and by the 1880 census one-third of
the population of Astoria and Clatsop counties were of Chinese ancestry. Three-quarters of these worked
in salmon canneries. None were permitted to fish. C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 5. See also, A. NETBOY,
supra note 14, at 28-29; and Cekay, A Chinese Memory, Northwest Magazine (Sunday Oregonian), Aug. 28,
1983, at NW 10, for accounts of conditions among the Chinese laborers in canneries. By the early twenti-
eth century the Chinese fish processors were gradually being replaced by a cleaning machine that could do
the work of 30 or 40 laborers. C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 24-25.
80 As many as 500 dead salmon might be dumped into the river in a single night. At first owners
ignored complaints about waste and stench, but during the mid-1880s the canneries set landing limits. C.
SMITH, supra note 41, at 30.
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would go to an Astoria dance hall where, if they lacked the price of admission,
they could simply toss the ticket-taker a freshly-caught chinook.8 '
The "Great American Barbecue" of the late nineteenth century-a phrase or-
dinarily applied to the widespread pillage of the public lands82-now played it-
self out on these once great salmon runs. It was a prosperous time for the fishers,
a ruinous time for the fishery. During the late 1880s the depredations began to
be reflected in the diminished size of the spring and summer chinook runs, and
fishing effort necessarily expanded to include other less desirable species and
runs.8 3 But even with fewer fish to can, the market became saturated.8 4 Declin-
ing prices during the next decade or two drove out all canneries but the hardiest
few, and the industry collapsed.8 5 It never recovered: although salmon canning
was once Oregon's third largest industry, by 1975 the quantity of salmon canned
had dropped to a level less than that of 1867, the year after the industry began.8 6
The market for fresh and frozen salmon had long since displaced the canners.
Such appalling waste was shocking to some sensibilities even in that age of
conspicuous bounty. In 1894 the Oregon Fish and Game Protector reported:
It does not require a study of the statistics to convince one that the salmon
industry has suffered a great decline during the past decade, and that it is
only a matter of a few years under present conditions when the chinook of
the Columbia will be as scarce as the beaver that once was so plentiful in
our streams. Common observance is amply able to apprehend a fact so
plain. For a third of a century Oregon has drawn wealth from her
streams, but now, by reason of her wastefulness and lack of intelligent
provision for the future, the source of that wealth is disappearing and is
threatened with annihilation. . . . Salmon that ten years ago the canners
would not touch now constitute 30 to 40 percent of the pack.8 7
Guardians of the public interest recognized the problem fairly early and tried
one of two approaches. The first led to some early and tentative attempts at state
regulation. The Washington Territory, for example, introduced gear restrictions
in 1871 and Oregon followed suit in 1878. In 1877 Washington began regulating
the duration of the fishing season, and Oregon followed suit the next year.8 8
8I S. HOLBROOK, THE COLUMBIA 238 (2d ed. 1974). A cannery foreman reminisced about those years:
"There wasn't no laws regulating what happened to the fish. The fishermen tried to catch all they could.
The canneries had agreed to take them. Every man tried to live up to his contract. Everyone aimed to
make all he could. Folks in Astoria got pretty sore, but that was about the smell more than about the
salmon being wasted." M. MCKEOWN, THE TRAIL LED NORTH: MONT HAWTHORNE'S STORY 13
(1960).
82 Se¢genera/y T. WATKINS & C. WATSON, THE LAND No ONE KNOWS: AMERICA AND THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN (1975).83 C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 21.8 4 1Id.
85 Between 1866 and 1887 the price paid to gill netters rose from 15 cents to $I per fish, but the price of
a case of canned salmon fell from $16 to $5. C. SMITH, supra note 47, at 14. On the economics of the
salmon canning industry during its heyday see C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 53-72.
86 C. SMITH, supra note 4 1, at 1.
87 A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 36.8 8 Id. at 34-35. See generaly H. WENDLER, REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL FISHING GEAR AND SEA-
SONS IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER FROM 1859 TO 1963, Wash. Dept. of Fisheries, 2 Fisheries Research Papers
No. 4 at 19-31 (1966). A special committee appointed by the Oregon legislature in 1887 to review fisheries
problems found that the claim that fish wheels, traps, and seines caught too many fish was due to
"prejudice and misinformation," and it recommended repeal of many gear restrictions. Oregon Legisla-
tive Report of Special Committee to Examine into and Investigate the Fishing Industry of This State
(1893), C. SMITH, OREGON FISH FIGHTS, supra note 71, at 6. During these years some Indian tribes
adopted fishing regulations that were more effective than any enacted by the states. The Quinault tribe of
1983]
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Catch limits were first imposed on the British Columbia Fraser River salmon
fishery in 1882,89 and in 1889 the federal government of Canada began to require
licenses of all non-Indian salmon fishers. 9°
The second approach was to attempt to augment the supply. In 1877, at the
request of and with partial financing by the canners, an agent of the United
States Fish Commission opened one of the first west coast salmon hatcheries on
the Clackamas River in Oregon. There was no apparent effect on the size of the
runs, and the hatchery was soon abandoned. 91
These early gestures at bringing law to the harvest and propagation of salmon
runs, however well-intentioned, had almost no lasting effect. The catch and gear
restrictions in the nineteenth century, universally disregarded and only sporadi-
cally enforced, were seen as a joke by fishers and enforcement officers alike. 92
Willful violators were prosecuted only when a particularly objectionable viola-
tion was accompanied by publicity sufficient to make it hard to ignore. Such a
situation drove thoughtful people to despair. In an address to the American
Fisheries Society in 1892, Livingston Stone of the United States Bureau of Fisher-
ies declared his pessimism:
Not only is every contrivance employed that human ingenuity can devise
to destroy the salmon of our west coast rivers, but surely more destructive,
more fatal than all is the slow but inexorable march of these destroying
agencies of human progress, before which the salmon must surely disap-
pear as did the buffalo of the plains and the Indian of California. The
helpless salmon's life is gripped between these two forces-the murderous
Washington, for example, adopted regulations in 1907 that the Washington State Fish Commissioner at
the time acknowledged as "the best fish protection of any river in the state of Washington." B. BROWN,
MOUNTAIN IN THE CLOUDS: A SEARCH FOR THE WILD SALMON 138 (1982).
89 Pacific Salmon Management for People, Dept. of Geography, University of Victoria, B.C. (D. Ellis
ed. 1977) at 71.
' R. CHILDERHOSE & M. TRIM, supra note 2, at 24. The first recorded violation of the 1889 General
Fishery Regulations for British Columbia was a citation for "fishing" with dynamite, and the citing officer
was told that it was a common fishing method in B.C. inlets. Most fish killed in an underwater explosion
will sink to the bottom. Id.
91 Stone, The Artiftical Propagaton of Salmon on the Pacift Coast ofthe United States, 16 BULLETIN OF THE
FISH COMM'N 203, 218 (1897). The first attempt to rear a salmonid fish artificially occurred in Germany
in 1763, and salmonid species were being cultured on the east coast of the U.S. by 1804. The first Pacific
salmon hatchery was built on the McCloud River in California in 1872. On the subsequent history of west
coast hatcheries, see in/ra note 342.
912 In the 1903 annual report of the Oregon Department of Fisheries the master warden lamented, "I
found that fishing was being carried on in all directions and no pretense whatever being made to respect
the law." Annual Report of the Department of Fisheries of Oregon to the Legislative Assembly (1903) at
7. In 1908 President Theodore Roosevelt lamented the ineffectiveness of state regulation of the salmon
fishery, pinpointed the problems inherent in multiple jurisdictions attempting to regulate a common-pool
resource, and called upon Congress to enact comprehensive federal legislation:
The salmon fisheries of the Columbia River are now but a fraction of what they were
twenty-five years ago, and what they would be now if the United States Government had
taken complete charge of them by intervening between Oregon and Washington. During
these twenty-five years the fishermen of each state have naturally tried to take all they could
get, and the two legislatures have never been able to agree on joint action of any kind
adequate in degree for the protection of the fishers . . . . There is no remedy except for the
United States to control and legislate for the interstate fisheries as part of the business of
interstate commerce. . . . In this as in similar problems the obvious and simple rule should
be followed of having those matters which no particular state can manage taken in hand by
the United States; problems which in the seesaw of conflicting state legislatures are abso-
lutely unsolvable are enough for Congress to control.
President Theodore Roosevelt, Special Message to Congress, Dec. 8, 1908, RICHARDSON, 10 MESSAGES ANt)
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 7610 (1913). No action was taken on Roosevelt's suggestion until nearly 70
years later. See in/ra text accompanying notes 177-201.
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greed of the fishermen and the white man's advancing civilization-and
what hope is there for the salmon in the end?
93
This speech was delivered only twenty-six years after large-scale commercial
salmon fishing began in the Pacific Northwest. By far the gravest challenge to
the fishery was yet to come.
C The Era of Dams and Hydropower (1933-1973)
The primary cause of the decline of Columbia River Basin salmon stocks dur-
ing the free-for-all era was overfishing. Despite intense fishing pressure, however,
the seasonal runs maintained vitality by virtue of the sheer numbers of fish. With
the progressive tightening of state landing laws, by the end of that period the
competing needs of society and the salmon were balanced in an uneasy truce.
The viability of the fish runs remained stable and the profligate waste that char-
acterized the age of the canneries was better controlled, although hardly elimi-
nated.94  Yet in 1938 the downward spiral in the annual catch resumed.95
Accelerated habitat degradation became the chief cause of the renewed decline,
and for reasons explained in this section 1938 was a benchmark year.
The particular causes of habitat degradation were many: drawdown of water
levels by the consumptive demands of irrigation agriculture; fish mortality in
carelessly unscreened diversion canals; increased river siltation caused by activi-
ties associated with logging and overgrazing of livestock; and pollution and
stream blockage as side effects of mining, dredging, port development, and urban
encroachment. 96 In some cases nature shared the blame. Large forest fires like
the 1902 Yacolt Burn in Washington or the 1933 Tillamook Burn in Oregon
denuded entire landscapes, destroying precious watershed.
97
The cumulative impact of these forms of habitat degradation has been consid-
erable. But none of the causes listed above has equaled the incalculable impact
of the dams built in the Columbia River watershed over the past forty years.98
Hydroelectric projects, by permanently blocking fish access to spawning habitat
and inflicting high mortality on downstream migrating juveniles, have been by
93 A. NETBOY, supra note 3, at 213.
94 The growing impact of trolling in the early years of this century created new forms of waste: trollers
often caught immature salmon, and fish that were hooked but unlanded or thrown back often died of
injuries. C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 85.
95 The average annual anadromous fish catch in the Columbia River for the period 1930-37 was more
than 25 million pounds. Between 1937 and 1938 the landings decreased from 24.7 million pounds to 18.8
million pounds. A. NETBOY, supra note 14, appendix table 1.
96 US Comptroller General, Impacts and Implications of the Pacifw Northwest Power Bill, REP. No. EMD-79-
105, at IV. 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 GAO Report]. On the causes of habitat degradation, see
generally, A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 55-71.
97 D. JOHANSEN & C. GATES, EMPIRE OF THE COLUMBIA, 544, 548 (2d ed. 1967). Later natural disas-
ters, such as the 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens, which obliterated some salmon runs in the Cowlitz
River watershed, also took their toll. A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 57. See also Newcomb & Flagg, Some
Efects of Mt. St. Helens Volcamc Ash onJuvende Salmon Smolts, MARINE FISHERIES REVIEW, Feb. 1983, at 8.
98 1979 GAO Report, supra note 96, at IV. 1. See also Ebel, Maojr Passage Problems, COLUMBIA RIVER
SALMON AND STEELHEAD 33, 34 (E. Schwiebert ed. 1977). In other west coast watersheds where the
chinook fishery is commercially important, other forms of habitat degradation are dominant. In the Sac-
ramento River Basin, the dominant impact is irrigation withdrawal; in the Klamath, a combination of
irrigation withdrawal and land and water use practices causes increased sedimentation; in the Fraser, it is
caused by former river blockages and urbanization in the lower river; in southeast Alaska it is from the
effects of logging. D. Poon & J. Garcia, A Comparative Analysis of Anadromous Salmonid Stocks and
Possible Cause[s] for Their Decline (Final Report Submitted to the Northwest Power Planning Council,
June 1982), Table 24 at 176.
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far the greatest single cause of the depletion of the anadromous fish resource.9 9
The comparatively recent dedication of the rivers in the Pacific Northwest to
power production reflects the evolution in federal policy toward the nation's riv-
ers. As far back as 1824 the Supreme Court decided in Gibbons v. Ogden 100 that
navigation for the purpose of commerce was to be given highest priority for river
use. Throughout the nineteenth century that view held sway, until it was institu-
tionalized in the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act,10 1 which perpetuated the Army
Corps of Engineers' historic responsibility for keeping navigable rivers
navigable. 10 2
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, another priority for
river use was emerging, as settlers populated the arid lands of the West. The
Jeffersonian ideal of a nation of farmers required the use of rivers for irrigation,
and the new demands of dry land agriculture had to be accommodated.10 3 This
change of emphasis was codified in the Reclamation Act of 1902.104 But within
only a few years after the passage of the Reclamation Act, the rivers of the Pacific
Northwest were being considered to accommodate yet another demand as the
enormous potential of using river flows for hydroelectric power generation began
to be recognized. One result was the Federal Power Act of 1920,105 which had
far-reaching effects on the geography and natural resources of the Pacific
Northwest.
The landscape of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho has been thoroughly re-
worked as a result of hydropower development. Hardly any major stream of the
260,000-square-mile Columbia River watershed has been left unaffected. The
unobstructed Columbia down which Lewis and Clark drifted in 1805 with only a
single portage at Celilo Falls is today a back-to-back series of slackwater reser-
voirs, from Bonneville Dam to the Canadian border. l°6 Only fifty miles of the
99 For an anthropologist's contrary human-centered view see C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 4. Smith
writes:
Dams are good scapegoats. These concrete monoliths serve as tributes to a technocratic age.
They cannot talk, and they weather the abuse heaped on them while continuing to slave for
those of us who benefit from their power. To blame "the dams," however, is to miss the
point. . . .A dam is not a problem because it is a dam. A dam is a problem because it
creates benefits for some and hardships for others. The dams are not "the problem." They
are merely symptomatic of a problem with interactions among people.
Id.
1oo 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
101 33 U.S.C. §§ 403-07 (1976).
0 2 See generally 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 213-15 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
103 Irrigation agriculture presently accounts for 90% of the consumptive use of Columbia River water.
Eight million acres are now under irrigation in the Columbia Basin. 2 PACIFIC NORTHWEST RIVER BASIN
COMMISSION, WATER TODAY AND TOMORROW: A PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGIONAL PROGRAM FOR
WATER AND RELATED RESOURCES 5-3 (June 1978).
104 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-76 (1976 and Supp. 1980).
105 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-825 (1976 and Supp. 1980). The Act created the Federal Power Commission to
license nonfederal hydropower development. Charged solely with the task of promoting dam construction,
the Act directed the FPC to consider power, navigation, and flood control along with other beneficial
public uses. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a). Unfortunately, "beneficial public uses" were to be determined solely by
the agency with a statutory mandate to license dams. Federal agencies with authority over fish and
wildlife habitat could comment on FPC actions, but otherwise had no substantial influence over FPC
decisions. 16 U.S.C. § 797(c). The Supreme Court, however, has construed sections of the Federal Power
Act to require consideration of impacts on anadromous fish. See lnja text accompanying note 138.
106 Although there are three dams on the Canadian portion of the Columbia River, Canada has so far
resisted the temptation to dam its chief salmon producer, the Fraser. R. CHILDERHOSE & M. TRIM, supra
note 2, at 54. See also infia text accompanying notes 223-24. In 1913 the lower Fraser River produced a
catch of 31 million salmon, and 6 million headed upstream to spawn. But that same year a human-
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portion of the river in the United States above Bonneville Dam remain free-
flowing. The 1,214-mile-long river that drains a land area larger than France
and whose annual discharge into the ocean is more than twice that of the Nile is
now a string of placid computer-regulated lakes.
10 7
In September 1932 presidential candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt visited Port-
land, promising that if elected he would see that the hydropower potential of the
Columbia River Basin-representing forty percent of the entire nation's hydroe-
lectric capacity-was fully developed. ' 08 As President, Roosevelt's sense of polit-
ical alchemy took a "gleam in a bureaucrat's eye" and began to forge it into a
reality that was complete by the early 1970s. 10 9 The Columbia Basin became
energy rich: per capita consumption of electric energy was twice the national
average at half the cost.' "o
With the inauguration of Roosevelt in 1933, the era of hydropower began in
the Pacific Northwest. That year the first dam on the Columbia-the nonfederal
Rock Island Dam' "-was completed, and the Bureau of Reclamation and the
Corps of Engineers began construction of the two federal dams-Bonneville and
Grand Coulee-that were to become synonymous in the Northwest with the
availability of inexpensive hydropower.
The builders were hardly unaware of the effects of dams on anadromous fish.
Early in the development of the river two contrasting solutions were proposed,
and Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams illustrate well how the proposals actu-
induced disaster blocked the river at Hell's Gate at river mile 129 when rock excavated by railway con-
struction slid into the riverbed. Fish could not pass the blockage, and for miles below it sockeye salmon
congregated in "incredible numbers." Although the obstruction was blasted open to provide passage for
the fish, further slides soon closed it again. In subsequent years commercial catches fell to as little as one-
seventh of the 1913 harvest. Some of the upriver sockeye stocks virtually disappeared and were gradually
rehabilitated only after the construction of fishways around both sides of the blockage between 1944 and
1946. The fishways that now exist at Hell's Gate are considered the largest and most complex in the
world. Id. at 76-77. See infra text accompanying notes 224-27 on the Fraser River salmon fishery.
107 E. Chaney, A Question of Balance: Water/Energy--Salmon and Steelhead Production in the Up-
per Columbia River Basin 1, Northwest Resource Information Center (1978). See also Boslough, The Elec-
tric Ritver, SCIENCE 81, July/Aug. 1981, at 71.
108 Candidate Roosevelt said:
We have, as all of you in this section of the country know, the vast possibilities of power
development on the Columbia River. And I state, in definite and certain terms, that the
next great hydroelectric development by the Federal government must be that on the Co-
lumbia River. This vast water power can be of incalculable value to this whole section of
the country. It means cheap manufacturing production, economy and comfort on the farm
and in the household . . . . There will exist forever a national yardstick to prevent extor-
tion against the public and to encourage the wider use of that servant of the American
people-electric power.
A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 72. For the views of the first Roosevelt, see supra note 92.
109 Development of the water resources of the Columbia Basin by the Army Corps of Engineers actually
traces to the passage of the River and Harbor Act of 1925, ch. 467, § 3, 43 Stat. 1116, 1190. By 1931, the
Corps had completed the first in a series of reports (subsequently referred to as the "308 Reports") that
recommended construction of an interconnected series of 10 dams on the Columbia. H.R. Doe. No. 103,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932). All 10 recommended sites are now developed. For a detailed legislative
history of the development of the Columbia and Snake Rivers see Blumm, H-ydropower vs. Salmon.- The
Struggle of the Pacift Northwest's Anadromous Fih Resources for a Peaceful Coexistence with the Federal Columbia River
Power System, I I ENVTL. L. 211,223-49 (1981). Much of this section of the present Article relies heavily on
Blumm's analysis.
1 10 E. Chaney, Cogeneration of Electrical Energy & Anadromous Salmon & Steelhead in the Upper
Columbia River Basin: An Economic Perspective on the Question of Balance 2, Northwest Resource
Information Center, (June 1982).
1 1 The Federal Power Commission issued the Rock Island Dam license in 1930 to the Washington
Electric Company, later transferring it to Puget Sound Power & Light Company and the Chelan County
Public Utility District. Blumm, supra note 109, at 229 n.77.
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ally worked. The first solution was to construct "fish ladders" whereby upstream
migrating fish could ascend the height of the dam stepwise to reach their spawn-
ing area. The second and more drastic solution applied to dams whose height
irreversibly blocked access to, or inundated, spawning habitat: the displaced
runs would be relocated or replaced by hatchery production.
The first idea was tried at the first completed component of the Federal Co-
lumbia River Power System:'" 2 Bonneville Dam at river mile 145.113 Finished in
1938, at the time the dam was a state-of-the-art engineering marvel, its fish lad-
ders supplemented with an intricate backup system of locks, traps, elevators, and
bypass canals.'1 4 Incredibly, the plan originally prepared by the Corps of Engi-
neers had no provision for a fish bypass system, and the chief engineer is said to
have replied to a protest, "We do not intend to play nursemaid to fish!" ' "15 Had
the original design prevailed, the entire watershed of the mainstem Columbia
above the dam would have been permanently closed off to anadromous fish.
1 16
The design was amended to include provision for fish passage before construc-
tion began. The ladders, however, were experimental: nobody knew whether
they would work, despite their great cost. Many predicted that the fish ladders
would turn out to be a boondoggle that would doom the upriver salmon runs
after all. Hence, in June of 1938, as the gates were closed, biologists and engi-
neers alike anxiously awaited the return of the spring chinook run. When the fish
returned, to the surprise of many they easily negotiated their way up the ladders
i12 Construction began under the interim authority of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch.
90, §§ 201(a)-(d), 48 Stat. 195 (1933). The Bonneville Power Administration was created by the Bonne-
ville Project Act of 1937, ch. 720, 50 Stat. 731, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 832, to build, operate, and maintain
a regional power system, and the Act gave the BPA authority to market power at low rates. Seegenera/ll V.
SPRINGER, POWER AND THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST: A HISTORY OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINIS-
TRATION, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION (1976); G. NORWOOD, COLUMBIA RIVER POWER FOR
THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF THE POLICIES OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, BONNEVILLE
POWER ADMINISTRATION (1980).
I 13 See tfra note 267.
114 The fish bypass systems cost $7 million in 1938 dollars. Anthony Netboy describes them thus:
Each ladder consists of curling, stepped-up pools, 40 feet wide and 16 feet long, with a
vertical drop of one foot between each pool. Powerful jets of water flowing down the ladders
are regulated to induce the fish to swim rather than jump from pool to pool. Fronting the
downstream face of the powerhouse is an elaborate collecting channel, with openings over
the turbine discharges. Once a fish swims or jumps until it reaches the counting board, it is
ticked off by a woman inside the glass-enclosed chamber, thus providing invaluable data on
the volume of traffic and number of fish belonging to each species-salmon, steelhead, stur-
geon, shad, and others.
The dam also has four fish locks of which only three-on the Washington shore-can be
operated. They are a combination of old-fashioned elevators with a tilted floor and
shiplocks. Huge chambers, they can be raised from the river to the reservoir as fast as they
are filled with water and fish. The lift is emptied at the top of the impoundment and the
fish sped on their way upstream. Each lift may accommodate 30,000 fish a day. However,
salmon were not readily attracted into them and they have been mostly used to lift sturgeon.
At present there are no fish locks in operation at Bonneville or any other high dam on the
Pacific coast.
A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 76.
5 The remark, though widely circulated at the time, cannot be substantiated. The Corps denies that
the statement was ever made. A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 161 n.2.
116 In fairness it should be noted that subsequent Corps of Engineers reports recommended that "ade-
quate provision should be made at all dams for passage of fish." Blumm, supra note 109, at 231 n.85. A
recent environmental impact statement prepared by the Corps states that agency's position: "It is the
Corps' policy to cooperate to the fullest extent possible with [fish and wildlife agencies] to assure the
greatest retention or enhancement of fish and wildlife resources permitted within our combined authori-
ties." U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Final Environmental Impact Statement on Construction, Operation,
and Management, Columbia River, Umatilla to the Dalles (1978) at 9-2.
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and into the reservoir behind the dam, as excited cries of "God bless you!" rang
out from the fishway's designers."17
The fish ladders of Bonneville Dam are now an important tourist attraction of
the Pacific Northwest. As a result of that success, hydropower proponents rea-
soned, if the fish could so easily be detoured around one high dam, why not six,
seven, eight or more? Unfortunately, events only a few years later would
dampen the euphoria.
The effect of Grand Coulee Dam-the other symbol of so-called cheap hydro-
power of the Northwest-was disastrous to fish passage." 8 Hailed at the time as
the greatest engineering feat ever undertaken, the dam was a colossus 343 feet
high, with a reservoir that backed up 150 miles, beyond the United States border
into British Columbia." 19 It had an impoundment capacity of more than sixty
times that of Bonneville.120 The dam was too high for fish ladders to be economi-
cally feasible or biologically effective. 12 1 When the gates were closed in 1941,
tens of thousands of chinook that swam nearly 600 miles up from the ocean were
forever shut out from more than 1,100 upstream river miles.' 2 2 Some of the
upriver stocks of chinook, which included the largest and most highly prized
specimens on the Columbia, were extinguished. The closing of the gates of
Grand Coulee Dam was probably the single most destructive act against the be-
leaguered Pacific salmon.123
117 A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 77. That year 470,000 salmon and steelhead scaled the ladders. In
subsequent years more fish seem to have learned the trick: the average yearly upstream passage for the
period 1938-1977 was 625,000 salmonids. Tagging studies conducted by the Oregon Fish Commission in
1948 indicated that fish were held up at the dam an average of only two or three days. Id. at 78. The
Bonneville fish ladders, at 65 feet, are the world's highest. Id. at 85. (Other experimental fish ladders
were, unfortunately, unqualified failures. Facilities built in 1958 on the nonfederal Brownlee Dam on the
Snake River failed to work and terminated all fish passage into the upper Snake River system. E. Chaney,
supra note 107, at 4.) See generally C. Clay, Design of Fishways and Other Fish Facilities, Dept. of Fisheries
of Canada (1961).
1 1 Power generation was originally a subordinate purpose of the dam. Section 2 of the River and
Harbor Act of 1935, authorized construction of Grand Coulee Dam "for the purpose of controlling floods,
improving navigation, regulating the flow of the streams of the United States, providing for storage and for
the delivery of the stored water thereof, for the reclamation of public lands, and Indian reservations, and
other beneficial uses, and for the generation of electric energy as a means of financially aiding and assisting
such undertakings." 49 Stat. 1039-40.
119 A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 59.
120 Blumm, supra note 109, at 227.
121 Under Washington state law of the early twentieth century, construction of fish ladders to mitigate
the effects of dams was mandatory. An 1890 law required fishways to be built on dams "wherever food fish
are wont to ascend." WASH. REV. CODE § 5199 (1910). The law gave the commissioner of fisheries power
to levy fines for violations and to seek court orders for the removal or modification of illegal dams, but it
often went unenforced even against private interests. B. BROWN, MOUNTAIN IN THE CLOUDS: A SEARCH
FOR THE WILD SALMON 64 (1982). In any event, this provision was no longer in the 1922 Washington
Code and provisions such as these have been held to be preempted by federal law. See, e.g., Federal Power
Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955). See also City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 60 Wash. 2d
66, 371 P.2d 938 (1962), and the authorities cited therein. But cf. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645
(1978).
122 E. Chaney, supra note 107, at 4.
123 The loss, however, was not total. At the urging of fishing interests, agents of the Bureau of Reclama-
tion undertook a relocation operation from 1939 to 1947. Upstream migrating fish were trapped in the
fishways of Rock Island Dam 150 miles downstream from Grand Coulee. Some were moved to holding
tanks to spawn, others were transplanted to nearby rivers in the hope that the fish would spawn naturally.
At Leavenworth hatchery-at that time the world's largest-many thousands of eggs were incubated and
hatched. Salmon fry were released into nearby tributaries that had remained unblocked, and from there
the juvenile fish made their way down the Columbia and into the Pacific. For years afterward fishery
biologists waited hopefully to see if the returning adults would move into the unblocked tributaries where
they had been released, or would make a futile attempt to reach their now blockaded ancestral streams.
(Nobody at the time knew whether salmon found their home streams by genetic memory or by sensory
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In 1941 the mainstem of the Columbia had three dams. Today it has eleven.
Its principal tributary, the Snake River, has ten. In the entire Columbia River
watershed there are now seventy-nine hydroelectric projects with a capacity of
fifteen megawatts or more. Thirty of these are federal dams, which collectively
comprise the Federal Columbia River Power System. 124 The Columbia and the
Snake have become the most highly developed river system in the world, supply-
ing more than eighty percent of the region's electrical energy. 125 The price of
"cheap" electricity, however, has been a nearly incalculable loss to the
anadromous fish resource. 126 Less than half of the spawning habitat available in
the time of Lewis and Clark is now accessible to migratory fish, and much that
remains has been transformed into an environment hostile to fish propagation. 1
2 7
The result has been a reduction of the peak inland commercial harvests of the
1880s by over ninety percent-a "decimation" in the most literal sense of the
term.'28 In losing its former importance in the economy of the Pacific North-
cues. See, supra note 30.) In 1944 the first of the transplanted fish returned, and in an orderly fashion they
moved up the fish ladders of Rock Island Dam and into the streams where they had been released. As
onlooking fishery biologists cheered the homecoming fish, it appeared that an entire upriver stock had
been transplanted. The event provided the first evidence that the migrations of fish stocks could be suc-
cessfully reprogrammed. A 1958 report of the Fish and Wildlife Service called the relocation program
"successful to a degree exceeding expectations." E. FISH & M. HANAVAN, A REPORT UPON THE GRAND
COULEE FISH-MAINTENANCE PROJECT, 1939-1947, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE SPEC. Sci. REP. No.
55 (Nov. 1958) at 5. The success of the transplant notwithstanding, several commercially important
upriver chinook stocks were extinguished, and after 1946 no adult salmon or steelhead was seen in the
Grand Coulee area. The closing of the gates of Grand Coulee Dam was an unprecedented loss of tens of
thousands of square miles of prime fish habitat at a single stroke.
12 4 See generally Hittle, Lason, Randall, & Michie, Pacifw Northwest Power Generation, MultiPurpose Use ofthe
Columbia Rter and Regional Energy Legislation An Overview, 10 ENVTL. L. 235 (1980). Integrated operation
of the FCRPS is made possible by a contractual agreement among the Corps of Engineers, the Bonneville
Power Administration, and fourteen public and private utilities. Pacific Northwest Coordination Agree-
ment, Agreement for Coordination of Operations Among Power Systems of the Pacific Northwest, Con-
tract No. 14-02-4822 (1964). The agreement expires in the year 2003.
125 U.S. Dep't of Energy, Bonneville Power Administration, 1979 Annual Report, Federal Columbia
River Power System 30 (1980). See generally Durocher, The Federal Columbia River Power System.- A Report on
the Experiment, THE ENGINEERING FOUNDATION, HYDROPOWER: A NATIONAL ENERGY RESOURCE 247
(1979).
126 In the words of resource consultant Ed Chancy: "It would be virtually impossible to accurately
estimate the total number of salmon and steelhead lost to northwest fisheries directly as a result of hydroe-
lectric development and operations in the upper Columbia River Basin; only Carl Sagan and his peers
could comprehend such a number in any event." Cogeneration, supra note 110, at 9. Economist Phillip
Meyer, however, has not been deterred from attempting an estimate of the economic cost of salmon and
steelhead losses caused by operation of the Columbia River Power System predominantly for hydropower:
a staggering $372 million annually, cumulative costs of $6.5 billion since 1960. Meyer projects future
losses of $370 million annually if river management practices remain unchanged. P. Meyer, Fish, Energy
and the Columbia River: An Economic Perspective on Fisheries Values Lost and At Risk 14, Northwest
Resource Information Center (March 1982).
127 Blumm, supra note 109, at 217. Columbia River Basin spawning habitat has been reduced from
163,000 square miles in the time of Lewis and Clark to 73,000 square miles today. NORTHWEST POWER
PLANNING COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM iii (Nov. 19U2).
128 Blumm, supra note 109, at 214-15. Fishery consultant Ed Chaney has concisely summarized the
problem thus:
The present imbalance in the production of fish and energy in the upper Columbia River
Basin is the product of many complexly interrelated factors. With full deference to the risk
of oversimplification, these factors can be reduced to one lowest common denominator: the
regional energy system was designed and operated to maximize energy production, not to
cogenerate fish and electrical energy in some optimal balance that would maximize net
social benefits to the region. Consequently, despite significant mitigating measures by en-
ergy interests, the largest, most valuable salmon and steelhead runs were reduced to eco-
nomic extinction and some important components to the threshold of biological extinction.
Cogeneration, supra note 110, at 11.
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west, the salmon fishery could no longer compete with other uses of the Colum-
bia River.
As recently as 1956 an adult chinook bound for its place of birth in the head-
waters of the Lochsa River had only two dams to cross: Bonneville and McNary,
the latter completed in 1953 at river mile 292, just below the confluence of the
Columbia and the Snake Rivers. Since both dams have fish ladders, the most
difficult upstream obstacle to fish migration in 1956 remained at Celilo Falls, the
site of the Indian fishery so vividly described by Lewis and Clark. 129 Until 1956
Indians fished there by traditional methods. 130 But that year was to be the last of
the Celilo Falls Indian fishery, and a vital part of the heritage of the Pacific
Northwest was about to disappear under seventy-five feet of water. The Corps of
Engineers had paid more than $27 million for the fishing rights at Celilo Falls,' 3 '
and the gates of the newly constructed The Dalles Dam were about to be closed.
On a Sunday afternoon in April 1956, representatives of the fishing tribes gath-
ered for the last time to hold their "first salmon" ceremony 132 on the bluffs over-
looking the falls where years before Lewis and Clark had smoked a pipe of peace
with the Indians' ancestors. Within the year Celilo Falls was gone, and locally
the rites were abandoned. 133
During the hydropower era legal protection of the anadromous fish resource
advanced beyond the free-for-all years when largely unenforced state fish and
wildlife laws were the only attempt at conservation. But even as state landing
laws were progressively tightened, federal and state actions were accelerating
degradation and constriction of the fish's habitat. Enhancement strategies fo-
cused on ways to increase the numbers of fish, largely ignoring the fish's habitat
needs. 134 If valuable habitat were lost to dams, then the fish could simply be
moved elsewhere. Few accepted or understood Aldo Leopold's fundamental in-
sight that to manage wildlife you need only manage their habitat effectively and
the animals will take care of themselves. 135 Thus, during the forty-year period
from 1933 through 1973, expanding state regulation of the fishery was overtaken
by affirmative neglect of the fish's habitat.
129 See supra, text accompanying notes 48-56.
130 In the years before the inundation of Celilo Falls, Indians harvested an average of 2.5 million pounds'
of salmon and steelhead per year on the Columbia River, selling 75% of the catch to commercial proces-
sors. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, SUMMARY REPORT ON THE INDIAN FISHERY AT CELILO FALLS
AND VICINITY, COLUMBIA RIVER, 1947-1954 at 13 (1955). For a description of the Indian dipnet fishery
during the years 1947-1951 see R. Schoning, T. Merrell Jr., & D. Johnson, The Indian Dipnet Fishery at
Celilo Falls on the Columbia River, Fish Comm'n of Ore. Contribution No. 17 (1951).
131 See Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. dened, 369 U.S. 818 (1962).
132 See supra note 40.
133 A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 17-18. The Indian commercial salmon catch on the Columbia was
nearly 2 million pounds in 1955. In 1956 it dropped to 910,000 pounds and in 1957, after Celilo Falls was
gone, the catch plummeted to a mere 58,000 pounds. Fish Comm'n of Oregon & Washington Dept. of
Fisheries, Status Report, Columbia River Fish Runs and Commercial Fisheries, 1938-70 (1971) at 62. In
1956 Stewart Holbrook wrote:
[Indian fishing rights were] written in sand. A dam is rising not far below Celilo at The
Dalles, and it will soon bury the falls so deep in a lake that not a ripple of their fury will
trouble the surface. The redskins have been defeated once more, this time not by the United
States Cavalry, but by the genial dam builders of the United States Army, Corps of Engi-
neers. Custer is revenged again. And if the Indians at Celilo should persist in their age-old
liking for salmon as food, then they may buy it in cans, by the case if need be.
S. HOLBROOK, THE COLUMBIA 250 (2d ed. 1974). Events of the 1970s, see infa text accompanying notes
155-76, were to render Holbrook's assessment unduly pessimistic.
13 4 See infra, text accompanying note 347.135 See generally A. LEOPOLD, GAME MANAGEMENT (1933).
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Federal regulatory authority to protect salmon was exercised sparingly during
the hydropower era. 136 The United States Supreme Court, however, found teeth
in the Anadromous Fish Conservation Act of 1965,137 which was enacted primar-
ily as enabling legislation for cost-sharing agreements among federal agencies,
states, and other nonfederal bodies to provide for conservation, development, and
enhancement of anadromous fish populations. After its passage as an apparently
routine funding authorization, few thought the Act had substantive content until
1967 when the Supreme Court surprised nearly everyone involved in salmon
management. It found within the Act a mandate sufficiently clear to vacate and
remand a Federal Power Commission permit to build another high dam on the
Snake River, in part for failure to consider the dam's effect on anadromous fish
runs. 138
In general, the rights of Indians to participate in the salmon fishery suffered as
a result of expanding state regulation. Although Indians prevailed in the few
cases that went to federal courts,'3 9 throughout the hydropower era Indian fish-
ing rights were steadily eroded.140
In addition to expansion of regulation by individual jurisdictions, efforts were
begun to mesh the workings of the laws of the various governments involved in
salmon management. Attempts at regulatory coordination date back well before
the beginning of the hydropower era, and while detailed analysis lies beyond the
scope of this paper, a few of these ventures may be mentioned here. The oldest
coordination pact relating to management of anadromous fish is the Columbia
River Compact, still viable and in force although it dates from 1918.141 Flexible
enough to withstand the passage of sixty-five years, this interstate agreement
played a prominent role in fishery management on the Columbia River during
the 1960s and 1970s. 142 Subsequent legislation created other regional fishery
management organizations. For coastal fisheries an interstate body called the
Pacific Marine Fisheries Commission, consisting of representatives of California,
Oregon, and Washington, was created in 1947 to promote the optimum utiliza-
136 Federal Acts related to anadromous fish conservation during this era include the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act of 1934, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c, which authorized measures to mitigate fishery losses
caused by federal water projects; and the Mitchell Act of 1938, 16 U.S.C. § 755, which provided funding to
restore and enhance anadromous fisheries of the Columbia Basin. See infra note 206. The Mitchell Act
currently supports the Columbia River Fishery Development Program, a joint federal and state effort that
involves the construction and operation of hatcheries and fish ladders and the restoration of habitat. 1979
GAO Report, supra note 96, at IV. II.
137 16 U.S.C. §§ 757a-757f (Supp. V 1976).
138 Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967). Justice Douglas wrote for the majority:
The importance of salmon and steelhead in our outdoor life as well as in commerce is so
great that there certainly comes a time when their destruction might necessitate a halt in so-
called "improvement" or "development" of waterways. The destruction of anadromous fish
in our western waters is so notorious that we cannot believe that Congress through thepres-
ent act authorized their ultimate demise.
Id. at 437-38. In 1975, Congress included the proposed dam site in the Hells Canyon National Recreation
Area, eliminating the likelihood of future development. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4 6 0gg to 460gg-1 3 (Supp. V 1976).
139 See, e.g., Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
140 "The impact of illegal regulation by state authorities and of illegal exclusionary tactics by non-
Indians in large measure accounts for the decline of the Indian fisheries during this century. ... Wash-
ington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 669 n. 14 (1979) (citations omitted). See generally AMERICAN
FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY (1970).
14l Act of April 8, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-123, 40 Stat. 515 (1918). See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 75.40.010; OR. REV. STAT. § 507.010.
14 2 See infra text accompanying note 301.
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tion of marine species. 143 Similarly, the Water Resource Planning Act of 1965144
created interstate river basin commissions with responsibility for developing pri-
orities of use for water resources.
On the international level, the 1964 Columbia River Treaty between the
United States and Canada, 145 which established an operating committee to over-
see joint development of water resources, achieved a modicum of regulatory coor-
dination. International treaties regarding the interception of ocean salmon were
concluded between the United States and Canada in 1931, and also between
Japan, Canada, and the United States in 1953.146
In retrospect, it is easy to see that the salmon management laws of the hydro-
power era, however well-intentioned, were piecemeal responses, inadequate to
meet the challenge of the dams. It remained for the next era to begin the task of
devising regulatory regimes appropriate for the magnitude of the job to be done.
III. THE LIFE JOURNEY OF A PACIFIC SALMON TODAY: THE ERA OF
ATTEMPTED RESTORATION (1973-PRESENT)
In its journey of more than 600 miles downriver from the headwaters of the
Lochsa River today's newly hatched chinook fingerling encounters eight dams-
six more than existed in 1956 when we last traced our hypothetical fish
downriver. 147  From a salmon's point of view the world has been drastically
changed-more so in the past fifty years than in the previous thousands of years
that humans have fished the rivers of the Pacific Northwest. To the degree it
may be imagined that a fish has the ability to reflect on its environment or pos-
sesses a genetic memory, today's fingerling would scarcely recognize the river that
was known to its ancestors of six or seven fish generations ago.
Today's obstacles to salmon migration are not only more numerous, they are
also more lethal by virtue of their cumulative effect. As will be seen below, fish
mortality is compounded at each of a series of dams. In addition, fishing pressure
on the returning chinook salmon from the various user groups is more relentless
than at any time in the past.1 48 As a result of the combined effects of overfishing
and habitat degradation, wild chinook stocks are depressed from the Columbia
River to the mouth of the Yukon and some fear that several stocks of upriver
wild chinook are rapidly becoming extinct. Many fishery biologists warn that
some runs may have already passed the point of "nonviability."' 149
143 Pacific Marine Fisheries Compact, Pub. L. No. 80-232, 61 Stat. 419 (1947), as amended by Act of
Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-766, 76 Stat. 763 (1962).
144 42 U.S.C. § 1962. The river basin commissions established by the Act have no implementing au-
thority and can only submit recommendations to federal, state, regional, and local resource agencies.
145 Columbia River Basin: Cooperative Development of Water Resources, United States-Canada, Sep-
tember 16, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5638. Twenty years of negotiations preceded the agreement.
For increased flood control benefits and generating capacity, the U.S. paid Canada more than $64 million
and agreed to return to Canada one-half of the additional power generated. Canada subsequently sold its
power benefits back to U.S. utilities. On the treaty neogotiations and provisions see 2 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS 452-69 (R. Clark ed. 1967). See also J. KRUTILLA, THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY: THE
ECONOMICS OF AN INTERNATIONAL RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT (1967).
146 See nfra text accompanying notes 224-26, 272-75.
147 For a list of dams and the location and height of each, see infra notes 249 and 267.
148 On efforts to limit entry into the salmon fishery, see infra text accompanying notes 442-59.
149 The Salmon Plan Development Team of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council reported
that "escapement" of wild chinook stocks in 1982 fell 30 percent below the optimum level in Southeast
Alaska, between 100 and 233 percent below optimum in British Columbia (depending on the stock in-
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If life is today more precarious for the chinook salmon of the Pacific North-
west, it is also more difficult for those charged with the responsibility of manag-
ing these fish and their habitat. Conflict among user groups has escalated as each
sector of the industry grows in its determination not to have a lesser share of a
dwindling resource.' 50 Annual reductions in allowable catch, the economically
unsupportable number of salmon fishing vessels in the waters of the Pacific
Northwest, and the competition between United States and Canadian fishers,
between Indians and non-Indians, between sport and commercial fishers, be-
tween trollers and gill netters have all combined to undermine the economic via-
bility of the chinook salmon fishery, to give chronic headaches to fishery
managers, and to create a resource allocation situation that may charitably be
described as "tense." In the words of the Director of the Oregon Department of
Fish and Wildlife, salmon management in the Pacific Northwest has become
such that "the measure of a good decision . . . is one which makes everyone
equally mad."' 15 1
Fishery managers have worries other than trying to satisfy competing user
group demands. The management regimes that now exist were virtually un-
dreamed of in 1956. If in that year management of the anadromous fish resource
was less precise, less coordinated, and less scientific than it is today, it was also
less complicated. In comparison with their counterparts of seventeen years ago,
the scientific, legal, and jurisdictional problems that beset today's fishery man-
volved), as much as 173 percent below optimum along the coast of Washington state, and between 38 and
222 percent below optimum in the Columbia River. Along the entire coastal range of the chinook fishery,
escapement was adequate only along the Oregon coast. Sabella, The Wild Kig Salmon. Peril and Promise,
PACIFIC FISHING, Mar. 1983, at 38. Ironically, the 1982 coastwide commercial catch of chinook was 2.5
million fish-a ten-year high-and was far greater than fishery biologists had predicted, despite drastically
abbreviated seasons. The unexpected bonanza, coupled with the shortest fishing seasons in history in
several states, intensified fishers' suspicions that current management practices are unscientific and unnec-
essarily restrictive. In comparison, it has been estimated that in 1883, the Columbia River alone produced
a commercial catch of 2 million chinook, a total landing of nearly 43 million pounds. S. Doc. No. 87, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1937). See supra text accompanying note 69.
The 1983 season appears to be the worst in 25 years. Because ocean conditions have been abnormal
during 1982-83, the catch of chinook and coho along the entire west coast up to southeast Alaska has been
unusually poor, falling far short of quotas. See generally Herring, El Nno Afects Salmon Survival, SALMON
NEWS (Or. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, June 1983) at 1; "Economic Effects of El Nino Likely to be Felt at
Coast for Years," Sunday Oregonian, Aug. 28, 1983 § B (Metro/Northwest) at BI. As of early September
1983, the Oregon commercial trollers have caught 72,000 chinook compared with 213,000 for the same
period in 1982. Fishermen's News, Oct. 1983 (1st issue), at 8. The 1983 chinook catch in Alaska in con-
trast appears to be the second largest in history. See generally Sabella, Salmon Review '83, PACIFIC FISHING,
Nov. 1983, at 77.
15o The prolonged history of conflict and violence among the various salmon fishing interests of the
Pacific Northwest is reminiscent of the range wars of the American West during the late nineteenth cen-
tury. See generally C. SMITH, OREGON FISH FIGHTS, supra note 71 and B. BROWN, MOUNTAIN IN THE
CLOUDS: A SEARCH FOR THE WILD SALMON (1982). In recent years the most intense conflict has oc-
curred between Indian and non-Indian salmon fishers. See infra text accompanying notes 155-76.
1 151 J. Donaldson, Oregon's Salmon Future, SCIENCE, POLITICS, & FISHING 39, Oregon State University Sea
Grant Publ. No. ORESU-W-81-001 (N. Krant ed. 1981). In the words of another observer: "The fisheries
managers, user groups and political factions from the various management jurisdictions along the coast
have been busy hurling accusations at each other as an excuse for not undertaking conservation measures
themselves, and grabbing fish while the stocks continue to decline." Sabella, supra note 149, at 34. When
allocation conflicts arise, social and economic issues inevitably become confused with conservation needs.
Indeed, "conservation" itself becomes a political wedge for one user group to take a greater share of a
resource from the competition. For a detailed discussion of the role of the salmon industry in the Pacific
Northwest, see generally Oregon State University Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics,
SOCIOECONOMICS OF THE IDAHO, WASHINGTON, OREGON AND CALIFORNIA COHO AND CHINOOK
SALMON INDUSTRY (2 %ol. 1978). See also Columbia River Salmon and Steelhead: Proceedings of a Sym-
posium, Amer. Fisheries Soc. Spec. Pub. No. 10 (E. Schweibert ed. 1977).
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ager are nothing short of labyrinthine. This swollen complexity, while ostensibly
necessary to conserve the resource and to allocate it fairly, can hardly serve to
ease the lot of anyone who seeks to understand the state of the anadromous
fishery in the Pacific Northwest or to untangle the web of responsible agencies.
Management authority, while more strictly enforced and perhaps better coordi-
nated than before, is also more cumbersome than ever, fragmented among multi-
ple jurisdictions at the state, federal, tribal, and international levels.
This multiplication of management authority is, for the most part, the result
of legal developments of the past decade. 1 52 The historic responsibility of state
fish and wildlife departments to manage the anadromous fish resource has been
supplemented by the creation of new coordinating bodies and also by the addi-
tion of new obligations of habitat management and allocation. New agencies
and commissions have been created to coordinate and in some cases to supervise
these augmented responsibilities. New user groups have come to the forefront,
and new priorities of right have been established by federal courts.
The history of commercial fishing for Columbia River salmon, as we have just
reviewed it, can be summarized succinctly. First, for millennia the Indian tribes
caught the fish with their dipnets, harpoons, and weirs, drying their catch and
using it for trade and subsistence. Then, during the nineteenth century, came
the operators of canneries, who put their fish traps and fish wheels in front of the
Indians' weirs and dipnets. Third, the gill netters took their place downstream
from the canners' traps. Fourth, downriver from the gill netters, where the river
was wide enough for maneuvering, the purse seiners moved in, netting even more
fish with greater efficiency. Finally, in this century the ocean trollers-both
United States and foreign-nudged their way to the head of the line, where the
fish were freshest and brightest and therefore commanded the best price. But,
since 1933, dams on the Columbia River and its tributaries have captured the
highest priority of all, claiming virtually unchallenged use of the river water to
the detriment of all pursuers of anadromous fish.
As this section will show, legal events of the 1970s and 1980s have dramatically
reordered these priorities. Hydropower generation no longer enjoys highest
claim to the water of the Columbia River. Indian tribes, asserting their federal
treaties, have once again become major forces in the fishery. Legislation has re-
duced the share of foreign ocean trolling vessels. All user groups must respect
direction from new and powerful management entities. These events have com-
bined to make the Pacific salmon fishery probably the most sophisticated and
complex fishery management system in the world.153
The last federal dam in the Columbia Basin was completed in 1973.154 It is an
appropriate year to mark the end of the hydropower era and the beginning of the
era of attempted restoration of the anadromous fish resource, for in the decade
since 1973 several legal events have revolutionized salmon and steelhead man-
15 2 See i'fira text accompanying notes 155-244.
153 For an explanation of this assertion, see infra note 306. Management of the Pacific salmon fishery is
arguably the most complex in law, social, and economic issues, but not necessarily in biological issues.
Fishery management problems are no doubt more ecologically complex in tropical latitudes, where the
variety of species is greater. In the temperate waters of higher latitudes fisheries tend to be dominated by a
few overwhelmingly important species with large populations. See generally G. ROUNSEFELL, EcoLoGY,
UTILIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT OF MARINE FISHERIES (1975).
15 4 See infra note 249.
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agement. We will discuss those mileposts and then trace a Lochsa River salmon
along its modern migratory trail in order to illustrate the effects of the major
legal events of the past decade on the management of Pacific salmon.
A. The Dominant Legal Events
1. The "Boldt" Decision of 1974 and Other Indian Fishing Rights Decisions
In the 1850s, as non-Indian settlers began to populate the Pacific Northwest in
substantial numbers, the government of the United States negotiated and con-
cluded treaties with the major Indian tribes of the region. Isaac Stevens, Gover-
nor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Washington Territory,
represented the United States in most of these negotiations with the tribes of the
lower Columbia River and the environs of Puget Sound. 155 Since the Indian
tribes of the Northwest were so greatly dependent on salmon for subsistence, the
issue of reserved fishing rights was essential to their well-being. 156 In recognition
of this need, the Stevens treaties expressly provided for the continuation of tribal
fishing rights, both on the new reservations that the documents established and
also at off-reservation sites where Indians had traditionally fished for salmon and
steelhead. At off-reservation sites the treaties guaranteed all participating tribes,
in similar language, the "right of taking fish .. .at all . . .usual and accus-
tomed stations, in common with citizens of the United States."' 157
Since the turn of the century, as pressure on the anadromous fish resource
continued to build, there have been protracted rounds of litigation over the na-
ture and extent of these treaty-guaranteed off-reservation fishing rights. States
prosecuted actions against individual members of treaty Tribes for alleged viola-
tions of state law. 158 The flooding of Celilo Falls' 59 resulted in litigation which
determined that Indian fishing rights on that reach of the Columbia had not
been terminated, even though the fishing tribes had been compensated for their
loss of the Celilo Falls fishery. 160 The Court of Claims found that the United
States had obtained only flowage easements in constructing The Dalles Dam,
leaving the tribes with a right to fish above the former site of the falls, in the pool
created by the dam.16 1
During the 1960s and early 1970s the states accelerated their enforcement ac-
155 The treaties with the Columbia River tribes are recorded as follows: Treaty with the Umatilla
Tribe, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945; Treaty with the Yakima Tribe, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951; Treaty with
the Nez Perce Tribe, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957; Treaty with the Tribes of Middle Oregon [now the
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation], June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963. The treaties with
tribes in the Puget Sound region, negotiated in 1854 and 1855, are cited in Washington v. Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 662 n.2 (1979). See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 10 1-02
(1982 ed.) [hereinafter cited as COHEN].
156 For estimates of the quantity of fish taken by Indians during aboriginal times, see supra note 51. The
Supreme Court has stated that, to Indians of the Pacific Northwest, the right to take salmon was "not
much less necessary to [their] existence than the atmosphere they breathed." United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
157 St, e.g., Art. I, Treaty with the Tribes of Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963. The language
of the other Northwest treaties contains no material difference. See supra note 155.
158 Reported cases include Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.
371 (1905); State v. McCoy, 63 Wash. 2d 421, 387 P.2d 942 (1963); State v. Satiacum, 50 Wash. 2d 513,
314 P.2d 400 (1957); State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953); State v. Meninock, 115 Wash.
528, 197 P. 641 (1921); State v. Towessnute, 89 Wash. 478, 154 P. 805 (1916).
159 See supra text accompanying notes 129-33.
160 Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 818 (1962).
161 Agreements between the United States and the four tribes with fishing rights at Celilo Falls
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tivities against Indian treaty fishers at off-reservation sites. 16 2 A series of
landmark federal court cases followed, with far-reaching effects on both natural
resource law and Indian law. In the first of these historic opinions, Sohappy v.
Smith ,I63 District Judge Robert Belloni held that the Columbia River tribes were
entitled to a "fair share" of the anadromous fish resource. The tribes and the
states, however, were unable to agree on a quantification of Judge Belloni's "fair
share" formula, and further litigation was needed to clarify the extent of Indians'
right to participate in the salmon fishery. In 1974 Judge George Boldt rendered
the famous and controversial "Boldt" decision, which drastically reordered pri-
orities of rights among salmon fishers of the Pacific Northwest. 164 The opinion
held that tribes in the Puget Sound Region were entitled to the opportunity to
harvest up to fifty percent of the harvestable fish (total run less spawning escape-
ment requirements) at their traditional off-reservation fishing stations. 16 5
On its face, the formula set out in the Boldt decision may seem elegant and
simple. Yet details of its implementation have given nightmares to many salmon
managers, because the opinion mandates an allocation of the salmon catch be-
tween Indian and non-Indian fishers with a precision and complexity that strain
to the limits the technical capabilities of scientific fishery management.
166
The Boldt ruling was substantially upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals 167 and, in a later collateral attack, by the United States Supreme Court. 168
Indian fishing disputes on the Columbia River have been settled short of the
Supreme Court, at least to date. In 1977, after the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
extension of the fifty percent allocation to the four Columbia River tribes,
169
those tribes and the states of Washington and Oregon concluded a five-year
agreement. 170 The settlement expired in 1982, however, and as of this writing
has not been renegotiated.171
The Indian fishing rights litigation has been the subject of voluminous com-
mentary,' 72 and detailed discussion lies beyond the scope of this article. It is
sufficient to mention four aspects of these judicial decisions that have had signifi-
cant effects on management of the anadromous fish resource in the Pacific North-
west. First, Indian tribes are self-governing entities not normally subject to state
fishing laws. 173 Thus, for the purposes of this article Indian tribes must be
"subordinated" the tribes' rights to the right of the United States to flood the Falls, but the tribes did not
thereby relinquish their rights to fish on the reservoir above the Falls. Id. at 672-73.
162 See generally, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY (1970); U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INDIAN TRIBES: A CONTINUING QUEST FOR SURVIVAL 65-75 (1981); Com-
ment, Sohappy v. Smith: Eight Years of Litigation Over Indian Fihing Rights, 56 OR. L. REV. 680, 687-99
(1977).
163 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).
164 United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), affd, 500 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
165 384 F. Supp. at 343.
166 See in/ra notes 439-4 1.
167 United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
168 Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
169 Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1976).
17° See A Plan for Managing Fisheries on Stocks Originating from the Columbia River and its Tributa-
ries above Bonneville Dam, January 20, 1977, discussed in Comment, Sohappy v. Smith- Eight Years of
Litigation over Indian Ftshing Righls, 56 OR. L. REV. 680, 699-701 (1977).
171 See infia note 299.
172 See, e.g., articles cited in COHEN, supra note 155, at 441 n.1.
173 States, however, possess limited authority to regulate for conservation purposes. See generall COHEN,
supra note 155, at 458-62.
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counted among the state, federal, and international jurisdictions with regulatory
authority over salmon. 17 4 Second, the Indian fishing rights litigation has un-
equivocally validated the reservation of special resource rights to a specific user
group. Third, Indian treaty fishing rights are vested property rights; therefore,
Indian fishing rights have special protection because, unlike the privileges of
other fishers, they require just compensation if they are abrogated. 175 Last, Indi-
an fishing rights may take precedence not only over the rights of other user
groups, but also over economic considerations of resource development. Eco-
nomic development of water resources under state law, for example, may be per-
missible only when undertaken in an environmentally sound manner that does
not substantially diminish the number of salmon available for Indian harvest.
That issue is currently being litigated, but no federal court has yet rendered a
final judgment. 176
Whatever courts may ultimately decide to be the actual extent of tribal fishing
rights, judicial recognition of the priority of the oldest rights on the Columbia
River during the past decade has left an indelible mark on salmon management
in the Pacific Northwest.
2. The F'shegy Conservation and Management Act of 1976
The second event that revolutionized anadromous fish management in the Pa-
cific Northwest was the 1976 passage of the Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act (FCMA), 177 now commonly known as the Magnuson Act after former
174 Tribal regulatory authority has been manifested in at least three separate ways. First, in the Puget
Sound litigation, the court set a series of qualifications that, if met, would allow tribes to regulate fishing
by their members free of state interference. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 340-42 (W.D.
Wash. 1974). If a tribe does not achieve self-regulating status, tribal seasons are initially set by the state
and the tribe must go to court for relief if it objects. Id. To date, only two tribes in the Puget Sound case
area, the Quinault and the Yakima, have been granted self-regulating status. Most of the Yakima
fisheries, however, are in the Columbia Basin, not the Puget Sound Basin, so that Yakima self-regulation
under United States v. Washington is of limited practical significance. On the Columbia River, seasons have
been set by the states under the five-year plan. See supra note 170. During the renegotiation of the plan,
the states have objected to tribal management authority. See, e.g., Letter to Columbia River Treaty Tribal
Chairman from William R. Wilkerson, Director, Washington Department of Fisheries, July 13, 1983.
Thus, although the issue has not been finally litigated, the pattern on the Columbia has been for the states
to set the seasons, with the tribes having recourse in federal court. See Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899,
905, 911-12 (D. Or. 1969). The second area of tribal management authority is found in the internal
enforcement of tribal laws in connection with off-reservation fishing by tribal members. See Settler v.
Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974). Virtually all tribes in the Puget Sound region, and the Yakima and
Warm Springs tribes on the Columbia, exercise Settler-type regulatory authority. Finally, tribes exercise
fisheries management authority in implementing the important water budget program recently established
by the Northwest Power Planning Council. See infta text accompanying notes 397-98.
175 See, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968); Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co.,
337 U.S. 86, 105 (1949); Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 648, 659 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
818 (1962).
176 See, e.g., "Phase II" of the Puget Sound litigation, United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187
(W.D. Wash. 1980), af'din part, revised in part, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1983),vacated and set for en hanc hearing
(Tribes claim that their 50% entitlement also gives them a right to a healthy fishery environment; other-
wise habitat degradation may render their treaty rights meaningless.). See generally Comment, Indian Rights
Return to Spawn.- Toward Environment Protection of Treaty Fisheries, 61 OR. L. REV. 93 (1982); Getches, Anadro-
mous Fsh Runs and Indian Treaty Rights: The Boldt II Saga, Coastal Law Memo No. 4, Ocean and Coastal
Law Center, University of Oregon School of Law (Oct. 1983).
'77 Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976 & Supp. 1981)). In 1980
Congress officially designated it the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. On
the background of the FCMA, see generally Magnuson, The Fsheqy Conservation and Management Act of 1976:
First Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427, 428-32 (1977). For an
insider's view of the politics that led to the Act's passage, see J. Walsh, Developing and Implementing the
Fishery Conservation & Management Act, in Science, Politics, & Fishing 129, Oregon State University Sea
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Washington Senator Warren Magnuson, the Act's chief sponsor. Immediately
before the passage of the FCMA, almost seventy percent of the fish caught in
what is now the "fishery conservation zone" of the United States was harvested
by foreign vessels. 1 78 Regulation beyond the three-nautical-mile limit of territo-
rial waters had been either nonexistent or governed by international agreement.
Domestic trollers fishing beyond the three-mile limit then claimed by the United
States fished without limit each day of the week, spring through fall. By the
1970s the absence of unified management of marine fisheries off the shores of the
United States and the increasing presence of foreign trawling vessels both com-
bined to create a chaotic situation: some fisheries were being depleted at an
alarmingly rapid rate, and immediate action was needed.' 79
After two years of debate Congress responded to the crisis by passing the
Grant Pub. No. ORESU-W-81-001, (N. Krant ed. 1981). For a comprehensive guidebook to the provi-
sions of the Act, see Federal Fisheries Management: A Guidebook to the Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act, Ocean and Coastal Law Center, University of Oregon School of Law (J. Jacobson & K.
Davis eds. 1983). A 1978 amendment, Pub. L. No. 95-354, 92 Stat. 519-20, gives priority to U.S. processors
for fish caught in the fishery conservation zone. The Act was extensively streamlined in 1980 by Pub. L.
No. 96-561, 94 Stat. 3275, and in 1982 by Pub. L. No. 97-453, 96 Stat. 2481. The 1980 amendments
enshrine the so-called "fish and chips policy" of using foreign fishing allocations as leverage to advance the
development of the U.S. fishing industry, with the goal of eventually phasing out the former. See infra note
187. On the 1982 amendments see Ray, Administration ofthe Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, Ocean
Law Memo No. 23, Ocean and Coastal Law Center, University of Oregon School of Law (May 1983).
'
78 Anderson, Marine Fisheries, in CURRENT ISSUES IN NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY 149 (P. Portney ed.
1982). (This article is valuable as a critique of the FCMA and its implementation by the regional councils
from the perspective of economic efficiency.) In 1977 U.S. landings in the fishery conservation zone ex-
ceeded the foreign catch for the first time. Id. at 152. In 1975, 2,700 foreign fishing vessels operated in
what later became the fishery conservation zone of the U.S. In 1978 permits were issued to 692 foreign
fishing vessels. In 1975 total foreign catch in the same area was 2.7 million metric tons; by 1978 it had
declined to 1.7 million. During the same period the U.S. share of the harvest rose from 30% to 61%. NAT'L
OCEANOGRAPHIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, RESOURCE STATISTICS DIVISION, FISHERIES OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1978 (Apr. 1979) at iv. For a detailed analysis of the state of the U.S. fishing
industry prior to enactment of the FCMA see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE U.S. FISHING
INDUSTRY-PRESENT CONDITION AND FUTURE OF MARINE FISHERIES (1976). Soviet trawling vessels
first appeared off the west coast in 1965, and by 1974 they had been joined by Japanese, North Korean,
East German, and Polish vessels.
t79 Before the passage of the FCMA, state landing laws were the chief means of regulating the ocean
salmon fishery, when regulation existed at all. In the words of former Senator Magnuson:
The United States approach to marine fishery management in the past may be considered
haphazard at best. Our federal fishery management legislation resembled a crazy patch-
work quilt of pieced-together remains. Generally its basis was not in resource information,
landing statistics, and data, but in weak divided authority and inadequate enforcement
among complex jurisdictions. The authorizing legislation itself was merely a collection of
single purpose statutes and international agreements ...
Magnuson, supra note 177, at 432.
The usual management response to declining fish populations was to impose restrictions on the inside
fisheries-in estuaries and rivers where populations and the effects of fishing on them could be more easily
quantified. At the same time that restrictions on inside fishing were made more stringent, ocean salmon
fishing was allowed to expand, perhaps partly because ocean trollers were seeking a greater degree of
political clout as the economies of coastal communities became increasingly dependent on ocean salmon
fishing, both commercial and recreational.
This expansion of the ocean salmon fishery in the 1960s and early 1970s may have been the result not
so much of political pressure, but rather of the good faith belief of many fishery managers that the ocean
could support increased fishing pressure while inland waters could not. Indeed, reliable information about
the ocean distribution of salmon and about the effects of ocean fishing on the upstream runs has not been
available until comparatively recently. See infra note 275.
Only in the 1970s, when it became irrefutable that increasingly severe restrictions on inside salmon
fishing were failing to halt the depletion of the fishery despite the release of enormous quantities of artifi-
cially propagated stock from hatcheries, was there a widespread realization that comprehensive ocean
management was needed. Today, of course, the observation that effective fishery management requires
protection of both the fish and its habitat over its entire range and life cycle is commonplace.
1983]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
FCMA, and on March 1, 1977 its provisions went into effect. ' 80 The Act unilater-
ally asserted the nation's right to manage, with certain exceptions, living marine
resources within 200 nautical miles of its shores.' 8 ' According to the Act's chief
sponsor, the legislation created for the first time a comprehensive scheme for the
management of marine fisheries of the United States and played "a key role in
establishing a new customary rule of international law in a relatively short period
of time and without major confrontation between nations.' ' z2
Under the provisions of the FCMA, the United States unilaterally claims "ex-
clusive management authority" over all fish, except "highly migratory species" of
tuna,' 8 3 within a 197-mile-wide "fishery conservation zone" contiguous to the
three-mile territorial sea under the control of the states. 18 4 The Act also claims
for the United States exclusive jurisdiction over "sedentary species"-such as
crabs, lobsters, and other shellfish-on the continental shelf, even when the shelf
extends beyond 200 miles from shore.' 8 5 Foreign fishing within the fishery con-
servation zone is prohibited in the absence of an existing agreement or a "Gov-
180 Passage of the Act, widely regarded at the time of its enactment as a protectionist measure that
would create serious foreign policy problems for the U.S., represented a dramatic reversal in U.S. policy on
management of extraterritorial marine fisheries. Arguing that management of fisheries on the high seas
properly lay within the realm of international law, the U.S. had previously opposed similar legislation in
Latin America that extended national jurisdiction over fish stocks beyond 12 miles. (Implementation of
the FCMA was delayed until the year after passage to accommodate those who believed that the summer
1976 session of the Law of the Sea Convention in New York might produce a treaty. See infra text accom-
panying notes 2 79-83.) Over strong opposition from the Departments of State and Defense, as well as the
Law of the Sea Office of the National Security Council, President Ford reluctantly signed the bill into law
on April 13, 1976. Magnuson, supra note 177, at 427. Before passage, the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee reported unfavorably on the bill, believing that it was inconsistent with existing U.S. legal obliga-
tions (the U.S. was a party to 22 international fishery agreements at the time), and that passage of the bill
would undermine Law of the Sea treaty negotiations in which the U.S. was at that time participating (see
nmfta text accompanying notes 279-83). S. Rep. No. 459, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975). See also Jacobs,
United States Participation in International Fisheries Agreements, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 471 (1975).
181 16 U.S.C. § 1811. In 1966 the U.S. first asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction in the ocean for the
purpose of fisheries protection with the passage of the Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act, Pub. L. No. 89-658,
80 Stat. 908. A response to the sudden appearance of Soviet trawlers and factory ships off the west coast
the year before, that Act-now superseded by the FCMA-extended exclusive U.S. fishery management
authority to 12 miles from shore. Alarmed by the sudden increase in foreign trawling off U.S. shores,
individual states passed laws claiming state jurisdiction for various distances beyond the territorial sea. See,
e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 130, § 17 (Supp. 1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 § 2-A (Supp. 1973); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-19 (Supp. 1973); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 506.750-.755 (1974). Both houses of the
Oregon legislature overrode Governor McCall's veto and claimed jurisdiction for Oregon out to 50 miles.
See Comment, Constitutionah'ty of State Fishing Zones in the High Seas. The Oregon Fisheries Conservation Zone, 55
OR. L. REV. 141 (1976).
182 Magnuson, supra note 177, at 427.
183 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802(14), 1821.
184 16 U.S.C. § 1811 provides:
There is established a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States to be known
as the fishery conservation zone. The inner boundary of the fishery conservation zone is a
line coterminous with the seaward boundary of each of the coastal States, and the outer
boundary of such zone is a line drawn in such a manner that each point on it is 200 nautical
miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.
For an analysis of what remains of state control over marine fisheries see Greenburg & Shapiro, Federalism
in the Fishery Conservation Zone.- A New Role for the States in an Era of Federal Regulator Reform, 55 S. CAL. L.
REV. 641 (1982); see also Schoenbaum & McDonald, State Management of Marine Fsheries After the Fishey
Conservation andManagement Act of/976, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 17 (1977). For an argument that the Act
achieves a balance of state and federal authority, see Tassi, Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976:
An Accommodation of State, Federal, and International Interests, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 703 (1978). Section
306(b) of the FCMA leaves state authority over "internal waters" intact, 16 U.S.C. § 1856(b), although the
Act nowhere defines that phrase.
185 16 U.S.C. § 1802(3) provides:
The term "Continental Shelf" means the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent
to the coast, but outside the area of the territorial sea, of the United States, to a depth of 200
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erning International Fishery Agreement" (GIFA) concluded between the United
States and the foreign government in question, according to standards specified
in the Act.18 6 As the law was originally written, a GIFA for foreign harvest was
ordinarily made available to a foreign nation that had traditionally harvested a
species in the waters of the newly created fishery conservation zone, and where
United States vessels were not expected to harvest all of that species' "optimum
yield." 18 7
An important and controversial provision of the FCMA asserts a United
States claim to management authority over anadromous fish 88 of United States
origin throughout their entire migratory range-even beyond the boundaries of
the fishery conservation zone-except when the fish are in waters under recog-
nized foreign jurisdiction. 18 9 The geographic reach of this claim is extensive and
unprecedented in international fisheries law: as we have seen, the migratory pat-
terns of some species of Pacific salmon carry them over vast areas of the North
Pacific, sometimes as much as a thousand miles from United States shores. 19°
The claim was asserted to prevent foreign fishing vessels from thwarting United
States management authority by intercepting the salmon just outside the 200-
mile boundary. 19 1 By the standards of international law at the time of passage,
the claim was bold and of dubious validity. 192
meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of such areas.
186 16 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1825. Existing fishing agreements concerning stocks subject to U.S. authority are
to be phased out if they are "in any manner inconsistent with the purposes, policy or provisions of the
Act." 16 U.S.C. § 1822. The foreign nation and its vessels must officially recognize U.S. authority to
manage fish in the fishery conservation zone and must abide by and cooperate with regulation and en-
forcement activities. Reciprocity of fishing privileges must also exist between U.S. and foreign vessels in
the waters of the foreign nation. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(0.
187 "Optimum yield" is defined at 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18). The 1980 amendments, known As the Ameri-
can Fisheries Promotion Act, Pub. L. No. 96-561, 94 Stat. 3275, require that allocations to foreign nations
be tied to reduction of trade barriers to United States produced seafood. Provisions are also made to
accelerate the phaseout of foreign fishing where there are specified increases in domestic fishing capacity.
The Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Commerce and partly in consideration of
foreign policy, determines the allocation among foreign nations of that part of the total allowable catch
that is not harvested by U.S. vessels. 16 U.S.C. § 1953. No salmon are currently allotted to foreign vessels
in the fishery conservation zone. But see in/fa note 271.
188 16 U.S.C. § 1802(1) defines anadromous fish as "species of fish which spawn in fresh or estuarine
waters of the United States and which migrate to ocean waters."
189 16 U.S.C. § 1812 provides:
The United States shall exercise exclusive fishery management authority, in the manner
provided for in this chapter, over the following:
(2 ) All anadromous species throughout the migratory range of each such species beyond the
fishery conservation zone; except that such management authority shall not extend to such
species during the time they are found within any foreign nation's territorial sea or fishery
conservation zone (or the equivalent), to the extent that such sea or zone is recognized by the
United States.
190See supra text accompanying note 35. For a map of the distribution and migratory patterns of
salmon in the North Pacific, see J. GULLAND, THE FISH RESOURCES OF THE OCEAN, Fig. 2.4 (1971).
9 The claim is directed primarily at Japanese fishing vessels which, despite a treaty that prohibits them
from fishing for salmon of North American origin in the Pacific Ocean east of the 1750 West Longitude
meridian, see in/ya text accompanying notes 272-77, nevertheless harvest substantial numbers of U.S.
salmon beyond the Fishery Conservation Zone of the U.S. See generally Nat'l Marine Fisheries Service,
Final Environmental Impact Statement/Preliminary Fishery Management Plan, High Seas Salmon Fish-
eries of Japan (1977). Japan at first refused to recognize the U.S. claim to a fishery conservation zone,
asserting it to be invalid until sanctioned by international law. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1976, § 1, at 14, col.
1.
19 2 See Comment, The Fsheqv Conservation and Management Act of 1976. Structure and Function of a Contiguous
Economic Zone, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 331, 351 (1977). Despite the claim's questionable basis in international
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The FCMA thus forged for the first time a unified national fishery manage-
ment program. The Act made the federal government an overseer of domestic
marine fisheries. It created eight regional fishery management councils to preside
over the operation of the program, each presumably more responsive to local
fishing interests than a nationwide agency. To each was given the task of prepar-
ing, monitoring, and revising management plans for each of the major harvest-
able marine species in the geographical area under its jurisdiction. 193 The two
regional councils involved in the management of Pacific salmon are the North
Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC), comprising the states of Alaska,
Washington, and Oregon, and headquartered in Anchorage1 94 and the Pacific
Fishery Management Council (PFMC), consisting of the states of California, Or-
egon, Washington, and Idaho, headquartered in Portland.1 9 5
The Act requires that fishery management plans prepared by the councils de-
scribe fully the fishery to be regulated, be consistent with seven national stan-
dards as specified in the Act, 196 and be periodically reviewed and revised to
law, to date it has not been forcefully challenged by any nation, nor has any nation sought review in the
International Court of Justice. Indeed, its passage precipitated a flood of similar claims from other na-
tions. Walsh, supra note 177, at 134. On the general implications of the FCMA on international law, see
Jacobson & Cameron, Potential Confls Between a Future Law of the Sea Treaty and the Fishey Conservation and
Management Act of /976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 451 (1977).
193 16 U.S.C. § 1852. Councils sometimes share joint responsibility for managing species that are com-
mercially important in two or more areas, and individual states are sometimes members of two councils.
The National Marine Fisheries Service, see infra note 303, coordinates the work of the councils, and deter-
mines whether species management plans are consistent with national standards, other provisions of the
Act, and other applicable law. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(g)-(h) enumerate the duties of the councils thus: (1) to
develop and amend fishery management plans; (2) to submit periodic reports to the Secretary of Com-
merce; (3) to review and revise assessments of optimum yield for a fishery and to review fishing allowances
for foreign licensees; (4) to encourage public participation, through hearings and opportunity for com-
ment, in the development of fishery management plans and in the administration of the Act; (5) to gener-
ate scientific and statistical data by establishing committees and advisory panels for that purpose; and
(6) to undertake other activities necessary to implement the Act. It is not required that all fisheries be
managed-only those that are overfished or are in danger of becoming so. The main work of the councils
is accomplished by a full-time professional staff consisting of an executive director and personnel with
training in law, biology, planning, and economics. As of early 1983 no council had yet completed plans for
all species under its jurisdiction requiring management plans. Anderson, supra note 168, at 169. At this
writing 23 fishery management plans are in effect in the U.S. fishery conservation zone, and an additional
65 are expected to be completed within the next few years.
194 The NPFMC has II voting members, including representatives of the fish and wildlife departments
of its constituent states, the regional director of the National Marine Fisheries Service of the Department of
Commerce, and interested and knowledgeable members of the public nominated by the governors of each
member state and approved by the Secretary of Commerce. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(7). (Public appoint-
ments to the commissions have so far been dominated by fishing industry representatives, with a notable
absence of consumer advocates, environmentalists, professional biologists, planners, and economists. See
generally Pontecorvo, Fihery Management and the General We/are: Implications ofthe New Structure, 52 WASH. L.
REv. 641 (1977).) Nonvoting members of the commissions include representatives of the Coast Guard and
the Department of State, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Pacific Marine Fisheries Commission. See
supra text accompanying note 135. Since no fishery management council has authority to negotiate, im-
plement, or enforce international fishing treaties or agreements, the State Department representative pro-
vides liaison with foreign governments.
195 Although Idaho is not a coastal state, the city of Lewiston is a seaport by virtue of its link with the
Columbia River, and important stocks of anadromous fish find their home streams in Idaho (as does the
representative fish that is the focus of this article). For Idaho's unsuccessful attempts at representation on
other fishery management bodies in the Northwest see intfra note 301. Council representation is generally
awarded according to the degree of a state's fishery dependence, and since the number of states in each
region is not equal, council membership varies in number. The PFMC has 13 voting and 5 nonvoting
members. A proposal to create a separate management council for the State of California is now under
study. The Fisherman's News, Sept. 1983 (2d issue), at 12.
196 Plans must be consistent with the following material standards:
(1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving...
the optimum yield from each fishery.
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conform to the latest projections of optimum yield and the allowable level of
foreign fishing. 19 7 Management decisions must be made only after the councils
have conducted public hearings.'19 Councils submit completed plans and imple-
menting regulations to the Secretary of Commerce, who must review them for
consistency with national standards, other provisions of the Act, and other appli-
cable law, and must publish them in the Federal Register. 199 When the ap-
proved plan takes effect, its catch limits, gear restrictions, and licensing
conditions are enforced by the Coast Guard in conjunction with agents of the
National Marine Fisheries Service.200
Because the alarming state of the salmon fishery off the coasts of California,
Oregon, and Washington in 1976 demanded immediate attention, shortly after
its formation the PFMC gave top priority to formulating a salmon plan. The
Council's 1978 plan governing the commercial and recreational salmon fisheries
within the area of its jurisdiction was one of the earliest fishery management
plans completed, and it has been amended annually since its initial adoption and
approval by the Secretary of Commerce. 20 1
3. The Pacift Northwest Power and Conservation Act of 1980
The third important legal event of the modern era of anadromous fish man-
agement in the Pacific Northwest was the 1980 passage of the Pacific Northwest
Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (Northwest Power Act). 20 2 The
Act was originally conceived as a comprehensive energy charter for the Pacific
Northwest.2 0 3 Congress forcefully added a second, though not subsidiary pur-
pose: to protect and restore fish and wildlife resources-particularly anadromous
(2) Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific informa-
tion available.
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit
throughout its range ....
(4) Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate between residents of dif-
ferent states ....
(5) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, promote efficiency in
the utilization of fishery resources ....
(6) Conservation and management measures shall take into account . . . the variations
among . . . fisheries, fishery resources, and catches.
(7) Conservation and management measures shall . . . minimize costs and avoid unneces-
sary duplication.
16 U.S.C. § 1851.
197 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a). For an analysis of the impact of the FCMA on traditional fishery management
practices see Alverson, The Role of Conservatzon and Fishery Science Under the Fshey Conservation and Management
Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 723 (1977).
198 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(3). Public hearings are to be conducted "so as to allow all interested persons an
opportunity to be heard in the development of fishery management plans and amendments to such plans,
and with respect to the administration and implementation of the provisions of this Act." Id. On public
participation see infta text accompanying notes 424-35.
199 16 U.S.C. § 1855. Interested parties have 45 days after publication to submit comments.
200 16 U.S.C. § 1861. See generally Fidell, Enforcement ofthe Fishey Conservatton and Management Act of 1976:
The Policeman's Lot, 52 WASH. L. REV. 513 (1977).
201 PFMC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 35, at 14. On the current plan see injfa note 297. See generally U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNrING OFFICE, THE PACIFIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL'S ROLE IN SALMON
FISHERIES, REP. No. CED-79-4 (Nov. 1978).
202 Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (Supp. V 1981)).
203 In future energy development of the region, the Act requires that highest priority be given to conser-
vation measures, second priority to renewable resources such as solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, biomass or
similar sources of energy, third to processes that use waste heat, and fourth to "all other resources" such as
coal or nuclear power plants. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(e)(l). See generally Jackson, The Paic Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act-Solution for a Regional Dilemma, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 7 (1980).
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fish runs-that had been adversely affected by the construction and operation of
the Federal Columbia River Power System.2 0 4 On December 5, 1980 President
Carter signed the bill, creating a regionally limited but significant addition to
federal wildlife law.2 0 5 Both the provisions of the Act and its legislative history
strongly reflect congressional exasperation with the apparent failure of past legis-
lation to protect the anadromous fish of the Columbia Basin.2° 6 As enacted, the
204 Among the six basic purposes of the Act is the obligation
to protect, mitigate and enhance the fish and wildlife, including related spawning grounds
and habitat, of the Columbia River and its tributaries, particularly anadromous fish which
are of significant importance to the social and economic well-being of the Pacific Northwest
and the Nation and which are dependent on suitable environmental conditions substantially
obtainable from the management and operation of the Federal Columbia River Power Sys-
tem and other power generating facilities on the Columbia River and its tributaries.
16 U.S.C. § 839(6). See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE
PACIFIC NORTHWEST POWER BILL, REP. No. EMD-79-105 (1979); Symposium on the Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act, 13 ENvTL. L. Nos. 3 & 4 (1983).
205 On wildlife law before the 1980s, see generally M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE
LAW (1977).
206 On legislative history of the Act, see Blumm & Johnson, Promistng a Process for Parity The Pacifc
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act and Anadromous Fish Protection, 11 ENVTL. L. 497 (1981).
Before the passage of the Northwest Power Act the principal means of protecting the Columbia River
Basin's anadromous fish resource was the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, as amended in 1946
and 1958. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666i (1976). See generally Blumm, Fulfilling the Parity Promise." A Perspective on
Scientific Proof, Economic Cost, and Indian Treaty Rights in the Approval of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program, 13 ENVTL. L. 103, 108-12 (1982); see also The Fih and Wildlife Coordination Act and Columbia Basin
Water Project Operations, ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO No. 6 (Natural Resources Law Institute, Mar.
1980). Despite repeated attempts of Congress to strength the Coordination Act, it has been widely viewed
as moribund and ripe for supplementation or replacement. A 1974 General Accounting Office study of
the effect of the Coordination Act on federal water projects concluded that "for the twenty-eight develop-
ments reviewed, the Act's requirement to consider conservation equally with other development features
had not been effectively carried out." U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, IMPROVED FEDERAL EFFORTS
NEEDED TO EQUALLY CONSIDER WILDLIFE CONSERVATION WITH OTHER FEATURES OF WATER RE-
SOURCE DEVELOPMENTS 53, REP. No. B- 118370 (1974). See also Parenteau, UnfUl6led Mitigation Require-
ments ofthe Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 42 N. AM. WILDLIFE CONF. PROC. 179 (1977). In hearings on
the Northwest Power Bill the House Commerce Committee concluded that existing federal legislation "is
not adequate to offset the cumulative impact of the hydroelectric dams of the Columbia and its tributaries
on fish and wildlife." HOUSE COMMERCE COMM., H.R. REP. No. 976, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48
(1980) [hereinafter cited as COMMERCE COMM. REPORT]. Courts in the Ninth Circuit have consistently
refused to recognize a right of action under the Coordination Act. See, e.g., Rank v. Drug, 90 F. Supp. 773
(S.D. Cal. 1950); Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975); County of Trinity v. Andrus,
438 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Cal. 1977).
One goal of the Coordination Act was to provide fish and wildlife "equal consideration" with other
purposes in water project development. 16 U.S.C. § 661. But because the Coordination Act allowed fed-
eral water project managers virtually unlimited discretion to ignore recommended mitigation measures in
order to maximize "overall project benefits," 16 U.S.C. § 662(c), it seldom accomplished its avowed pur-
pose. The Act also placed the burden of documenting resource loss on fish and wildlife agencies, thus
delaying the implementation of effective mitigation measures, sometimes until long after project approval.
The Act also concentrated the placement of mitigation measures-usually hatcheries-disproportionately
in the lower river basin, further hastening the depletion of upriver fish runs. COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-
TRIBAL FISH COMM'N, THE MITCHELL ACT: AN ANALYSIS 11-12 (June 1981). See also U.S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE, WATER RESOURCES PLANNING UNDER THE FISH AND WILDLIFE COORDINATION
ACT (Aug. 1980).
In passing the Northwest Power Act Congress sought not so much to supersede the Coordination Act as
to rectify its shortcomings. Thus, the Northwest Power Act
removes from federal water managers the discretion to judge the merits of the mitigation
measures; it imposes a time deadline on the development of a comprehensive remedial pro-
gram to effectuate such measures; and it recognizes the importance of preserving and restor-
ing upriver resources . . . . Congress responded to past failures (1) by significantly
restructuring water management decision-making authority, (2) dramatically accelerating
the time frame for making decisions, and (3) directing that long overdue fish and wildlife
protection and compensation be designed to benefit those who had lost the most: the
upriver users.
Blumm, supra at 118-19.
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Northwest Power Act promises to become a powerful restraint on the ruinous
effects of hydropower generation on the region's anadromous fish.
During the hydropower era electricity was artificially cheap in the Pacific
Northwest. Costs of fish and wildlife losses caused by the construction and opera-
tion of dams were, in the language of economists, externalized. In effect, inex-
pensive hydropower was at least partly subsidized by passing along hidden costs
to the salmon fishery. In 1980 Congress decided that the time had come for
hydropower interests to begin repaying their substantial debt to anadromous fish.
It narrowly limited the role of traditional methods of economic valuation in bal-
ancing energy production against fish and wildlife protection. The Northwest
Power Act thus attempts to redress the historic dominance of power generation
over fish and wildlife conservation, and suggests that biological considerations
will henceforth take precedence over economic considerations. 20 7 The cost of
protecting and restoring the salmon fishery will be treated as a cost of doing
business, borne by all consumers of electric power in the region.
The Act thus requires internalization of formerly uncounted costs of operation
and development. It further mandates that protection of the anadromous
fisheries be made a co-equal partner with hydropower production,20 8 in the ex-
press goal "to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife affected by the
development operation, and management of [the Columbia Basin hydroelectric
facilities] while assuring the Pacific Northwest an adequate, efficient, economical,
and reliable power supply. °2 0 9 The expansive fish and wildlife provisions of the
Act are not only protective in nature, but also remedial, designed among other
things "to provide for improved survival of [anadromous] fish at hydroelectric
facilities" 210 and "to provide flows of sufficient quality and quantity. . . to im-
prove production, migration, and survival .. .as necessary to meet sound bio-
logical objectives. '21 1
One effect of the Northwest Power Act has been a restructuring of decision-
making authority over Pacific Northwest water resource issues. The Act places
limitations on federal water management agencies with an institutional bias in
favor of power generation and instead vests planning authority in a new regional
207 The application of traditional methods of cost/benefit analysis is limited by the Act's mandate for
"equitable treatment." In the words of one commentator:
Congress specifically considered and rejected a proposed definition of "protect, mitigate and
enhance" that was linked to "minimum economic cost and minimum adverse impact on
electric power production." The House Commerce Committee made it explicit: "[C]ost
should not be a deterrent if a fish and wildlife need might be sacrificed to save dollars." This
theme is repeatedly reinforced by various provisions of the act which severely limit the use of
economic cost as a constraint on achieving salmon and steelhead protection and restoration
objectives.
The legislative history indicates Congress clearly recognized traditional benefit/cost
evaluations discriminated against anadromous fish ...[and t]hat it would be illogical, at
least, to condition repayment of a longstanding debt upon it being economically convenient
to the debtors. And there is much evidence which suggests Congress realized the regional
economic value of restored fisheries would exceed the energy cost of modifying hydroelectric
operations. These factors presumably contributed to the rejection of cost effectiveness as a
criterion for evaluating measures to restore salmon and steelhead . . ..
E. Chaney, Cogeneration, supra note 110, at 6. See also Blumm, supra note 206, at 146-52.
208 COMMERCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 206, at 56-57.
209 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(5).
210 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(i) (1976).
21 Id. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(ii).
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council, called the Northwest Power Planning Council. 2 12 Section 4(h) of the
Act, 2 13 which contains the principal provisions for rehabilitating the anadromous
fisheries, directs the Council to develop and promulgate a comprehensive fish
and wildlife program within a tight statutory deadline.2 14 It gives the Council
authority to oversee implementation of the adopted program to ensure that fed-
eral water managers fulfill their statutory obligation to give "equitable treat-
ment" to fish and wildlife and take the adopted program into account "to the
fullest extent practicable. '2 15
The Fish and Wildlife Program, by far the most comprehensive and ambitious
fish and wildlife restoration plan ever attempted in the Columbia River Basin,
was adopted on November 15, 1982.216 Since it was not challenged in court
within the time limit allowed by statute, the Program now has the force of law in
the Columbia River Basin.2 17
4. The Proposed Paciic Salmon Interception Treaty with Canada
The fourth legal event revolutionizing salmon management in the Pacific
Northwest is, strictly speaking, one that has not yet occurred. In December of
212 The institutional structure of the council, based as it is on a regional outlook, resembles that of the
Pacific Fishery Management Council created by the FCMA, see supra notes 193-95, and may have been
patterned after it. Although the council is not a federal agency, the Northwest Power Act gives federal
courts exclusive review of its actions. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(4). The council has eight members, two each
from Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana, appointed by their respective governors. 16 U.S.C.
§ 839b(a)(2). Responsibility for balancing fish and wildlife protection with the need for power generation
was formerly distributed among four agencies: the Bonneville Power Administration, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (formerly the Federal Power Commis-
sion), and the Water and Power Resources Service (formerly the Bureau of Reclamation). See i 7ra note
299. These agencies are now charged with exercising their responsibilities consistent with the Act and its
requirervent of "equitable treatment" for fish and wildlife. They must consider the fish and wildlife plan
at each stage of decisionmaking and consult with all the region's fish and wildlife agencies and treaty tribes
in order to coordinate actions. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(l I)(A).
213 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h).
214 Congress viewed the condition of some of the upriver fish runs as critical and ordered immediate
action, After the establishment of the council, federal, state, and tribal fishery agencies and interests were
given 90 days (subsequently extended by 60 days) to submit recommendations for the program. 16 U.S.C.
§ 839(h)(3). The council was given only one year from the receipt of recommendations to solicit and
review public comment on recommendations received and to adopt a plan. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(9). Once
approved, the plan can be amended at any time, and must be reviewed at least once every five years. 16
U.S.C. § 839b(d)(1). Significantly, the Act requires that adoption of the fish and wildlife plan precede the
approval of a compatible energy plan, thus deliberately reversing past practice of appending fishery needs
to energy plans almost as an afterthought. E. Chaney, Cogeneration, supra note 102, at 5.
215 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)( 11)(A).
216 Notice of Program Approval, 47 Fed. Reg. 53,976 (1982). See generall NORTHWEST POWER PLAN-
NING COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM (Nov. 1982), [hereinafter cited as
FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM], summarized in I NORTHWEST CONSERVATION ACT REP. No. 23 (Nov.
26, 1982). Important elements of the program include establishment of a water budget to provide ade-
quate flows for downstream migration, § 300; provisions for fish passage at dams, § 400; enhancement
measures, § 700; provisions for new hydropower development, § 1200; and provisions for cotrdination of
river operations, § 1300. For a detailed evaluation of the plan, see NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST.,
ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO No. 22 (July, 1983). The proposed electric power plan was adopted on
April 27, 1983. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, CONSERVATION AND ELECTRIC POWER PLAN
(April 1983).
217 1 Northwest Energy News No. 9 (Jan-Feb. 1983) at 9. The Act provides that challenges to the plan
be filed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals within sixty days after publication of notice of approval in
the Federal Register, which occurred on November 30, 1982. 16 U.S.C. § 839f(e)(5). See supra note 216.
The Act also requires that "due consideration" be given to "equitable treatment" of fish and wildlife
outside the Columbia River Basin, such as in the Puget Sound or Oregon coastal watersheds. 16 U.S.C.
§ 839b(e)(2). See Thatcher, The Pacifw Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act.- Fish and Wildlife
Protection Outside the Columbia River Basin, 13 ENVTL. L. 517 (1983).
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1982 negotiators for the governments of the United States and Canada con-
cluded and signed a treaty governing mutual harvest of all species of Pacific
salmon. The proposed treaty, formally entitled the Pacific Salmon Interception
Agreement between the United States and Canada (Pacific Salmon Treaty), 2 18
requires ratification by both governments to take permanent effect. 219 Negotia-
tors have agreed, however, that certain provisions of the proposed treaty will be
in force on an interim basis for the 1983 and 1984 fishing seasons, pending final
ratification or rejection by the United States and the Canadian Parliament. 220
Pacific salmon of North American origin spawn not only in the rivers and
streams of California, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska, but also in those of Brit-
ish Columbia and portions of the Yukon. Salmon fishing is an important indus-
try along the coast of British Columbia, and that province vies with Alaska for
the title of chief producer of salmon in North America. 22 1 With a land area far
exceeding that of Texas and a population of slightly more than two million, Brit-
ish Columbia has generally been spared the population and industrial pressures
of the neighboring state of Washington to the south. Much of the province, with
its 16,000 miles of rugged coastline, retains at least some of the characteristics of
wilderness. Protection of salmon habitat has thus been more successful in British
Columbia than in its neighbors to the south and the proportion of wild to hatch-
ery salmon produced is greater than ninety percent. 222
The Fraser River, which enters the Straight of Georgia just south of Vancou-
ver, is the richest producer of salmon in Canada. Unlike the Columbia-the
218 Mimeographed draft available from the Pacific Fishery Management Council, 526 S.W. Mill Street,
Portland, Oregon 97201.
219 By international custom a treaty is often signed subject to later ratification. Once a proposed treaty
is signed by a representative of the United States, it is submitted to the State Department for review. The
Secretary of State submits the proposed treaty, together with recommendations and comments, to the
President, who in turn may submit it to the Senate for advice and consent. (The President is not required
to submit the treaty to the Senate; if he does not, the proposed treaty is considered withdrawn or rejected.)
If the President submits the proposed treaty for advice and consent, the Senate considers it in committee
and in floor debate, and upon affirmative vote by two-thirds of the Senators present, the treaty is remitted
to the President for ratification. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. (The term "ratification" is not mentioned
in the Constitution and properly applies to presidential, not Senate action.) The President then may ratify
the document according to its own terms, together with any appropriate or required conditions, reserva-
tions, or understandings attached by the Senate, the State Department, or the President himself. L. HEN-
KIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 133-36 (1972). On the effective date of the treaty it is
proclaimed by the President as law. See generally M. WHITEMAN, 14 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 8
at 54-55 (1970); Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty Ratifcation, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1983).
220 Pacific Salmon Interception Agreement, supra note 204, Annex IV [proposed] [hereinafter cited as
Treaty]. As this article is in galleys, the proposed treaty is stalled, and negotiations resumed on Nov. 28,
1983. See infra text accompanying notes 243-44. Despite agreement of both parties to implement its provi-
sions pending ratification, neither country was doing so as of December, 1983.
221 A. NETBOY, supra note 3, at 251. Canada, in fact, has a stronger interest in salmon fisheries (as a
percentage of the country's total fishing industry) than any other nation in the world, and no other nation
faces salmon interception problems more difficult than Canada's, since most Pacific salmon of Canadian
origin pass through U.S. waters at sometime in their life cycle. Copes, The Law of the Sea and Management of
Anadromous Fish Stocks, 4 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L. L. J. 233, 241 (1977). In Canada marine fisheries lie
entirely under the jurisdiction of the federal government. See Fisheries Act of 1932, CAN. REV. STAT. ch.
F-14 (1970). On the history and provisions of the Canadian Fisheries Act, see PACIFIC SALMON MANAGE-
MENT FOR PEOPLE 122-35 (D. Ellis ed. 1977). For a comparison of Canadian with United States federal-
ism as they relate to offshore natural resource management, see Charney, The Ofthorelunsdiction of the States
of the United States and the Provinces of Canada-4 Comparison, 12 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L. L. J. 301 (1983). For
an overview see VanderZwagg, Canadian Fishenes Management: A Legal and Administrative Overview, 13
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L. L. J. 171 (1983).
222 D. Poon & J. Garcia, A Comparative Analysis of Anadromous Salmonid Stocks and Possible
Cause[s] for Their Decline 85 (Final Report Submitted to the Northwest Power Planning Council, June
1982).
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other big salmon producer on the west coast of North America-the Fraser is
undammed, with the result that during the 1960s the Fraser supplanted the Co-
lumbia as the dominant salmon river of North America. 223
Although the Fraser River lies entirely within Canada, management responsi-
bility for some of its salmon stocks is shared with the United States under the
terms of the Fraser River Treaty of 1930,224 which established a pioneering in-
ternational fishery management body, the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries
Commission (IPSFC, popularly called the "Sockeye Commission"). The Com-
mission has authority to manage sockeye and pink salmon from the Fraser River
and nearby areas within a specified geographical area called "convention wa-
ters." 2 25 Both the Treaty and the Commission it created have been highly suc-
cessful in achieving their stated goals, and fishing interests in both nations have
lauded the Sockeye Commission for revitalizing the sockeye salmon runs of the
Fraser River and for impartially allocating the fish among Canadian and United
States users.226
223 The recent annual average chinook catch from the Fraser River has been 578,000 fish. Id. at 88. See
also supra note 106.
224 Formally, the Convention for the Preservation, Protection and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon
Fisheries in the Fraser River System, 8 U.S.T. 1057, T.I.A.S. No. 3857. Ratified in 1937 and in effect since
1946, the Fraser River Treaty was amended in 1957 to include provisions for the management of pink
salmon in addition to sockeye, and further amended in 1980 to establish a supplemental advisory commit-
tee. Unsuccessful attempts at drafting and ratifying such a treaty date back to 1908, and U.S. salmon
fishers have been catching Fraser River fish since the late nineteenth century. For a summary of the
history of the Fraser River Treaty see J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, THE PACIFIC SALMON FISH-
ERIES: A STUDY OF IRRATIONAL CONSERVATION 140-46 (1969). On its provisions see H. KASAHARA &
W. BURKE, NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE PROGRAM OF IN-
TERNATIONAL STUDIES OF FISHERY ARRANGEMENTS No. 2 (1973) at 32-34. For recent fishery statistics
and a summary of Commission actions, see INT'L PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT,
1981 (1982). The Treaty as ratified in 1937 contained three substantive provisions: (1) the Sockeye Com-
mission would have no power to authorize fishing contrary to the laws of Canada or the State of Washing-
ton; (2) the Commission would not promulgate or enforce regulations until the scientific investigations
provided for were completed, and in any event no sooner than eight years or two "sockeye cycles" from the
time of ratification; and (3) the Commission would set up and include in its deliberations advisory commit-
tees on which industry representatives would sit. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty would be
guided by two goals: (1) to restore the Fraser River sockeye runs (and after 1958 the pink salmon runs) to
their early twentieth century abundance; and (2) to provide an equal division of the catch between Cana-
dian and U.S. fishers.
The Commission consists of six members, three from each nation. Two commissioners from each coun-
try must agree on any Commission action for it to become effective. Canada and the U.S. share equally in
the costs of management and the expenses of the professional staff. Although the Commission has no
enforcement powers, its recommendations to the Washington Department of Fisheries and the Canadian
Department of Fisheries and Oceans have been routinely adopted and enforced. For an overview of the
history of the U.S.-Canada cooperative salmon management, see E. MILES, S. GIBBS, D. FLUHARTY, C.
DAWSON & D. TEETER, THE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE REGIONS: THE NORTH PACIFIC 95-97 (1982).
225 Outside convention waters, mutual fishing privileges have been governed by a series of reciprocal
fishing agreements. In 1957, for example, British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, and California formed
a joint compact to prohibit all offshore net fishing of salmon. In 1970, as negotiations began for a compre-
hensive treaty, interim agreements allowed salmon fishers of each country to fish in the waters of the other.
Agreement Between the Government of the U.S.A. and the Government of Canada on Reciprocal Fishing
Privileges in Certain Areas Off Their Coasts, 752 U.N. Treaty Ser. 3; 21 U.S.T. 1283, T.I.A.S. No. 6879
(1970). These agreements terminated in 1978, after each nation had extended its fisheries jurisdiction to
200 miles. At that time both nations closed their waters to salmon fishing from the other. For a discussion
of the history of the current negotiations and the events that led to them, see E. MILES, S. GIBBS, D.
FLUHARTY, C. DAwSON, & D. TEETER, THE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE REGIONS: THE NORTH PACIFIC
173-76 (1982); K. Henry, Pacifc Salmon Interception, SCIENCE, POLITICS, & FISHING 137, Oregon State Uni-
versity Sea Grant Pub. No. RESU-W-81-001 (N. Krant ed. 1981). With all reciprocal salmon fishing
closed (except under the terms of the Fraser River Treaty), conclusion of a new and more comprehensive
treaty has taken on greater urgency. PFMC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 35, at 12. See also H.R. REP. No. 96-
1243, Pt. 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1980).
226 J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 224, at 143. Provisions of the treaty and actions of
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It has been apparent for many years that the Fraser River Treaty, limited as it
is in scope and in geographical coverage, is inadequate to meet the challenges of
modern salmon management. First, the terms of the Treaty apply to only two of
the five species of salmon found in the convention waters. No cooperative agree-
ment on the management of chinook, coho, or chum salmon now exists between
the United States and Canada, other than through the proposed Pacific Salmon
Treaty. Second, the Fraser Treaty has been increasingly anachronistic in the
extent of its geographical coverage. 227 Accordingly, in 1970 Canada and the
United States entered negotiations for a new and comprehensive treaty that
would govern salmon interceptions and reciprocal fishing privileges for all ocean-
going salmonid stocks intercepted on the way to their natal streams in either
country. Negotiations have been protracted and sometimes bitter. But the result
is the proposed 1982 Pacific Salmon Treaty, at this writing under review in prep-
aration for submission to both governments for ratification. 228
The proposed treaty has two governing principles: (1) to prevent overfishing
that results in a level of escapement less than that needed to insure optimum
sustainable yields; and (2) to set allotments so that each country receives benefits
equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its own waters. 229 In order
to implement these principles, the proposed treaty establishes a new agency, to be
called the Pacific Salmon Commission, as a forum for consultation and negotia-
tion on interception limits and other management questions.230 The Commis-
sion will be composed of no more than four members from each nation, and it
will in turn establish three regional panels to conduct studies and offer recom-
mendations concerning escapement objectives for the various stocks in their re-
spective areas. A technical dispute settlement board will also be established with
the Commission, however, have run afoul of the treaty Indian tribe allocation requirements of United
States v. Washington, see supra text accompanying notes 164-68. See, e.g., United States v. Decker, 600
F.2d 733 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 855 (1979) (in accordance with United States v. Washington, the
United States government issued regulations giving certain United States Indians longer fishing time than
non-Indians in waters controlled by the Fraser River Treaty. The Sockeye Commission countermanded
the United States regulations, issuing an emergency order that the regulations must apply equally and
without exception to all United States fishermen. Appellant, a non-Indian commercial fisherman, was
convicted of fishing on days restricted to Indian fishing. (The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
conviction.) Seejudicial Dections, United States v. Decker, 74 AMER. J. INT'L. L. 198 (1980).
227 In 1946, the first year ofjoint management of sockeye salmon of the Fraser River, nearly 95% of the
sockeye catch was taken in "convention waters," ie., within the geographical area covered by the terms of
the Treaty. By 1981, however, the Commission controlled only 39.4% of the Fraser River sockeye run and
40.8% of the pink salmon run. According to Canadian government estimates, 727,000 Fraser River sock-
eye were taken within convention waters in 1982, while as many as three million were caught outside.
Fishermen's News, May, 1983, (2nd issue), at 17, col. 2. (The 1982 Fraser River sockeye catch was the
largest since 1958 and the second largest since 1902.) Thus, over the years the Fraser River Treaty has
come to cover a dwindling portion of the Fraser River harvest, and the Canadian government has shown
no inclination to restrict the sockeye harvest outside convention waters so that more fish can be caught by
United States salmon fishers.228See infra text accompanying notes 243.
229 Treaty, supra note 220, Art. III (1). The second of these is termed the "equity principle." The
negotiators of the treaty caution that more data are needed before interceptions can be determined with
precision, and that the methods of evaluating benefits accruing within each country may differ. Where a
substantial inequity exists, it is expected that the oversight commission established by the treaty will phase
out the inequity over a period of time. Id Letter of Understanding Between the Negotiators Regarding
Implementation of Article III. l(b). Although the terms of the treaty ensure a continued annual allotment
to U.S. fishermen of Fraser River sockeye and pink salmon for a number of years yet to be determined, the
50/50 split mandated by the 1930 Treaty, supra note 210, is eliminated. Most likely, this will result in an
increased Canadian share of the Fraser River runs.
230 Treaty, supra note 220, Art. II.
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unreviewable authority to make findings of fact. 2 31
Ratification of the proposed treaty will terminate the Fraser River Treaty. 232
Some of the responsibilities of the superseded Sockeye Commission will be trans-
ferred to the new Pacific Salmon Commission; others will revert to the Canadian
Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Provisions are made to conduct joint re-
search, and each party will allow access to its waters for research undertaken by
the other, subject to normal restrictions. 233 The terms of the treaty will be inter-
preted and applied so as not to interfere with existing Indian treaty rights or
existing federal laws.234
Governing principles are embodied in the articles of the treaty; technical mat-
ters are reserved for annexes, some of which have expiration dates. Annexes may
be renegotiated at any time or amended by an exchange of notes. 235 Although
the treaty was to take effect in 1983, the annexes contain interim measures that
would have the effect of managing the 1983 and 1984 salmon seasons according
to the terms of the treaty.236
For the first time Canada will be guaranteed benefits from salmon originating
in "transboundary" rivers, which begin in Canada but flow to the sea through
the United States.237 Salmon originating in Alaskan parts of transboundary riv-
ers are to be considered Alaskan stocks. Those hatching in Canadian portions of
the river but migrating through Alaska are "shared" fish. In the latter case en-
hancement programs are undertaken cooperatively. 238
Arguably, the most urgent feature of the proposed treaty concerns the conser-
vation of wild stocks of chinook salmon, which have suffered drastic and
coastwide declines in escapement in recent years. 239 The terms of the treaty pro-
vide for a badly needed twenty-five percent cut by both Alaska and British Co-
lumbia in the 1983 chinook catch, using the 1978-1981 seasons as a base
period. 240 An important provision of the proposed treaty controls the harvest of
catch reductions made in one nation's chinook fishery by fishers of the other na-
tion. 24' Thus, extra fish resulting from a twenty-five percent reduction in the
23 1 Id Art. XII.
2 32 1d. Art. XV(3).
233 Id Art. X.
234 1d Art. XI.235
Id. Art. XIII(3).
2 36 1d. Annex IV.
2 37 1d Art. XII. The Alsek, the Stikine, the Taku, and the Yukon are the important transboundary
rivers with headwaters in Canada and mouths in Alaska. Negotiators have so far been unable to agree on
what proportion of the catch on transboundary rivers is due each country, but an appended "letter of
understanding" allows for ratification of the document and for fishing to continue while future negotia-
tions attempt to work out an equitable split. For maps of affected areas and charts of 1983 and 1984
allotments see ALASKA SEAS AND COASTS, Feb.-Mar. 1983, at 6-9. The Columbia River, which originates
in British Columbia, is specifically excluded from the transboundary river provisions since sea-run salmon
are now blocked from its Canadian reaches. Treaty, supra note 220, Annex IV ch. 1(6).
238 Treaty, supra note 220, Art. VII(4).
239 Escapement of chinook in British Columbia has declined by 50% since 1950. D. Poon& J. Garcia,
supra note 222, at II. The Fraser River Treaty of 1930 has no provisions for chinook interception or
conservation. No bilateral regulation of the chinook fishery now exists, until the interim measures of the
Pacific Salmon Treaty take effect. See supra note 220.
240 Treaty, supra note 220, Annex IV ch. 3(6). The combined catch for all of Alaska will be limited to
263,000 fish for 1983, up from 255,000 in 1982. (The allowable catch rises because cuts already made by
Alaska as conservation measures in past years are set off against future cuts.) The British Columbia catch
is not to exceed 868,000 fish, down from 1.5 million taken in 1982. Further reductions will be made for the
1984 season after the effectiveness of the 1983 regulations has been determined. Id. Annex IV ch. 3(3).
241 Id Annex IV ch. 3(4).
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Canadian chinook catch will not, for example, lead to a windfall to Washington
trollers. For cooperative conservation measures to work, catch transfers must be
minimized and escapement savings must be passed to the spawning grounds.
The proposed treaty also requires joint development of a coastwide conserva-
tion program for wild chinook stocks. It commits both nations to undertake chi-
nook enhancement projects and rehabilitation plans, with a view toward a
phased decrease in fishing pressure on wild stocks and a gradual increase in the
production and harvest of hatchery fish. 242
At this writing, the proposed treaty is under review by the United States De-
partment of State and its Canadian counterpart in preparation for submission to
the United States Senate and the Canadian Parliament for approval. Although
negotiators for both parties remain hopeful, early ratification is doubtful. The
treaty is opposed by powerful Alaska fishing interests, and the governor and both
senators of Alaska have indicated that they will not endorse its ratification. 2
43
The State Department has not yet made public its view of the proposed treaty,
nor has it publicly responded to comments submitted. Whether ratified, rejected,
or delayed, the Pacific Salmon Treaty will have a profound effect on the future of
the Pacific salmon fishery-either positive, by its ratification and implementa-
tion, or negative, by its absence. If ratified, it will serve as a capstone upon the
legal events of the past decade designed to advance the protection of the salmon
fishery in the Pacific Northwest. Without it, or an equivalent treaty, the achieve-
ments of the era of attempted restoration will remain incomplete.2 44
B. The Regulatoy Matrix
The legal events previously discussed are, of course, not the only causes of the
proliferation of management authority that characterizes the past decade. Other
causes will be discussed or touched upon in the narrative that follows. But with
this background we are now prepared to follow our illustrative chinook salmon
for the final time on its 4,000-mile journey from the headwaters of the Lochsa
River out into the Gulf of Alaska and back. Before its journey is complete, the
fish will pass through seventeen separate management jurisdictions, each with
some degree of independent authority to allocate the harvest of chinook salmon.
In addition, the fish will move through the overlapping jurisdictions of a host of
agencies and commissions with no management authority over the fish them-
selves, but with regulatory responsibilities that affect the fish's habitat. 245
1. Protection of Downstream Aigrating Juveniles
As before, our chinook fingerling begins its life journey in the headwaters of
the Lochsa River of Idaho. If in its downstream passage it now faces perils that
were nonexistent in 1956 when we last traced its journey, it also reaps the benefits
2421d Annex IV ch. 3(7).
243 Fishermen's News, March 1983, (2nd issue) at 1.
244 On the benefits of ratification and the nature of the objections, see Alaska Seas and Coasts,
Feb./Mar. 1983; Conner, The Troubled Paafr Salmon Treaty. Why It Aust Be Ratitfd, Ocean Law Memo No.
24, Ocean and Coastal Law Center, University of Oregon School of Law, Sept. (1983). See also infta text
accompanying notes 421-22.
245 For a list of regulatory bodies with resource management authority affecting salmon habitat, see thJ#a
note 299.
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of protective measures that have since come into force. The habitat of its place of
birth, for example, is now protected from development. Its spawning stream lies
within the boundaries of the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness Area, so designated
under the Wilderness Act of 1964.246 The juvenile fish proceeds down the Lochsa
River parallel to U.S. Highway 12, through Black Canyon, over Big Hill Rapids
and Indian Rapids, on a stretch of the river now protected as a component of the
National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
of 1968.247 The fish enters the middle fork of the Clearwater River, where it joins
thousands of its artificially-reared cousins before reaching the Snake River just
past Lewiston, Idaho.2 48
At the Snake River the ocean-seeking fingerling enters the realm of hydro-
power. It must now attempt passage of four dams, all built since 1956.249 Dur-
246 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. V 1981).
247 16 U.S.C. § 1284 (Supp. V 1981). This stretch of the Lochsa is designated recreational, under sec-
tion 3(a)(l) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906, 907 (1968). Both the
Lochsa and the middle fork of the Clearwater into which it flows are populated and readily accessible.
2411 The Kooskia hatchery on the middle fork of the Clearwater was completed in 1969 and is operated
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The Dworshak hatchery on the north fork of the Clearwater, some
506 miles upstream from the mouth of the Columbia, was completed in 1968 at a cost of $7 million and is
operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Netboy describes the completely automated operation of
tle Dworshak hatchery thus: "An IBM computer regulates not only the flow of water but its temperature
and quality and also the feeding operations. One does not see men scattering the feed into the ponds by
hand. Little automated carts do the job; the computer tells them when to do it and how much to drop into
each pond." A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 108.
Both hatcheries operate under common management. In 1983 they planned to release a total of
585,000 chinook fingerlings, up from a 1982 total of 496,796. The size of the release is limited primarily by
the difficulty of securing sufficient quantities of eggs, which come only from local stock. In the best of
years the hatcheries expect a return of only three fish per thousand released; more typically only one in a
thousand return. Telephone conversation with Dr. Bruce McLeod, Kooskia National Fish Hatchery (Apr.
18, 1983). Figures are not available on the proportion of wild to hatchery fish in the Clearwater, but in
response to a question on the effect of competition between wild and hatchery stocks, Dr. McLeod stated
his belief that it is not significant because "there are not enough fish to fight for the available space" and
because the high proportion of hatchery to wild stock eases the predation pressure on the wild fingerlings.
Although it is difficult to distinguish hatchery from wild fish on the upstream runs, hatchery fingerlings are
generally larger than the wild on downstream migration, and they tend to travel separately.
Actually, research suggests that under some circumstances hatchery fish may indeed compete with
their wild cousins, even where space seems ample. Some species of juvenile salmon display a territorial
behavior that will fill all suitable habitat in a stream and will drive less dominant fish to less desirable
territory. Chapman, Aggressive Behavior inluvenile Coho Salmon as a ause of Emigration, 19 J. FIsH. RES. BD.
CAN. 1047 (1962); see also Everest & Chapman, Habitat Selection and Spatial Interaction by juvenile Chinook
Salmon and Steelhead Trout in Two Idaho Streams, 29 J. Fisit. REs. Bt. CAN. 91 (1972). See discussion of
carrying capacities of streams, infra text accompanying notes 367-69; discussion of hatchery problems, infra
note 347.
The Kooskia and the Dworshak hatcheries are only the first of many that release chinook juveniles into
the streams and rivers of the Columbia watershed. Although the actual number of hatcheries releasing
chinook varies from year to year, during the 1970s about 20 Columbia Basin hatcheries were rearing
spring chinook juveniles. Wahle, Chancy & Pearson, Areal Distribution of Aarked Columbia River Basin Spring
Chinook Salmon, 43 MAR. FISH. REV. 12, Dec. 1981, at 2-3. See also Cleaver, The Role of Hatcheries in the
Management of Columbia River Salmon, COLUMBIA RIVER SALMON ANID STEELHEAD 89, Amer. Fisheries Soc.
Spec. Pub. No. 10 (E. Schweibert ed. 1977). Tagging studies from the early 1970s indicate that 90% or
more of hatchery chinook turn northward in the ocean after leaving the Columbia River, and of the
returning adults more are taken in the marine fishery than in the river. Id at 8-9. Oddly enough, of
46,000 marked chinook juveniles released in the Lochsa River in the spring of 1972, there were no returns
and no recoveries of marked fish anywhere along their known range-the only total loss among the 21
release stations. Id. at 6.
24' All four are federal dams, operated by the Army Corps of Engineers, and all lie within the State of
Washington. Lower Granite Dam at river mile 432 was completed in 1973, the last federal hydropower
construction project in the Columbia River Basin. It has a gross head of 100 feet and a reservoir 39 miles
long. The second is Little Goose Dam at river mile 395. Completed in 1970, it has a head of 100 feet and
a reservoir 37 miles long. Third is Lower Monumental Dam at river mile 366. Completed in 1969, it has a
head of 100 feet and a reservoir of 29 miles. Last on the Snake River is Ice Harbor, immediately above the
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ing the years 1938 through 1973, when federal dams were constructed in the
Columbia River Basin, it was widely believed that to maintain the salmon and
steelhead runs at acceptable levels it was sufficient merely to provide adequate
facilities for upstream passage of fish. More recent research, however, has
demonstrated that the dams cause mortality to juvenile fish in a wide variety of
ways, and that protection of downstream migration is critical for the survival of
an upriver stock. 250 In addition, the reservoirs behind the dams are themselves a
cause ofjuvenile mortality. In the slack water and warmer temperatures of reser-
voirs some fish become "residuals," losing their migratory urge and dying in the
reservoir by predation, disease, or thermal shock after failing to complete their
journey to the ocean.
Safe downstream passage of dams must somehow be assured for an acceptably
high proportion ofjuvenile fish. Currently there are four ways to get fish past the
dams in the downstream direction. Until recently, passage through the turbines
has been the usual route available to the migrating juveniles, and it is by far the
most lethal. As fish are forced from the turbine intake through the rotating
blades and out through a tunnel at the base of the dam, the shearing action of
the blades and turbulent water, along with sudden internal changes of pressure,
can cause high levels of injury and death. If the fish survive passage through the
turbine, they are stunned and disoriented-easy prey for squawfish and' other
varieties of predatory scrapfish that await them at the base of the dam. During
past periods of low river flow nearly all the river's water has been channeled
through the turbines at each dam, leaving no alternate route for young and
vulnerable fish.
A second method of getting the fish past the dams is by passage over the spill-
way. Though not usually as lethal or traumatic as passage through the turbines,
the sudden drop of a hundred feet or more in turbulent water moving over con-
crete can be equally disabling or disorienting to a young fish. Formerly, during
periods of high river flow, juvenile mortality from the effects of spillway passage
was compounded by the lethal effects of nitrogen supersaturation caused by en-
trainment of air into the splash pools at the base of the dam. This "gas-bubble
disease" frequently created fatal embolisms in the young fish, causing them to die
of the "bends. ' 251 Fortunately, the problem is amenable to relatively simple tech-
nological solution and has now been alleviated by the installation of spillway
deflectors.
In the past, combined mortality from spillway and turbine passage has been
estimated at around twenty-five percentper dam. During years of acute low flow
such as 1973 and the 100-year low runoff of 1977, mortality may have leaped to
mouth of the Snake at Pasco at river mile 334. It was completed in 1961 with a head of 97 feet and a
reservoir of 32 miles. A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 91; see also E. CHANEY & T. PERRY, COLUMBIA BASIN
SALMON AND STEELHEAD ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY REPORT 62 (1976). On the history and politics of the
Snake River dams, see A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at 90-97.
250 "[A] dam is a stream blockage and it will affect: 1) Fish passage and upstream and downstream
migration timing; 2) Gravel recruitment below the dam; 3) Water flow and temperature patterns;
4) Stream sediment load and effectiveness of flushing actions; 5) Inundation of spawning and rearing
habitat." D. Poon & J. Garcia, supra note 222, at 17. See also Ebel, Major Passage Problems, COLUMBIA
RIVER SALMON AND STEELHEAD 33, Amer. Fisheries Soc. Spec. Pub. No. 10 (E. Schweibert ed. 1977).
251 U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST POWER
BILL, REP. No. EMD-79-105, 22 (1979). See generally Wesley & Raymond, Effect of Atmospherzc Gas Supersatu-
ration on Salmon and Stecdhead Trout of the Snake and Columbia Rivers, 38 MAR. FISH. REV. 1 (1976).
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as much as forty-five percent per dam.252 Simple calculation reveals that if there
is even a twenty-five percent mortality at each of eight dams, nine hundred fish
out of every thousand beginning the downstream migration will perish before
reaching the estuary; and if mortality under extraordinary circumstances reaches
forty-five percent at each dam, fewer than two fish out of every thousand will
survive.
A third and more extraordinary method is the so-called "fish pullman." The
Army Corps of Engineers currently funds and directs an applied research pro-
gram whereby downstream migrating juvenile salmon and steelhead are col-
lected at mainstem dams and transported by barge or truck for release below the
last dam on the river, where passage to the ocean is unimpeded.2 53 Although this
imaginative response has demonstrated a measure of success, it may not offer a
permanent solution. It is too cumbersome and expensive. 254 Moreover, the long-
term effects of the stressful and crowded holding conditions on the small fish
remain unknown, as does the effect of long-distance transport on the homing
instinct of returning adults. Trucking is widely viewed as a stopgap solution to
the mortality problem created by dams, eventually to be phased out as more
effective and economical bypass systems are perfected and installed.
255
The fourth method, though its initial cost is high, is usually seen as the most
promising long-term solution. It consists of a bypass sluiceway of low gradient
into which downstream migrating fish are corralled and deflected from the power
turbines by a device known as a "submersible traveling screen."'256 This device
appears to offer the highest potential for fish survival, and enhancement plans
are generally committed to its eventual use and further refinement at all dams.
Two of the Snake River dams-the Lower Granite and the Little Goose-
currently have functioning juvenile bypass systems with submersible traveling
screens.2 57 The third dam-Lower Monumental-lacks a sluiceway system that
is capable of structural modifications to provide effective bypass, and safe fish
passage must currently be accomplished by collecting fingerlings and transport-
252 COLUMBIA RIVER FISHERIES COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN SALMON AND STEELHEAD MAN-
AGEMENT FRAMEWORK PLAN 8 (Mar. 1981) [hereinafter cited as FRAMEWORK PLAN]. Migrant mortality
has been estimated to have deprived the inland fishery of 7.5 million adult chinook salmon during the
period from 1960 through 1979. Id. The current management goal is a survival rate of 87 percent or
better at each project-a cumulative survival rate after eight dams of about 33 percent. Id. at 11. Returns
after years of fishing and predation pressure on the ocean and on the way back are, of course, far lower.
On returns of upriver hatchery fish, see supra note 248.
253 Transported juveniles are released below Bonneville Dam. On the construction of Bonneville Dam
see supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
254 FRAMEWORK PLAN, supra note 252, at 12. The trucking program was expanded to its maximum
capacity during the emergency measures of the spring of 1977, when the Corps renovated two 750-ton
barges to haul juvenile fish to the lower river. For a description of the emergency measures of 1977 see E.
Chancy, A Question of Balance, supra note 107, at 13-17.
255 FRAMEWORK PLAN, supra note 252, at 12. Some 4.5 million fingerlings from the spring run of 1979
were transported by this method. It has been estimated that fingerling transport results in a survival rate
for chinook 16 times higher than if they were left to take their chances at the dams. A. NETBOY, supra note
14, at 109-10.
256 For a schematic diagram of the traveling screen bypass system, see FRAMEWORK PLAN, supra note
252, at 11.
257 The Fish and Wildlife Program developed and promulgated by the Northwest Power Planning
Council under the mandate of the Northwest Power Act of 1980, see supra text accompanying notes 202-17,
calls for studies to determine the efficiency of this system. The Corps of Engineers was to complete them
by November 15, 1983. Proposals for structural modifications to reduce injury and mortality to fish were
also due at that time. FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, supra note 216, at 4-7 to 4-8.
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ing them by truck or barge. 258 In contrast, Ice Harbor Dam-the last of the
Snake River projects-is equipped with a sluiceway that passes juvenile fish by
spillage over the ungraded height of the dam. 259 Thus, two of the four Snake
River dams currently lack effective long-term bypass systems, and juvenile
salmon passage must be accomplished either by controlled and sequential spill-
ing of the fish over the dam2 60 or by trucking trapped fish around the obstacle for
release below. Depending on the outcome of studies designed to determine the
effectiveness of each method, it may be expected that both will be phased out as
better on-site bypass systems are designed and built. To the extent these timed
and mandatory spills involve energy production tradeoffs, require more accurate
information on costs and benefits than is currently available, and limit consump-
tive withdrawal for irrigation, powerful incentive exists for energy and water
managers to implement effective bypass systems in order to eliminate these
wasteful but currently necessary spills.
Lower Granite-the first dam our migrant chinook meets-is also subject to a
"water budget." This is a plan whereby a fixed quantity of water is "budgeted"
for release to provide adequate flow during peak periods of downstream migra-
tion.2 6 1 In the past the overriding commitment to meeting energy demands has
resulted in reduced river flows at critical times of a migrant fish's life cycle. The
effects of diminished flows on fingerling salmon are well known: travel time to
the ocean is increased, and this delay exposes the fish to higher mortality from
altered water chemistry and higher water temperatures, which in turn cause in-
creased susceptibility to disease. Mortality also results from disorientation and
residualism caused by slack water and by predation from other fish that flourish
in slack water. 26 2 Water budgets, therefore, are calculated to minimize such risks
to the greatest extent compatible with firm power commitments, appropriative
water rights, and flood control. 26 3
258 See supra text accompanying note 255.
259 The effectiveness of both the transport system and the sluiceway is in dispute. At both the Lower
Monumental and the Ice Harbor Dams the Fish and Wildlife Program requires the Corps of Engineers to
develop and implement an interim plan for spillway passage. The plan must be sufficient to protect the
fish during periods of peak migration at survival levels "comparable to or better than that achievable by
the best available bypast system" until permanent solutions to migration problems can be achieved. FISH
AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, supra note 216, at 4-8. The plan also requires studies and implementation of
findings to minimize stressful and crowded holding conditions where fish must be trucked. Id. at 4-9 to 4-
10.
260 "Sequential spills" are timed spills at successive dams, designed to maximize spillage as the peak
period of migration of a particular downstream run is passing. Another passage technique is sequential
load dropping, whereby power turbines are shut down in sequence to ease passage of a downstream fish
run. Blumm, supra note 109, at 219-20 n.35. At this point the reader may begin to appreciate the ex-
traordinary complexity of the task of anadromous fish management in the Columbia River Basin and why
interconnected computing systems have become increasingly necessary.
261 On the novelty of the water budget plan, see t4fra text accompanying notes 396-401. The water
budget program is to be developed and coordinated by "water budget managers"-representatives of state
fish and wildlife agencies and the affected treaty Indian tribes, whose recommendations are subject to
approval by the Northwest Power Planning Council. FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, supra note 216, at 3-
4.
262 FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, supra note 216, at 3-1.
263 The total water budget at Lower Granite Dam is 1.19 million acre-feet (MAF) or 20,000 cubic feet
per second per month. The Fish and Wildlife Program requires the water budget managers to apportion
the flow over the dam during the critical season of peak migration. Id. at 3-4. Since virtually all water
projects in the Columbia River Power System are interconnected, it is necessary to compute a water
budget at only one strategically placed dam on each tributary. The corresponding water budget dam on
the middle Columbia will be the Priest Rapids Dam. Id. at 3-3. On the contractual agreements that make
integrated operation possible, see Blumm, supra note 109, at 249-56.
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Accordingly, minimum flow requirements for optimum survival of juvenile
fish are under development for Lower Granite Dam, with quantities chosen to
insure a sufficient volume of water for the critical spring migration of April 15 to
June 15.264 The water budget program will need close monitoring because, un-
like turbine mortalities, adequate seasonal river flow for fish is a problem not
readily solved by technology. 265
At Pasco, Washington our fingerling enters the mainstem of the Columbia, at
the place where Lewis and Clark saw thriving Indian fisheries 178 years ago.
26 6
Four more dams-all federal, stretching across the Columbia between Washing-
ton and Oregon-remain to be crossed before the chinook fingerling has unim-
peded passage to the sea.26 7 Only one of them-The Dalles Dam, which, as we
have seen, flooded Celilo Falls in 1956, bringing the Indian fishery there to an
end 26 8 -has a fully functional sluiceway bypass system operating at its fullest
potential. At Bonneville-the last dam in the downstream direction and the old-
est federal dam in the Columbia River Basin-bypass systems with submersible
traveling screens are currently being installed at the two powerhouses on the
dam. 2 6 9
Having passed Bonneville Dam, the chinook fingerling encounters no further
structural obstacles in its migration to the sea. The hazards it now meets are
predation, in-river pollution, or the smolting process itself. It rests temporarily in
the estuary of the Columbia River, completing its adjustment to salt water. Pass-
ing the bar of the Columbia River, the young fish turns northward as before.
Over a period of months and years it reaches its destination on the feeding
grounds of the continental shelf of the Gulf of Alaska, where it feeds, fattens, and
becomes a harvestable adult. At this point in our narrative, management
problems shift from those of habitat preservation and enhancement to allocation
problems.
264 See t'fra text accompanying notes 402-07.
265 The Council believes that a Water Budget approach at Priest Rapids and Lower Granite
dams will markedly increase the number of Columbia Basin fish without seriously affecting
the provision of an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable water supply. However,
since this is the first effort to establish a Water Budget for fisheries enhancement, the Coun-
cil anticipates that the currently specified Water Budgets may be modified through the pro-
gram amendment process based on study results and on whether increases in scheduled firm
power flows occur in the spring months.
FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, supra note 216, at 3-4.26 6 See supra text accompanying note 24.
267 First is McNary Dam at river mile 292, completed in 1953. It has a gross head of 86 feet and a
reservoir length of 61 miles. John Day Dam at river mile 216 was completed in 1968, and has a head of
105 feet and a reservoir 76 miles long. The Dalles Dam at river mile 192 was completed in 1957; it has a
head of 86 feet and reservoir of 31 miles. Last is Bonneville Dam at river mile 145. Completed in 1938, it
has a head of 59 feet and a reservoir length of 45 miles.2 6aSee supra text accompanying notes 129-33.
26q On the construction of Bonneville Dam, see supra notes 112-17. Of the four Columbia River dams
our fingerling must cross, the first of them-McNary-presents the most difficult passage problems techno-
logically. A number of structural modifications to improve passage of juvenile fish have been undertaken
at McNary Dam since 1968, but their effectiveness is in dispute. The Fish and Wildlife Program required
that studies be completed and proposals submitted by November 15, 1983. At the second dam-John
Day-the Corps of Engineers must complete installation and evaluation of a bypass system with traveling
screens by March 30, 1986. The Bonneville Power Administration is to fund its construction, operation,
and maintenance. In the meantime the Corps of Engineers must implement a spillway passage program at
John Day Dam that will achieve or surpass that achievable by the best available bypass and screening
systems. Studies and proposals for increased effectiveness of the existing bypass systems at The Dalles and
Bonneville dams are to be completed by November 15, 1983 and December 31, 1984 respectively. FISH
AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, supra note 216, at 4-5.
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2. Harvest in the Ocean
Our specimen chinook is now an adult, fully harvestable, feeding in the pe-
lagic pastures of the Gulf of Alaska. So long as it remains in the high seas beyond
the 200-mile limit of the fishery conservation zone of the United States or its
Canadian equivalent, 270 the fish is relatively safe from human exploitation. It is
not likely to be caught by small-scale commercial trollers closely tied to their
home ports; similarly, it is comparatively safe from foreign trawlers or gill netters
who are prohibited by international agreement from intercepting on the high
seas salmon that do not originate in the home rivers of the fishing vessels.2 7 1
Formerly, salmon of United States or Canadian origin were caught on the
high seas in gill nets of the Japanese fishing fleet. 272 But under the terms of a
trilateral treaty originally negotiated in 1952 by Japan, Canada, and the United
States, no Japanese vessel may lawfully engage in high seas fishing for Pacific
salmon of United States or Canadian origin. 2 73
2 70 See supra text accompanying notes 183-87.
271 Salmon, however, are taken as "incidental catches" when vessels are netting or trawling for other
fish. Incidental catches, both inside and outside the 200-mile limit of the fishery conservation zone, remain
a source of heated contention between U.S. and foreign fishers. Inside the boundary of the fishery conser-
vation zone there is currently no allotment of salmon for foreign harvest, except for Japanese fishing in the
westernmost Aleutians, see infra note 275, and by interim provisions of the proposed Pacific Salmon Treaty
with Canada, supra text accompanying note 220. Even so, anadromous fish are frequently taken by foreign
vessels while trawling for hake and similar fish. Although the agency rules implementing the FCMA
require that foreign incidental catches of "prohibited species" be returned to the water dead or alive, 50
C.F.R. § 611.13(b) (1980), it is too much to expect that some will not be surreptitiously consumed or
processed. In 1980 an estimated 8,433 salmon were reported as incidental catches off the coast of Ore-
gon-98% of them chinook. PFMC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 35, at 6. Commercial fishers are inclined to
be suspicious of such figures, thinking that incidental catches are grossly underreported, that Russian
trawlers are clandestinely fishing for salmon, and that in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy, officials look
the other way. OREGON COAST, Aug.-Sept. 1982, at 10-11. Most official sources, however, conclude that
incidental catches have had no significant impact on the resource off the coasts of Oregon and Washing-
ton. OREGON SALMON ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR ON COHO SALMON SITUA-
TION IN OREGON IN 1982 at 15 (Sept. 1982).
Outside the fishery conservation zone the effect of incidental catches may be far more serious. In 1978
the Japanese fleet began a large-scale gill netting operation for squid a thousand miles or so off the coasts
of Oregon and Washington between 40 and 46 degrees north latitude-a situation with high potential for
significant incidental catches of chinook salmon and steelhead, since both feed in the region of the ocean's
thermocline where squid are found. Investigations have revealed that not only are Japanese fishing vessels
taking increased numbers of salmon as incidental catches, but also that they have illegally increased active
interception of salmon of North American origin. Japanese Activity Seen as Potential Danger to Fishety, The
Oregonian, Feb. 24, 1983, at D8. Congressional members of the House Merchant Marine Committee have
asked Secretary of State Shultz to warn the Japanese government that future allocations of fish to
Japanese fishers within the U.S. fishery conservation zone "will be influenced by Japanese commitment to
resolution of the salmon interception problems." OCEAN SCIENCE NEWS, Feb. 28, 1983, at 4. Taiwanese
vessels are also suspected of poaching salmon of U.S. origin on the high seas. PACIFIC FISHING, Nov. 1983,
at 18.
272 The Japanese began high seas gill net fishing for salmon in 1932, discontinued it during the war and
resumed in 1952. For a summary of the history of the Japanese high seas salmon fishery, see F. JONES,
FISH MIGRATION 65-66 (1968). Of the four nations bordering the North Pacific with a sizeable domestic
salmon fishery (Canada, the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and Japan), only Japan has engaged in high seas salmon
fishing. More recently, South Korean vessels have occasionally joined the Japanese. Salmon fishing in the
other Pacific rim nations is concentrated in coastal waters. For a detailed account of the development of
the ocean salmon fishery in the North Pacific and of the international agreements that have accompanied
that development, see E. MILES, S. GIBBS, D. FLUHARTY, C. DAWSON, & D. TEETER, THE MANAGEMENT
OF MARINE REGIONS: THE NORTH PACIFIC 90-97 (1982) [hereinafter cited as N. PACIFIC MARINE
MANAGEMENT].
273 Officially entitled International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean,
May 9, 1952, 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786 [hereinafter cited as Trilateral Pacific Salmon Treaty], the
treaty went into effect in 1953. See generally VAN CLEVE & JOHNSON, MANAGEMENT OF THE HIGH SEAS
FISHERIES OF THE NORTHEASTERN PACIFIC, University of Washington Publications in Fisheries, New
Series, Vol. II, No. 2 (1963); and J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, THE PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES:
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The Trilateral Pacific Salmon Treaty embodies the so-called "abstention prin-
ciple" propounded by the United States. According to this principle, the nation
of origin has governing interest in its anadromous fish and has the authority to
prohibit high seas fishing on fully exploited stocks that originate in its territorial
waters. In short, salmon should be managed and harvested only by their country
of origin or at its sufferance, because the nation of origin foregoes other uses of
freshwater environments in order to maintain salmon populations.2 74 As origi-
nally embodied in the Treaty, the abstention principle is manifested in a prohibi-
tion of Japanese fishing of Canadian or United States salmon eastward of a
provisional line drawn for the most part at the 1750 West longitude meridian,
which bisects the Aleutian Island chain in a north-south direction. 2 75
The passage of the FCMA in 1976-in particular the provision that asserts
A STUDY OF IRRATIONAL CONSERVATION 190-94 (1969). For a detailed history of events that preceded
and followed ratification, see Johnson, The japan-United States Salmon Conflit, 43 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1967).
Diplomatically weak after its World War II defeat, Japan agreed to abstain from fishing North American
salmon stocks on the high seas without receiving anything substantial in return. Now that Japan is more
secure diplomatically and economically, its continued participation in the Treaty is bolstered by U.S.
fishing concessions for other species within the 200-mile exclusive fishery zone.
274 Source nations, especially the U.S., "reason that they have expended large sums in protecting spawn-
ing areas and fish runs and thus deserve first crack at the resource, that high seas gill-netting captures or
kills the fish before they attain their optimum size and is therefore wasteful, and that indiscriminate fishing
on several stocks at once jeopardizes rational management of individual salmon runs." Jacobson, The Law
of the Sea Conference's "New" Salmon Provision, Ocean Law Memo No. 11, Ocean & Coastal Law Center,
University of Oregon School of Law at 1 (Dec. 1978). See also Copes, The Law of the Sea and Management of
Anadromous Fish Stocks, 4 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 233, 243-44 (1977). On the status of the abstention
principle in international law before the Law of the Sea negotiations, see Johnson, supra note 273, at 27-34
and the sources cited therein; Yamamoto, The Abstention Principle and Its Relation to the Evolving International
Law of the Seas, 43 WASH. L. REv. 45 (1967).
275 A subsidiary but important provision of the Convention established the International North Pacific
Fisheries Commission (INPFC) to conduct scientific investigation into the life histories and oceanic ranges
of Pacific salmon, and thereby to determine areas where North American and Asian stocks intermingle.
Trilateral Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 273, Art. III. Much of what is now known about the migra-
tion of Pacific salmon was learned from investigations conducted under the supervision of the INPFC.
The Treaty provides a fine example of what happens when regulations are written in advance of scien-
tific study. In the early 1950s very little was known about the physical oceanography of the North Pacific,
and virtually nothing about the oceanic migration routes of Pacific salmon. After the Treaty was signed
and ratified, tagging studies sponsored by the INPFC showed that some stocks of Alaska sockeye migrate
into international waters beyond the farthest Aleutians west of the agreed-upon meridian. There they
mingle with Asian stocks from Siberian rivers, and were being captured by Japanese gill netters. R.
BROWNING, FISHERIES OF THE NORTH PACIFIC 47 (rev. ed. 1980). See also Major, The High-Seas Distribution
of North American Salmon and Their Vulnerability to Foreign Exploitation Under Various High-Seas Treaty Arrange-
ments, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON SALMON AQUACULTURE AND THE ALASKAN FISHING
COMMUNITY 201-37 (University of Alaska Sea Grant Program, 1976). Similarly, Asian salmon were found
to migrate east of the dividing line, but neither U.S. nor Canadian fishers operated in this area. The
Treaty was therefore amended in 1978, see infra note 277, and the revised agreement sharply reduced
Japanese harvest of North American salmon by moving the "abstention line" 10 degrees of longitude
westward across the international dateline.
In return for this Japanese concession, the revised agreement also provides for limited Japanese fishing
of Asian salmon stocks off the coast of the westernmost Aleutians within the 200-mile fishery conservation
zone of the U.S. at times when salmon of Alaskan origin are not normally present. In the "Governing
International Fishery Agreement" (GIFA) which, under the provisions of the FCMA, see supra text accom-
panying note 186, allows Japan to harvest surplus stocks of U.S. controlled fish other than salmon, Japan
has apparently tacitly conceded the U.S. claim to its high seas salmon wherever they may be found,
although the North American salmon stocks that frequent the North Pacific will no doubt remain attrac-
tive targets in the event of a diplomatic disagreement between the U.S. and Japan. Jacobson, supra note
274, at 2. See also supra note 192. The Japanese (and to a lesser extent the South Koreans and the
Taiwanese, who also operate distant-water fishing fleets) are thus in a position to become a significant
threat to some stocks of North American salmon. At the moment, however, the Japanese salmon catch is
mostly of Asian origin; it comes from spawning streams in the Soviet Union under an agreement reached
by Japan and the U.S.S.R. in 1956 under the title Convention Concerning the High Seas Fisheries of the
Northwest Pacific Ocean. See generally N. PACIFIC MARINE MANAGEMENT, supra note 272, at 93-95.
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control over anadromous fish of United States origin beyond the 200-mile limit
of the fishery conservation zone 27 6 -rendered the 1952 Convention obsolete. Ac-
cordingly, the Trilateral Pacific Salmon Treaty was renegotiated by means of a
Protocol in 1978, again with Japan, Canada, and the United States as signato-
ries.27 7 The salmon fishery provisions were substantially the same as those in the
1952 Treaty, except that the "abstention" line was moved farther from United
States shores.2 78
The high seas of the North Pacific under the coverage of the Trilateral Pacific
Salmon Treaty comprise management jurisdiction number one of our list. En-
forcement of the prohibition against salmon fishing is accomplished through dip-
lomatic channels under the United States Department of State.
Article XII of the 1978 Protocol amending the Trilateral Pacific Salmon
Treaty provides for review by all parties "upon the conclusion of a multilateral
treaty resulting from the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea." The phrase refers to the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention, negotiated
over many years and signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica in late 1982.279
Article 66 of the Law of the Sea Treaty deals with anadromous fish. 28 0 Its
application to our narrative, however, is problematic, because at this writing the
276 See supra text accompanying notes 188-92.
277 Protocol Amending the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific
Ocean, Apr. 25, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 1095, T.I.A.S. No. 9242. The original 1952 treaty covered herring and
halibut fisheries in addition to salmon. The 1978 agreement applies only to salmon. For a detailed discus-
sion of treaty provisions now in effect and current catch statistics, see N. PACIFIC MARINE MANAGEMENT,
supra note 272, at 170-73.2 78 See supra note 275.
279 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Draft Final Act of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (Doc. No. A/Conf. 62/122, Oct. 21, 1982). For summary reviews of the
Convention, see Oxman, The New Law of the Sea, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1983, at 156; Borgese, The Law ofthe Sea,
Scd. AM., Mar. 1983, at 42. For a summary of the negotiations that preceded the signing see Wertenbaker,
The Law ofthe Sea, The New Yorker, Aug. 1, 1983, at 38, and Aug. 8, 1983, at 56.
2
ao eeraly Copes, The Law ofthe Sea and Management of Anadromous Fish Stocks, 4 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
L.J. 233 (1977). Article 66 (Article 55 in earlier drafts of the LOS Treaty) provides:
1. States in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the primary interest in
and responsibility for such stocks.
2. The State of origin of anadromous stocks shall ensure their conservation by the es-
tablishment of appropriate regulatory measures for fishing in all waters landward of the
outer limits of its exclusive economic zone and for fishing provided for in paragraph 3(b).
The State of origin may, after consultations with the other States referred to in paragraphs 3
and 4 fishing these stocks, establish total allowable catches for stocks originating in its rivers.
3. (a) Fisheries for anadromous stocks shall be conducted only in waters landward of the
outer limits of exclusive economic zones, except in cases where this provision would result
in economic dislocation for a State other than the State of origin. With respect to such
fishing beyond the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone, States concerned shall
maintain consultations with a view to achieving agreement on terms and conditions of
such fishing giving due regard to the conservation requirements and the needs of the
State of origin in respect of these stocks.
(b) The State of origin shall co-operate in minimizing economic dislocation in such
other States fishing these stocks, taking into account the normal catch and the mode of
operations of such States, and all the areas in which such fishing has occurred.
(c) States referred to in subparagraph (b), participating by agreement with the State
of origin in measures to renew anadromous stocks, particularly by expenditures for that
purpose, shall be given special consideration by the State of origin in the harvesting of
stocks originating in its rivers.
(d) Enforcement of regulations regarding anadromous stocks beyond the exclusive
economic zone shall be by agreement between the State of origin and the other States
concerned.
4. In cases where anadromous stocks migrate into or through the waters landward of the
outer limits of the exclusive economic zone of a State other than the State of origin, such
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United States has rejected the LOS treaty and refused to participate further in
negotiations, primarily because of the Reagan Administration's unwillingness to
endorse its provisions on deep seabed mining.28t By Proclamation President
Reagan has, however, substantially endorsed the fishery provisions of the
Treaty.2 2 To the degree that the Presidential Proclamation and the pending
enabling legislation endorse the anadromous fishery provisions of the LOS
Treaty, Article 66 may be expected to supplement and eventually to supersede
the current high seas fishery agreements on Pacific salmon. Although the long-
term effect on high seas salmon fishing of the LOS treaty and the United States
rejection remain uncertain, there is no reason to suppose that either will be the
occasion of any immediate change in the status quo. 28
3
State shall co-operate with the State of origin with regard to the conservation and manage-
ment of such stocks.
5. The State of origin of anadromous stocks and other States fishing these stocks shall
make arrangements for the implementation of the provisions of this article, where appropri-
ate, through regional organizations.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Draft Final Act of the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea (Doc. No. A/Conf. 62/122, Oct. 26, 1982); see also 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1261 (Nov. 1982) at 1282-83. It is unclear whether Article 66 creates new international law or whether it
merely institutionalizes international agreements and customs as they now stand. By effectively prohibit-
ing salmon fishing beyond a signatory nation's Exclusive Economic Zone, most probably it creates new
law, when international custom is silent. For a discussion of problems interpreting Article 66 see N. PA-
CIFIC MARINE MANAGEMENT, supra note 255, at 140-42.
The LOS Treaty also recognizes the primary interest of the nation of origin in salmon management.
There is, however, one potentially important exception to the abstention principle embodied in the
Treaty: any nation that can demonstrate "economic dislocation" by the ban on high seas salmon fishing
might legally continue to fish in its accustomed places and with its usual methods.
Although originally designed to allow nations with no indigenous salmon resource but with a demon-
strable economic interest in the fishery-like Japan--to continue fishing on the high seas, the economic
dislocation exception as developed requires signatories to "maintain consultations with a view to achieving
agreement on terms and conditions of such fishing giving due regard to the conservation requirements and
needs of the State of origin. ... Art. 66(3)(a). See Jacobson,supra note 274, at 2-3. See also Jacobson &
Cameron, Potential Confltics Between a Future Law of the Sea Treaty and the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976, WASH. L. REV. 451 (1977). The anadromous fish provisions of the LOS were not an item of
central interest in the negotiations. Only nine nations, so far limited to the Northern Hemisphere, have
direct economic and conservation interests in anadromous fish: Canada, Denmark, Great Britain, Iceland,
Ireland, Japan, Norway, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R. Only six of these actively made proposals in the
negotiations. Copes, supra note 263, at 241.
21 See also Larson, The Reagan Admtnilstraton and the Law ofthe Sea, 11 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. (1982);
LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY DILEMMA (B. Oxman, D. Caron & C. Buderi eds. 1983). See also Law of the
Sea Symposium, OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 1984); Shusterich, Comments on the [President's Ocean Pohl State-
ment, OCEANUS, Summer 1983, at 69.
212 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 14, 1983). At this writing, implementing legislation to establish unilater-
ally a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone that will parallel certain provisions of the LOS Treaty has been
introduced by Sen. Ted Stevens of Alaska and Rep. John Breaux of Louisiana. MARINE FISH MANAGE-
MENT, Feb.-Mar. 1983, at 5. The bills, S. 750 and H.R. 2061, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 11, 1983, are
identical except that the Stevens bill proposes a five-year phaseout of all foreign fishing in the Exclusive
Economic Zone of the U.S.
283 There is currently no lawful foreign fishing on the high seas beyond 200 miles for Pacific salmon of
U.S. origin. (But see supra note 271.) Should any exist at the time the U.S. might choose to become a full
signatory to the LOS Treaty, whatever foreign salmon fishery then exists when the Treaty becomes law
may be effectively frozen by the "economic dislocation" exception, supra note 280, and for that reason
might be correspondingly difficult to phase out.
The current "hands-off" approach to U.S. salmon on the high seas, publicly though tacitly observed by
all nations, might be drastically disrupted if some other nation-for example, the Soviet Union, South
Korea, or the People's Republic of China--should undertake harvest of North American salmon beyond
the Exclusive Economic Zone of the U.S. in contravention of Article 66, perhaps using U.S. rejection of the
LOS Treaty as a justification. Such an action would no doubt invite retaliatory restrictions on fishing
fleets that might operate in the United States fishery conservation zone under the terms of the FCMA. See
supra text accompanying notes 183-92. Ironically, the 1982 amendments to the FCMA, which commit the
U.S. to a policy of eventually phasing out altogether foreign fishing within the fishery conservation zone,
see supra note 177, may have the effect of increasing fishing pressure on U.S. salmon stocks on the high seas.
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Article 66 of the Law of the Sea Treaty, to the uncertain extent that it supple-
ments the existing Trilateral Pacific Salmon Treaty to which the United States is
a party, 2 4 constitutes the second management jurisdiction through which our
chinook salmon will probably pass. Because the LOS Treaty has not yet been
ratified by a sufficient number of nations for it to become effective, and because
of the ambiguous nature of United States endorsement of its fishery provisions, it
should, strictly speaking, not be counted among the management jurisdiction
described. We include it nevertheless for the sake of completeness, and because
of its potential importance in high seas fishery management. When enabling
legislation that tracks the fishery provisions of the LOS Treaty becomes opera-
tive, enforcement will occur through diplomatic channels under the Department
of State.2 5
As our chinook begins its homeward migration it leaves the bountiful feeding
grounds of the continental shelf. Moving landward across the boundary of the
200-mile fishery conservation zone, the fish seeks the coastal waters of southeast
Alaska. Here it enters the jurisdiction of the Northern Pacific Fishery Manage-
ment Council (NPFMC), one of the two west coast regional councils established
in 1976 by the FCMA.28 6 Management decisions are made in accordance with
the provisions of the Act.28 7 The NPFMC is the third management jurisdiction
our salmon must cross on its way home. Enforcement of its regulations is accom-
plished by the United States Coast Guard and agents of the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS).288
Eventually, the fish will move back into state territorial waters that lie within
three nautical miles of the coastline. Here it falls under the jurisdiction of the
Alaska Department of Fish and Game,28 9 which administers the salmon fishery
under Alaska law, but also under policies developed in conjunction with the
NPFMC.29 0 In 1982, 255,000 chinook were harvested by both line and net off
the coast of southeast Alaska within the jurisdictions of both the state and the
management council. 29 1
The Alaska Department of Fish and Game is the fourth management jurisdic-
tion with authority to oversee the pursuit of homeward-bound salmon. Depart-
ment wardens and state'police are charged with enforcement, but state fishery
regulations are subject to federal preemption by the United States Secretary of
If distant-water fishing fleets of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea are excluded from fishing in U.S. waters,
fishing pressure will be deflected to whatever stocks remain on the high seas. United States salmon on the
high seas of the North Pacific will be particularly tempting, because effective U.S. enforcement of its claim
over them will no doubt prove difficult.
284 S, supra text accompanying note 273.
285 See supra note 282.
286 See supra note 194. Here the fish first become vulnerable to land-based commercial and charterboat
trollers, who cruise the nearshore regions from Cape Fairweather north of Sitka, Alaska, to Cape
Foulweather, south of Newport, Oregon, during the trolling season. Since the 1960s, commercial trollers
have dominated the coastal salmon fishery. B. BROWN, MOUNTAIN IN THE CLOUDS: A SEARCH FOR THE
WILD SALMON 52 (1982).2 8 7 See supra text accompanying notes 177-201.
2 88 See supra text accompanying note 200.
289 ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.251 (1977). On the development of the Alaska salmon fishery see generally R.
COOLEY, POLITICS AND CONSERVATION: THE DECLINE OF THE ALASKA SALMON (1963); J. REARDEN,
ALASKA'S SALMON FISHERIES (1983). See also NATURAL RESOURCE CONSULTANTS, A STUDY OF THE
OFFSHORE CHINOOK AND COHO SALMON FISHERY OF ALASKA (Apr. 1981).290 See supra note 194.
291 See supra note 240.
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Commerce or the Secretary of the Interior.2 92
Our chinook next moves southward into the territorial waters of Canada,
where it comes under the jurisdiction of the Canada Department of Fisheries and
Oceans (CDFO).293 Preliminary figures from the CDFO indicate that during the
1982 fishing season 1.5 million chinook were taken in British Columbia waters, 294
and it may be that more salmon are caught in the waters of the Inland Passage
off British Columbia than in any comparable saltwater stretch in the world. 295
The Canada Department of Fisheries and Oceans is the fifth management juris-
diction through which the homeward bound chinook will pass. To the extent its
provisions may now be in place on an interim basis,2 96 the proposed Pacific
Salmon Treaty between the United States and Canada is the sixth.
After leaving Canadian waters, the fish now crosses back into the fishery con-
servation zone of the United States off the coasts of Washington and Oregon.
Here the Pacific Fishery Management Council (PFMC) presides under the provi-
sions of the FCMA.297 The PFMC, distinct from, yet working in cooperation
with the NPFMC, its northern counterpart off Alaska, is the seventh manage-
ment jurisdiction.
In search of the mouth of the Columbia River, the fish moves shoreward back
within the three-mile limit of state sovereignty, into the territorial waters of
Washington and Oregon. The Washington Department of Fisheries and the Or-
egon Department of Fish and Wildlife are the eighth and ninth management
jurisdictions. 298 Our specimen chinook is now prepared to complete its epic jour-
ney by entering once more the waters of the Columbia River. In its homeward
migration through the ocean it has traversed about half the number of jurisdic-
tions through which it must pass before its travels are complete. The remaining
half must be traversed during the final 700 miles of its trip.
292 On federal preemption of state fishing regulations see mfia note 304.
293 See supra note 221. Description of Canadian management authority over Pacific salmon lies beyond
the scope of this article, except insofar as it relates to the proposed Pacific Salmon Treaty. See supra text
accompanying note 218-44.
294 See supra note 240.
295 A. NETBOY, supra note 3, at 268.
2 96 See supra note 220.
2 97 See supra note 195. Assistance in coordinating the actions of the PFMC and its northern counterpart,
the NPFMC, see supra note 194, is provided by the Inter-Council Salmon Coordinating Committee. The
PFMC, relying for the most part on data provided by the constituent states, develops annual amendments
to its 1978 management plan for regulating the ocean salmon fisheries under its jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Pacific Fishery Management Council, Proposed Plan for Managing the 1983 Salmon Fisheries Off the
Coasts of California, Oregon, and Washington (May 1983) [hereinafter cited PFMC 1983 Plan]. The
process of making annual amendments to the salmon plan has become excessively burdensome. Because
annual fishery statistics are usually incomplete when the annual public review draft of the arpendments is
published, the final draft adopted in April or May often bears little resemblance to the earlier draft. The
PFMC is proposing to streamline its rulemaking procedures by adopting a Salmon Framework Plan by
1985. PFMC To Consider Rule Changes, SALMON NEWS, Or. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, Oct. 1983, at 1. See
generally Pacific Fishery Management Council, Proposed Framework Plan for Managing the Ocean Fisher-
ies Off the Coasts of Washington, Oregon, and California Commencing in 1984 (Feb. 1983).
298 Statutory authority comes from WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 75.18.005 (1983) and OR. REV. STAT.
§ 507.010 (1981). The Washington Department of Fisheries and the Department of Game actually are
independent agencies, each with separate responsibilities in fish management. They have been treated as a
single unit here. Four Washington state Indian tribes, the Makah, Quileute, Hoh, and Quinault, have
treaty rights to fish for salmon in the coastal waters off Washington state. PFMC 1983 Plan, supra note
297, at 6.
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3. Harvest in the River
On its way to the headwaters of the Lochsa River to spawn, the returning fish
eventually crosses the bar of the Columbia River. Here the balkanization of
management regimes becomes most extreme, because regulatory authority on the
Columbia and the Snake River is distributed among three state agencies, one
interstate compact, two federal agencies, and four Indian tribes. It is a complex
relationship governed by a far-flung legislative and judicial infrastructure.299 Al-
though coordination among responsible agencies is attempted and achieved with
varying degrees of success, each retains autonomous authority to manage the
salmon harvest. 3
° °
The first management regime the fish will encounter on leaving the ocean is
the Columbia River Compact of 1918,301 which gives the fish and wildlife agen-
299 FRAMEWORK PLAN, supra note 252, at 31-32. The PFMC and each of the state and federal agencies
involved in salmon management on the Columbia are in turn subject to orders of the federal district courts
of Oregon and western Washington, both of which hold continuing jurisdiction over salmon allocation
disputes arising from actions of the states, the treaty tribes, or the PFMC. See supra text accompanying
notes 164-71. See generally Comment, Empty Victories.- Indian Treaty Fishing Rights in the Pacifx Northwest, 10
ENVTL. L. 413 (1980). The interjurisdictional relationships are governed by overlays of various manage-
ment plans jointly developed, sometimes under court supervision. The annual management plans of the
regional fisheries councils have already been mentioned, supra text accompanying notes 196-201. Another
plan, negotiated between the treaty Indian tribes and the states of Washington and Oregon in 1977, ex-
pired in 1982 and has not been renegotiated. See A Plan for Managing Fisheries on Stocks Originating
from the Columbia River and Its Tributaries Above Bonneville Dam (Feb. 1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977
Plan]. See also Heinemann, Securing a Fair Share.- Indian Treaty Rights and the "Comprehensive" Plan for the
Columbia River, Natural Resources Law Institute, Anadromous Fish Law Memo No. 21 (Mar. 1983). A
third fisheries plan promulgated by the Columbia River Fisheries Council, a non-regulatory advisory and
coordinating body comprised of representatives of Oregon, Washington, Idaho, two federal agencies, and
the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, see 1979 GAO Report, supra note 96, at IV-12-IV-14,
provides that constituent jurisdictions allot the salmon and steelhead harvest according to three general
principles, in decreasing order of priority. Allotments must: (1) meet spawning escapement goals mutu-
ally decided upon; (2) meet Indian treaty obligations as determined by federal courts; and (3) provide
enough fish for productive non-Indian sport and commercial fisheries. The plan was adopted in 1981 by
vote of the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the state fish and wildlife
agencies of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. The treaty Indian tribes of the Columbia River abstained.
FRAMEWORK PLAN, supra note 252, at 19. Ratification of the Pacific Salmon Treaty with Canada, see
supra text accompanying notes 214-17, will of course add another layer to this priority list. The Northwest
Power Planning Council added still another management plan overlay when it adopted the Columbia
River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program in November 1982. See supra, text accompanying notes 214-17.
None of these plans is in fact "comprehensive" because no existing jurisdiction or alliance of jurisdictions
has the ability to protect the anadromous fish resource over its entire range. Other agencies and commis-
sions that have no direct authority over the salmon and steelhead harvest per se nevertheless play key roles
in the life of our hypothetical fish by virtue of their management responsibility over the salmon's habitat.
These agencies include the Northwest Power Planning Council, the Bonneville Power Administration
under the Department of Energy, the Water and Power Resources Service under the Department of the
Interior, the Corps of Engineers under the Department of the Army, the Coast Guard under the Depart-
ment of Transportation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission under the Department of Energy, as
well as federal land managers of the Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service, the Bureau
of Indian Affairs under the Interior Department, and the Forest Service under the Department of Agricul-
ture. State agencies include the Idaho Department of Water Resources, the Oregon Department of Water
Resources, and the Washington Department of Ecology. A host of advisory or coordinating bodies and
quasi-governmental commissions with interests in anadromous fish management also exist. Two of
them-the Columbia River Fisheries Council and the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission-
have been mentioned supra. The Pacific Marine Fisheries Commission was mentioned supra note 143. Also
prominent are the Salmon and Steelhead Advisory Commission, see infa text accompanying note 478, and
the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission. Others are too numerous to list here. See generally Pacific
Northwest River Basins Commission, Agencies, Organizations and Interests Affecting Columbia River
Anadromous Fish (Apr. 1980).
300 On attempts to integrate fragmented management authority, see infa text accompanying notes 470-
83.
301 Article I, section 10 of the Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall, without the consent of Con-
gress . . . enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power .... " In
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cies of Washington and Oregon concurrent jurisdiction over the commercial har-
vest of salmon and steelhead on the mainstem of the Columbia where the river
flows between the two states. This is management jurisdiction number ten.
Salmon or steelhead taken by sport fishers on tributaries that lie wholly within
state boundaries remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate state
agency, which also regulates sport and commercial ocean trolling up to three
miles from shore. 30 2
Two federal agencies also are involved in salmon management on the Colum-
bia River and its tributaries. They are the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS),
under the Department of the Interior, and the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS), under the Department of Commerce. 30 3 Their participation in salmon
management ordinarily is limited to enhancement activities such as hatchery op-
erations. Absent an overriding federal interest, authority to allocate the catch is
left to state fishery agencies and the regional fishing council. The jurisdiction of
the FWS and the NMFS, to the extent the secretaries of the departments under
which they operate may preempt state management authority or override state
or regional management plans, encompasses the entire salmon habitat of the
United States portions of the Columbia River and its tributaries. 30 4 These fed-
1853 Congress gave the Washington and Oregon territories concurrent jurisdiction over the shared main-
stem of the Columbia River. 10 Stat. 172 (1853). In the late nineteenth century, when commercial salmon
fishing was in full swing on the Columbia, Oregon attempted to enforce its more restrictive fishing laws
against Washington fishers, and the State of Washington sought injunctive relief. In In Re Mattson, 69 F.
535 (C.C.D. Or. 1895), the court held that concurrent jurisdiction necessarily meant that all regulatory
actions taken by either state must be approved by both states. Id at 542. In 1915 Washington and
Oregon agreed on uniform fishing laws for the Columbia River, and established a compact that provided:
All laws and regulations now existing, or which may be necessary for regulating, protect-
ing or preserving fish in the waters of the Columbia River, over which the states of Oregon
and Washington have concurrent jurisdiction, or any other waters within either of said
states, which would affect said concurrent jurisdiction, shall be made changed, altered and
amended in whole or in part, only with the mutual consent and approbation of both States.
40 Stat. 515 (1918). Congress ratified the compact three years after the agreement. See generally Wol-
lenberg, The Columbia Rter Fish Compact, 18 OR. L. REV. 88 (1939). Currently Washington regulatory
decisions are made by an appointed director of the Washington Department of Fisheries, WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 75.08.014 (1983), and Oregon's are made by a seven-person commission appointed by the
governor, OR. REV. STAT. § 496.090 (1981). Concurrent regulation is of course enforceable only where the
states agree.
One salient feature of the Compact is that under its provisions the two states' management decisions
may affect the salmon resource beyond the boundaries of either state where no representation exists. Fish
originating and returning to Idaho, for example, are allocated under the Compact, yet Idaho has no voice
in the allocation. Idaho has unsuccessfully sought representation in a seven-year-long suit. In Idaho ex rel.
Evans v. Oregon, 444 U.S. 380 (1980), the Supreme Court refused Idaho's demand for an equitable appor-
tionment of fish in the Columbia-Snake River system. The Court reasoned that apportionment would be
inappropriate unless Idaho could show actual injury by mismanagement. The Court dismissed the suit
without prejudice, leaving Idaho free to bring another action to show injury. Interstate fishery compacts,
because of the constitutional burden and because of natural competition between states, have riot often
been successful. The Columbia River Compact is a notable exception. See generally G. Knight & T. Jack-
son, Legal Impediments to the Use of Interstate Agreements in Coordinated Fisheries Management Pro-
grams: States in the NMFS Southwest Region (Louisiana State University Office oF Sea Grant
Development, Sept. 1973).
302 See supra note 298.
303 The first federal fisheries agency was the Bureau of Fisheries under the Department of Commerce.
In 1939 it was transferred to the Department of the Interior and was renamed the Fish and Wildlife
Service in 1940. In 1956 the FWS split into the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the Bureau of Sport
Fisheries and Wildlife. In 1970 the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries was transferred back to the Depart-
ment of Commerce, where it became part of Commerce's new National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and was renamed the National Marine Fisheries Service. R. HILDRETH & R.
JOHNSON, OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 197 (1983).
304 It is settled that the federal government may preempt a state's power to regulate fisheries within its
territorial waters. The leading case is Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977), in which the
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eral agencies constitute management jurisdictions eleven and twelve.
From the mouth of the Columbia River up to the Bridge of the Gods, an
historic Indian fishing site just below Bonneville Dam, the migrating salmon is
today pursued by non-Indian commercial gill netters. Their catch is regulated
jointly by Washington and Oregon under the Columbia River Compact. The
fish traps and fish wheels of a former era have long since disappeared, replaced
by rows of gill nets stretched from power boats.30 5 Gill netting on this 140-mile
stretch of the river is divided into five management zones, each with different bag
limits and differing, although usually overlapping, seasons that are set according
to projections of the size of the runs and the destination of each. 30 6 Since 1964,
Supreme Court held that catching fish in state waters affects interstate commerce, and that the commerce
clause of the Constitution gives the federal government the right to regulate that activity. In any event,
section 306(b) of the FCMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1856b, specifically reserves to the Secretary of Commerce author-
ity to preempt state fishing regulations (in other than internal waters) where he or she finds that (1) the
fishing in question occurs "predominately within the fishery conservation zone"; and (2) the state action
"will substantially and adversely affect" the operation of a fishery management plan.
The first use of section 306(b) occurred in Oregon in May 1982, when the Secretary of Commerce, after
petition from the Washington Department of Fisheries, preempted a salmon fishing regulation of the State
of Oregon and directed the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration to adopt regula-
tions for the area in question. 50 C.F.R. § 619.4 (1983). The action was taken after an administrative law
judge recommended preemption, finding that a salmon fishery management plan was in place for the
waters off Oregon, that salmon fishing occurs predominately within the fishery conservation zone, and that
the Oregon action would substantially and adversely affect carrying out the salmon plan. See Ray, Admin-
titration of the Fiheries Conservation and Management Act, Ocean Law Memo No. 23 at 6-8 Ocean and Coastal
Law Center, University of Oregon, School of Law (May 1983); Secretar of Commerce Preempts Oregon Salmon
Regulations, 2 TERRITORIAL SEA No. 2 at 6, 9 (Dec. 1982).
The preemption machinery began to grind again on the west coast during the summer of 1983. In
response to the State of Alaska's refusal to abide by the 1983 catch ceiling for chinook salmon, as agreed in
the currently stalled proposed Pacific Salmon Treaty with Canada, seesupra text accompanying notes 218-
44, the Pacific Fishery Management Council in July 1983 petitioned the Secretary of Commerce for pre-
emption of the Alaska regulations. The action was mooted when Alaska closed its season before preemp-
tion could be implemented. Letter from Senator Bob Packwood to Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish
Commission Chairman Harold Culpus (Aug. 4, 1983). Aware, perhaps, that federal preemptive actions
are often time consuming and politically sensitive, states sometimes have not been easily deterred from
enacting fishing regulations inconsistent with those of the Department of Commerce. See generally Green-
berg & Shapiro, Federalism in the Fishery Conseration Zone. A New Role for the States in an Era of Federal Regula-
torg Reform, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 641 (1982); see also Schoenbaum & McDonald, State Management of Marine
Fisheries Afler the FCMA of 1977 & Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 19 WM. & MARY L. REv. 17 (1977);
and Note, Territorial Waters-Ownership & Control, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 240, 241-49 (1976).
305 On gill netting in general see supra note 78. Several initiative petitions have attempted to eliminate
gill netting on the lower Columbia. Regulation of gill netting on the Columbia began in 1915 in Washing-
ton and 1927 in Oregon. Fixed gear was prohibited in Washington in 1935 and in Oregon in 1949. Since
1950 drift gill nets have been the only legal commercial fishing method on the Columbia River for non-
Indians. See generally C. SMITH, SALMON FISHERS, supra note 41, at 91-100. The most recent initiative, a
1964 Oregon ballot measure designed to eliminate all net fishing on the Columbia, was defeated. A.
NETBOY, supra note 14, at 124. Gill netting continues on the lower Columbia, although the season is
shortened almost every year in order to meet escapement goals and court-dictated Indian treaty obliga-
tions. From 1909 until the 1940s a typical gill netting season lasted 270 days; by 1980 it was down to 14
days. In 1982 the fall gill net season on the lower Columbia lasted only a single day. As of this writing, the
1983 season has been open twelve hours, and only 14,900 fish have been netted, earning only 50 cents per
pound. Rumors of the imminent collapse of the Columbia River gill net industry are widespread, and a
non-Indian can no longer make a full-time living fishing the Columbia River. Sabella, Salmon Review '83,
PACIFIC FISHING, Nov. 1983, at 82. Gill netters-a small but tenacious group of third and fourth genera-
tion fishers-are now near the bottom in user-group priority, and their shrinking allotment must be
crammed into a few hysterical hours of fishing per season. Even so, between 1965 and 1977 the number of
Columbia River gill net vessels grew from 237 to over 700. H.R. REP. No. 96-1243, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 34 (1980). For an account of the worsening plight of the lower Columbia River gill netters see Cekay,
Rage Against the Dyng Light, The Sunday Oregonian, May 8, 1983 (Magazine) at 4.306See charts and map, FRAMEWORK PLAN, supra note 252, at 18. The five zones are statistical landing
areas that correspond to Washington county boundaries. Escapement goals for each stock vary according
to the expected size of the run, the production area for which the returning fish are bound, the projected
efficiency of the harvest, and the expected proportion of wild to hatchery fish. Reliable data on which
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gill netting for the upriver summer chinook run-once the most valuable of all
runs-has been almost entirely prohibited. Gone also are the upriver spring chi-
nook fishery and the early fall fishery-the last seasons occurring in 1977 and
1979 respectively. Only a short winter season (February - March) and an abbre-
viated late fall season (September - November) remain, closed early by necessity
in an attempt to deflect fishing pressure toward more hardy hatchery stocks. 307
these projections are based are difficult to obtain, and they are quickly rendered obsolete by changes in
environmental conditions, migration patterns, or market conditions. Reliable data on the distribution and
behavior of wild chinook stocks in the ocean are virtually nonexistent, because the separate stocks can be
distinguished only by tagging-impractical for wild fingerlings-or by their time and place of assembly
for upriver migration. A newly developed method of distinguishing wild from hatchery fish by "reading
scales" is costly and not yet fully reliable.
Lacking reliable data on which to project the size and timing of chinook runs, fishery managers must
adjust quotas and season lengths on short notice, as the fishing season progresses and catch statistics be-
come available. Because chinook runs vary in size from year to year, and because the size of each run
cannot be accurately determined until some fishing has occurred on the lower river, fixed numbers of fish
cannot be allocated in advance. Instead, percentages of each run are allocated to each user group. For
example, the 1977 Columbia River comprehensive plan allotted 60% of the usable fall chinook run to
treaty Indian fishers and 40% to all others. 1977 Plan, supra note 299, at 6-7.
Estimates of the size of a run can be made from lower river catch reports, but accuracy is not assured
until the fish pass counting stations on the fish ladders at Bonneville Dam. If the run turns out to be larger
than expected, the season may be extended accordingly; if smaller, the season will be curtailed. At this
point, however, much of the harvest already has been landed, and if the first accurate count at Bonneville
Dam reveals an overestimation, the burden of the resulting abbreviated season falls most heavily on
upriver users, who are primarily Indian and sport fishers. Yet, because the federal courts have guaranteed
to the Indian fishers a certain portion of the harvest, see supra text accompanying notes 164-72, downriver
fishery managers must be doubly cautious in their projections to allow for a margin of error. Where the
upriver Indian fishery is cheated in one year by overestimation of run size, the deficiency must be made up
in subsequent years.
This lack of predictability is, of course, a potent source of conflict between user groups and fishery
managers. But it is only the first of many intractable problems that managers encounter in allocating the
anadromous fish resource of the Columbia River Basin.
A second complication results when salmon whose home streams lie in tributaries below Bonneville
Dam are migrating upriver simultaneously with stocks from tributaries above the dam. Salmon runs
overlap, and migrations are composed of fish of different sizes, different home streams, and different ge-
netic strains. In such circumstances fishing on the lower river with lower river stocks as a target results in a
significant incidental harvest of much less numerous upriver stocks. Thus, the length and timing of the
lower river fishing seasons may critically affect the number of fish that reach upriver spawning grounds.
A third complication arises when wild fish stocks mingle with hatchery stocks, resulting in a "mixed-
stock fishery." Because no reliably effective way of selectively fishing a particular stock in the ocean exists,
it is virtually impossible to protect weak stocks fully without simultaneously restricting the harvest of
stronger stocks. Hatchery stocks can usually sustain greater fishing pressure than their wild cousins: as a
general rule the harvest rate of wild stocks must not exceed 67% in order to provide adequate escapement,
while hatchery stocks may be safely harvested at 95% or higher. D. Poon & J. Garcia, supra note 208, at 9.
Accordingly, if harvest allotment is set to meet escapement needs of hatchery fish, the natural component
of a run will be severely overfished, thus further increasing dependence on artificial propagation. Con-
versely, if the harvest is set to afford fullest protection to wild stocks, the politically unacceptable result is
that hatchery fish survive to spawn far in excess of escapement needs. The problem of mixed stock man-
agement continues to elude solution.
Dilemmas like these make it necessary for salmon managers to devise a set of complex apportionment
formulas annually, which are necessarily tentative and subject to emergency revision. See, e.g., FRAME-
WORK PLAN, supra note 252, at 25-27, for samples of such formulas. Despite the Sisyphean magnitude of
the salmon manager's task, few users are satisfied with the results, for economic trauma inevitably falls on
some user group. Although gradual refinements in predictive capability may be expected as more data
become available on the distribution of specific stocks in the ocean, the day when the salmon runs of the
Columbia can be managed with precision probably lies far in the future.
307 Before passage of the FCMA in 1976, see supra text accompanying notes 177-201, the ocean salmon
fisheries off the west coast were not regulated to achieve specific stock-by-stock conservation and allocation
goals. Neither were the allowable catches adjusted to reflect the annually fluctuating numbers of fish
available for harvest. Natural stocks were consequently overfished and an increasingly disproportionate
share of the harvest accrued to the ocean fishery at the expense of the river fishery. PFMC PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 35, at 14.
The upriver wild chinook runs suffered the most, particularly the spring and summer runs. Even with
increasingly restrictive seasons and bag and size limits, these stocks are hovering near an all-time low. The
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The lower river fall run of chinook, once disdained as a fish of inferior quality,
now accounts for the largest portion of the commercial catch in the lower Colum-
bia River.30 8 Our Lochsa River chinook, as a wild member of the upriver sum-
mer run, will probably escape the gill nets; fishery managers try to set the seasons
so that the nets will not be in the river when upriver wild fish pass through.
For a 130-mile stretch beyond the Bridge of the Gods up to the Umatilla River
lies a sixth management zone, which is the exclusive commercial fishing preserve
of about three or four hundred members of treaty Indian tribes who fish with set
nets stretched across portions of the river.3 0 9 The commercial Indian fishery in
this zone is regulated jointly by the states of Washington and Oregon under the
Columbia River Plan of 1977 under the continuing supervision of federal
courts.3 1 0 On this same stretch of the Columbia, subsistence and ceremonial In-
dian salmon fisheries are separately regulated by officials of the Warm Springs,
Yakima, Umatilla, and Nez Perce tribes, again under the supervision of federal
courts. 31 1 The autonomous allocation authority of these four tribes comprises
management jurisdictions thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen. 3 12
If our chinook has survived the ocean trollers and the sea lions, the gill netters
and bureaucrats of the lower Columbia, the set nets of the Indian tribes of the
middle Columbia, and the administrators and federal judges who oversee them,
one might at this point be tempted to view the upstream passage of four more
upriver spring run numbered 71,100 adults in 1982, an improvement over the low runs of 1979-1981 but
still far below the minimum escapement need of 100,000 fish. The 1982 upriver summer run was the
lowest count ever, 20,100 adults, down from a high of 210,000 in 1957, and only 4,500 of these went into
the Snake River as would our hypothetical Lochsa River fish. PFMC 1983 Plan, supra note 297, at 20-11.
This figure is particularly alarming, since virtually no in-river harvest of this run has taken place since
1964. The few summer chinook taken annually in the river have been for treaty Indian ceremonial and
subsistence use only. The upriver fall chinook, on which the treaty Indian fishery most heavily depends, is
far more numerous, yet is also declining dramatically. In the four-year period from 1976 to 1980 the
upriver fall run was halved, from 400,000 to 200,000 fish. Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n,
CRITFC NEWS, April/May/June 1981, at 2.
Most of the loss is occurring in the ocean fishery. It has been estimated that of the 1980-81 catch of
Columbia River wild fall chinook, Alaskan and Canadian trollers caught more than 60% of the run, Ore-
gon and Washington trollers caught 4%, in-river fishers, both Indian and non-Indian, caught 8%, and 27%
escaped harvest. Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n, Supplemental Information for the Columbia
River Compact, Aug. 1981, at 6.
The depleted state of the upriver chinook runs is thus acute, perhaps beyond recovery in the case of the
summer run. Even with complete closure of the ocean chinook fishery, escapement needs could not be met
for that devastated run. PFMC 1983 Plan, supra note 297, at 2-I. Only a gradual and incremental in-
crease in escapement over a period of decades, plus drastic improvements in fish passage facilities at the
dams can rehabilitate these stocks, if indeed they can be saved at all. PFMC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 35,
at 15.
30a The lower river chinook runs with spawning areas in tributaries below Bonneville Dam remain gen-
erally healthy, largely because there are no large dams to cross and because of greatly augmented hatchery
production. For charts of the Columbia River chinook salmon catch from 1957 through 1978 see A.
NETBOY, spra note 14, at 118.
309 In 1982 the Columbia River tribes caught about 64,000 salmon and 8,000 steelhead, according to
figures released by the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission. CRITFC NEws, July/Dec. 1982,
at 1. Of the 64,000 salmon taken, 55,000 were fall chinook. Fishery biologists employed by the tribes
estimate that non-Indian U.S. fishers harvested more than 175,000 chinook from the upper Columbia fall
run, or 76 percent of the harvestable run. As of this writing the 1983 season for the tribal fishery of
chinook and steelhead is scheduled to last only six days. Eugene Register-Guard, Sept. 29, 1983, at 8B, col.
I. 31
°Seesupra text accompanying notes 155-76. As noted, supra note 299, the Columbia River 1977 Plan
expired in 1982 and has not yet been renewed.
I See supra text accompanying notes 155-76.
312 Two other Indian tribes-the Colville Confederated Tribes and the Shoshoni-Bannock Tribes-
exercise fishing rights for subsistence and ceremonial purposes on tributaries of the Columbia River.
FRAMEWORK PLAN, supra note 252, at 32; State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho 759, 497 P.2d 1386 (1972).
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dams as a trivial obstacle. Even so, the fish must now negotiate the fish ladders
of the dams on the Snake River. 31 3 Eventually, the persevering fish will reach
the mouth of the Clearwater River at Lewiston, Idaho. Here it comes under the
authority of the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, the seventeenth and final
management jurisdiction of our list and a terminal point for many of the upriver
runs. 314 A few miles upriver of Lewiston the fish will enter the Nez Perce Indian
Reservation, where it will again be subject to the subsistence and ceremonial
fishery of the tribe.31 5
If our fish survives the Nez Perce subsistence fishers, it will soon reach tile
place of its hatching in the headwaters of the Lochsa in the Selway-Bitterroot
Wilderness Area.316 There the exhausted fish will deposit its eggs in the gravel of
a streambed and die shortly thereafter, having eaten nothing since it left the
ocean. Our survivor represents only the minutest fraction of the hatchlings that
accompanied it downriver four or five years earlier, 31 7 one of the last few surviv-
ing representatives of a heroic, long-journeying race. According to the chairman
of the Idaho Fish and Game Commission:
Idaho chinook stocks are unique. No other stocks in the Columbia Basin
are capable of returning to spawning grounds 700 to 1,000 miles from the
ocean. Lower river stocks have been planted in Idaho with poor or no
returns. Idaho stocks are presently close to extermination and, once lost,
can never be restored. Historically the upper river runs were among the
most productive in the Columbia system. Every effort should be made to
restore these runs. 318
IV. REDRAWING THE PRECEPTS: ANADROMOUS FISH MANAGEMENT IN THE
1980s
The foregoing sections of this Article demonstrate that the conceptual bases
for laws that govern anadromous fish management today are vastly different
from those existing even as recently as ten years ago. Indeed, a revolution in the
premises that underlie the conservation and harvest of salmon has occurred in
313 Hazards exist at the fish ladders as well. Flow and spill conditions at the base of dams may dis-
courage fish movement in the river or deflect fish away from entrances to fish ladders, particularly when
fishway flows are inadequate to attract the fish. Concentration of fish at the base of ladders may also
increase the incidence of disease. FISH & WILDLIFE PROGRAM, supra note 216, at 6-1.
314 IDAHO CODE § 36-101 (1977). Natural spawning escapement of Idaho chinook is at 10% or less of
the levels of 20 years ago, and there has been no sport fishing season on Idaho salmon since 1978. Letter
from Bill Frank, Jr., Chairman of the Idaho Fish and Game Commission, to the Pacific Fishery Manage-
ment Council (Feb. 17, 1983).
315 No commercial salmon fishing on the Snake River, Indian or non-Indian, now exists. Inland com-
mercial salmon fishing occurs only under the Columbia River Compact, supra note 301, of which Idaho is
not a member, or under the 1977 Plan, supra note 299. Within the Nez Perce reservation, the harvest is
limited to fish for subsistence and ceremonial use. To participate in the commercial fishery, Nez Perce
Indians join the other three tribes that fish in zone six of the mainstem Columbia. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 309-12.
316 State wildlife laws govern recreational fishing on federal lands unless Congress directs otherwise.
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). Hence, Idaho law governs salmon fishing in this federal
wilderness area, and no additional federal management authority exists over our returning salmon. Under
Idaho law no legal sport fishing for salmon has occurred since 1978. See supra note 314.
3'7 Although federal hatcheries downstream on the Clearwater River typically get one return for every
thousand chinook released, the proportion of returns of wild stocks in Idaho rivers is certainly far lower.
See supra note 248. Had our Lochsa River chinook been part of the 1982 summer run, it would have been
one of only 4,500 returning fish to enter the entire Snake River watershed. See supra note 307.
318 Letter from Bill Frank, Jr., Chairman of the Idaho Fish and Game Commission, to the Pacific Fish-
ery Management Council (Feb. 17, 1983).
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the past decade. Significantly, this reordering reflects and builds upon develop-
ments in other areas of natural resource law.
This section will illustrate the scope of this revolution in the law of the Pacific
salmon fishery by contrasting the modern precepts of salmon management with
those that dominated the field in former eras. Many of the differences between
the old and new precepts are substantial and characteristic of the historical eras
described above. They stand out in high relief when illuminated from the per-
spective of the present. Before discussing the new precepts, we will briefly review
the essential but now obsolete ideas that dominated anadromous fish law until
the modern era of attempted resource restoration began a decade ago.
A. The Old Ideas.- The Era of Dams and Hydropower
I. The Primacy of Hydropower and Irrigation Over the Needs of the Fshey
Until the passage of the Northwest Power Act in 1980, 3 19 hydropower genera-
tion, irrigation, and other commercial uses of the rivers of the Columbia Basin
took precedence over the habitat needs of anadromous fish. When habitat pro-
tection was attempted at all, it was nearly always done as an afterthought, and
then only when irrigation and energy needs had first been satisfied. Although
statutory and judicial authority existed under which activist fish managers could
have attempted to augment their degree of control over river habitat of fish and
to insist on equal treatment for the salmon fishery, that authority was rarely
invoked and was less often successful. 320
A related aspect of salmon management in former eras was its concentration
of power over fish habitat in single-purpose resource agencies. This concentra-
tion of decisionmaking authority is a characteristic by no means unique to the
anadromous fisheries of the Columbia Basin: it is a feature commonly found in
the management of water resources. 321 During the hydropower era in the Co-
lumbia Basin, regulation of the rivers was left primarily to the Bonneville Power
Administration, the Army Corps of Engineers, or the Bureau of Reclamation, all
of which had built-in biases in favor of either hydropower generation or irriga-
tion. 322 With few exceptions, these agencies have exercised their discretion with
no legislative oversight and minimal court review.323
2. The Primacy of State Control over Fishing Seasons, Bag and S'ze Limits, and Gear
Restrictions
The tensions between the state and federal governments are especially well-
3, 9 See supra text accompanying notes 202-17.
320 See discussion of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, supra note 206; see also discussion of Udall v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967), supra text accompanying note 138.
321 See, e.g., Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 233, 256-58
(1980).
322 In the words of one observer:
If each organization is free to pursue its own institutional interest, it will do so at a minimum
sacrifice to itself, with a concomitant disregard of the costs to others. Such an entity can be
expected to participate in voluntary associations (that limit its autonomy] to the extent it
serves the entity's purpose. Even mandated participation in an organization that has no
sanction or control over its members generally fails to mitigate organizational self interest.
Haggard, The Columbia River: Protein, Power, Preservation, and Politics, 10 ENVTL. L. 221, 231 (1980).
323 In anadromous fish cases the most notable exception to court deference to agency expertise was
Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
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illustrated when questions about natural resources in general, and wildlife in par-
ticular, are involved. 324  Until recently, the rule has been that states "owned"
wildlife within their boundaries and held the wildlife "in trust" for their citizens,
and that this state ownership interest placed limits upon the regulatory powers of
the federal government. 325 Although the concept of state ownership of wildlife
has been discredited, 326 the primacy of state control over fish and wildlife re-
sources remains a tenacious precept.
States began to regulate the salmon harvest in the late nineteenth century.
They provided almost the only effective regulation of seasons, bag limits, and
gear restrictions throughout the hydropower era that ended in the early 1970s.
3 2 7
State primacy, however strongly advocated by local interests, proved inadequate:
it did not allow for comprehensive management through the full territorial range
of migratory species. It could not accommodate or adequately protect Indian
treaty rights, which were created outside state law. Ultimately, placing regula-
tory authority at the state level has the effect of hastening the decline of the
common-pool resource; in practice, an unfettered state-based regulatory scheme
creates incentives for each state to increase the harvest for its own citizens with-
out concern for harvest in other states.
State regulation of the Pacific salmon fishery, of course, has not been elimi-
nated. But a variety of modern laws have curtailed the state domination over the
salmon harvest that prevailed throughout the hydropower era.
3 2 8
3. The Primacy of Non-Indian Commercial and Sport Fishzng over Indian Fishing
Rights
Steadily increasing assertions of state authority over Indian fishing through
the 1960s resulted in part from the traditional notions of state supremacy over
fish and wildlife discussed in the preceding section. By the early years of this
century, states had increased their management and enforcement capabilities,
and they declined to construe any limitations on their authority to regulate
fisheries in the admittedly vague language of the Indian treaties. 329 Further-
more, doubts remained about the constitutionality of a state recognizing special
rights created by Indian treaties. To some, a special regulatory system for Indian
fishing seemed to amount to a form of racial discrimination in favor of
Indians. 330
324 See generally Berg, Private Ocean Ranching of Pacifi Salmon and Fhey Management. A Problem of Federal-
ism, 12 ENVTL. L. 81, 102-10 (1981); United States Law for Living Marine Resources: Cases and Materi-
als (W. Burke ed. 1980) (unpublished manuscript, available at University of Washington Law School). On
federal preemption of state fishing regulations under the FCMA see supra note 304.
325 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (state can prohibit the export of game taken within the
state without violating the commerce clause).
326 The "state ownership" theory in Geer was expressly disapproved in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322 (1979). See generally Coggins, Wildlife and the Constitution: The Walls Come Tumbling Down, 55 WASH. L.
REv. 295 (1980).327 See supra text accompanying notes 177-201.
328 For discussion of the existing interjurisdictional management scheme, see ina text accompanying
notes 460-83.329 See supra text accompanying note 157.
330 Reversing a Washington Supreme Court holding that Indian treaties would violate the equal protec-
tion principle if they provided special fishing rights to Indians, the United States Supreme Court cited
existing authority and held that "the peculiar semi-sovereign and constitutionally recognized status of
Indians justifies special treatment on their behalf." Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passen-
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These doctrinal concerns, together with the effects of intensified competition
for a dwindling resource and a dose of racial antagonism, 33 1 guaranteed that an
essential feature of the regulatory regimes of the hydropower era would be a
steady decline in the exercise of Indian treaty fishing rights.
.. The Primacy of Hatcheries as a Method of Resource Enhancement
In their efforts to restore overfished salmon runs, fish managers of the hydro-
power era placed primary reliance on hatcheries as an enhancement technique.
The potential for supplementing wild fish runs with artificially reared fish was
appreciated relatively early, and hatcheries have been operating on the west
coast almost as long as commercial fishing has existed. The first salmon hatchery
on the Pacific coast of North America was built in 1872 on the McCloud River, a
tributary of the Sacramento in northern California. 332 In 1877 a hatchery was
opened in Oregon on the Clackamas River, a tributary of the Willamette. 333
British Columbia built its first salmon hatchery on the Fraser River in 1883, 3 3 4
and Washington opened its first on the Kalama River in 1895. 335 Alaska fol-
lowed suit in 1905.336
Many salmon hatcheries were thus in full operation on the Pacific coast of
North America before the beginning of the hydropower era in the Columbia
Basin in 1933. All, however, were largely isolated in their operations; coordi-
nated compensation programs in the United States had no legal foundation until
passage of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934. 3 3 7 But long before
coordination became possible, artificial propagation was seen as the most effec-
tive means of compensation for overfishing, for degraded habitat, and even for
the loss of entire production areas such as the loss at Grand Coulee Dam in
ger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979). See generally Johnson & Crystal, Indians and Equal
Protection, 54 WASH. L. REV. 587 (1979).
331 See supra note 162. The United States Supreme Court has noted that the exclusion of Indians from
the salmon fisheries was hastened by the rise of private canneries and "encouraged by the onset of often-
discriminatory state regulation in the early decades of the 20th century." Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 669 (1979) (citations omitted).
332 Stone, The Artiftial Propagation of Salmon on the Pacfic Coast of the United States, BULL. OF THE FISH
COMM'N No. 16 (1897) at 206. Unlike most early artificial propagation efforts, the McCloud hatchery,
under its director, Livingston Stone, see supra note 91 and text accompanying note 93, was moderately
successful. It shipped salmon eggs to 27 states, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. The McCloud
hatchery was credited with restoring depleted Sacramento River salmon runs toward the end of the nine-
teenth century. C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 74. See generally Leitriz, A Histo of California's Fish Hatcheries
1870-1960, CAL. DEPT. OF FISH & GAME BULL. No. 150 (1970). In general, however, the following assess-
ment of a 1922 critic of early hatchery efforts is still valid: "In the early days... the hatcheries probably
inflicted as much, or more, damage to the salmon runs as they did service of value." Rich, Early Htory and
Seaward Migration of Chinook Salmon in the Columbia and Sacramento Rivers, BULL. OF THE BUREAU OF FISHER-
iES No. 37 (1922) at 68.
333 Built by the same Livingston Stone of the U.S. Fish Commission, see supra note 332, the Clackamas
hatchery, in contrast to the McCloud, had little impact on the Columbia River salmon runs. It was "too
near civilization [so that] gradually mills and dams, timber-cutting . . . and logging in the river, together
with other adverse influences crippled its efficiency." Stone, supra note 332, at 218.
334 R. CHILDERHOSE & M. TRIM, supra note 2, at 27.
335 WASHINGTON DEPT. OF FISHERIES, SALMON HATCHERIES 4 (1970). In the state of Washington
large-scale propagation began immediately: between 1895 and 1900 fourteen hatcheries were built and
production of salmon tripled with a release in 1900 of more than 23 million eggs and fry. Production
tripled again by 1905, with a release of 62 million. J. COBB, PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES 664, BUREAU OF
FiSHERIES Doc. No. 1092 (1930). Today, Washington's hatchery system is the largest on the west coast of
North America. B. BROWN, MOUNTAIN IN THE CLOUDS: A SEARCH FOR THE WILD SALMON 74 (1982).33 6 See generally W. HUNT, HISTORY OF THE MARINE HATCHERIES OF ALASKA, ALASKA SEA GRANT
PROGRAM REP. No. 76-10 (June 1976).




Despite the investment of large sums of money, many early enhancement ef-
forts left no discernible effect on salmon populations. 339 Concentrating almost
exclusively on the incubation of eggs, early salmon culturists often operated in
ignorance of basic facts of nutrition and disease control, giving little thought to
the feeding and rearing needs of young fish or to strategies of release timing.
Juvenile salmon with their yolk sacs still attached were released unprepared into
a hostile environment. 340 By the 1920s, however, a growing number of fishery
biologists questioned the effectiveness of hatcheries, and after World War II
hatchery production in the Columbia Basin actually began to decline. During
this period British Columbia discontinued its artificial propagation programs
altogether. 34'
In the early 1960s, however, technical improvements in methods of artificial
propagation of salmon made it possible to achieve far more favorable survival
rates for hatchery-reared juveniles. Improvements in disease control, regulation
of chemical contents of water, and diet-particularly the development of the Or-
egon Moist Pellet in 1959, still the standard hatchery fish food-made hatchery
compensation programs demonstrably cost-effective for the first time.3 42 As a
result, in the 1960s Columbia Basin states and the federal government both be-
gan a massive campaign to supplement and rebuild the declining wild salmon
stocks by increasing hatchery output. One consequence of this campaign was
that in the late 1960s hatchery production of chinook, coho, and steelhead in the
Columbia Basin overtook and far surpassed natural production. 343 In fiscal year
1974 forty federal, state, private, and Indian tribe hatcheries in the Columbia
Basin released 155 million juvenile salmon and steelhead-a fivefold increase
over 1960 release rates.3 44 Estimates show that in 1981 the now vast network of
public and private hatcheries along the entire west coast of North America from
California to Alaska released a total of 1.06 billion artificially reared salmon
juveniles.3 45 Japan and the Soviet Union released an additional 2.5 billion
young salmon into the streams that flow into the Pacific.3 4 6 Thus, more than
three billion artificially hatched and reared salmonids are being released every
year into streams that flow into the North Pacific, with ecological effects that
remain largely unknown.
As hatchery production accelerated during the final years of the hydropower
era, wild salmon stocks were usually left to fend for themselves. The conse-
quences of this policy of neglect of the wild stocks have been manifold and con-
troversial. Many fishery biologists and fish managers have unhappily concluded
338 E. Chaney, supra note 107, at 4. On Grand Coulee, see supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
33 9 See supra note 332.
340 Salmon hatchlings with yolk sacs still attached (called "alevin") are extremely vulnerable to disease
and predation. In the wild, alevin normally stay hidden in the gravel beds of their hatching until they
become active swimmers.
341 C. SMITH, supra note 36, at 79.
34 2 1d. On improvements in hatchery operations during the 1960s see generally A. NETBOY, supra note
14, at 106-08. For a description of a modern hatchery operation see supra note 248.
343 For a chart of the relative proportion of natural to hatchery production on the Columbia River from
1940 to 2000 (projected) see FRAMEWORK PLAN, supra note 252, at 23.
344 A. NETBOY, supra note 14, at I11.34 5 Johnson, Salmon Ranching (Part I), PACIFIC FISHING, July 1982, at 43.34 6 Id at 41.
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that this sudden and unprecedented expansion of hatchery production, rather
than passively supplementing natural stocks, has itself been an important cause
of the further depletion of the wild salmon runs. 347 Partly because of mixed
results in artificial enhancement of salmon stocks, fish managers have been seek-
347 Six important problems have been linked to excessive reliance on artificial propagation of salmon:
(1) increased incidence of disease in hatchery stock; (2) competition between wild and artificially reared
stocks; (3) difficulty of selective harvest of intermingled wild and hatchery fish; (4) density dependent
mortality caused by release of hatchery fish in excess of natural carrying capacity; (5) economic and polit-
ical vulnerability of hatcheries; and (6) "genetic pollution" resulting from inbred hatchery stocks. The first
problem is the result of bacterial infections and other diseases often associated with crowded rearing condi-
tions at hatcheries. Some diseases may be transmitted to wild strains by infected hatchery fish, and for this
reason it has occasionally been necessary to destroy as much as half a million infected hatchery fry. (For
an account of one of these events at a Washington state hatchery see B. BROWN, MOUNTAINS IN THE
CLOUDS: A SEARCH FOR THE WILD SALMON 116-18 (1982). Fish pathologists have made dramatic ad-
vances in disease control in recent decades, yet hatchery diseases continue to limit the effectiveness of
enhancement by artificial propagation.
Competition-the second problem-takes two forms: "egg-robbing" of fish spawning in the wild, and
competition for food and space between wild and hatchery stocks. For reasons that will become apparent
in the discussion of genetic pollution, hatchery biologists must cross-fertilize eggs and sperm ("milt") gath-
ered from hatchery fish with those of wild fish. But every salmon egg taken from its natural spawning
environment is a potential fish lost from a wild run. Even though the egg's chance of survival may have
been greatly improved by the transfer, its hatchling has thereby become a hatchery fish, and its genetic
potential lost to the wild run from which it came. Perhaps more important, however, it is now known that
hatchery fry compete with their wild relatives for food and space. See supra note 248. Because of controlled
environments, hatchery fry are not subject to the high natural mortality that is characteristic of naturally
spawned fish in fresh water. In addition, hatchery fish grow more rapidly because of their controlled
environment and are larger than their wild cousins at the same age. This size differential gives hatchery
fish an early competitive advantage over wild fingerlings. Although this augmented stock strength of
hatchery fish permits a harvest rate on adults that is higher than that possible on wild runs, see supra note
306, it depresses the survival rate of wild fish, since hatchery juveniles tend to residualize more, remaining
longer in fresh water and driving the less sturdy wild fish downriver. The effects of competition between
natural and hatchery-reared juveniles can be alleviated by placing hatcheries where little or no natural
spawning occurs or by careful timing of hatchery releases so as not to coincide with the peaks of wild
juvenile migrations. Since wild fingerlings are found in the rivers at all times of the year, however, compe-
tition can never be completely eliminated.
The third problem created by artificial propagation is that the presence of intermingled wild and
hatchery stocks in the ocean and in the lower rivers results in a "mixed-stock fishery," in which a high
proportion of hatchery fish encourages a higher rate of harvest than the intermingled wild stocks can
withstand. See also supra note 306. The result is a further erosion of the viability of a weaker wild stock by
the very fish that were released to supplement them.
The fourth problem involves density dependent mortality that occurs when the carrying capacity of a
stream or the nearshore ocean is exceeded by hatchery releases. (For a discussion of the carrying capacity
of rivers see infra text accompanying notes 368-69.) A still speculative and controversial hypothesis offered
by two fishery biologists at the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife postulates an upper limit on the
numbers of juvenile coho salmon that the rivers and nearshore ocean can support. (Unlike those of chi-
nook and steelhead, coho migration routes tend to keep them close to shore.) Exceeding that carrying
capacity by releasing too many juveniles leads to fewer returning adult coho. Paradoxically, to increase
the numbers of returning adults when carrying capacity has been exceeded, it is necessary to cut back on
the number of fry released. Johnson, Salmon Ranching (Part 1), PACIFIC FISHING, July 1982, at 46. See
generally R. GUNSOLUS, THE STATUS OF OREGON COHO AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANAGING THE
PRODUCTION, HARVEST, AND ESCAPEMENT OF WILD AND HATCHERY-REARED STOCKS, OR. DEPT. OF
FISH & WILDLIFE (1978).
The fifth problem of undue reliance on hatchery bred fish is that hatcheries are costly to build and
operate. Since the total contribution of the salmon fishing industry to the U.S. economy is not large and
must be heavily subsidized in order to survive, salmon hatcheries are obvious targets for governmental
austerity programs. Heavy reliance on hatchery production to rehabilitate a fishery thus places the health
of that fishery at the mercy of economic fluctuations and political tradeoffs.
The sixth problem is of potentially the greatest concern for the future of the Pacific Northwest's salmon
runs. The question of the genetic viability of hatchery fish and their effect on the gene pools of wild
salmon has stimulated much comment but few answers. It is well-known that fish that spawn naturally
are subject to relentless selective pressures. The result, in the long run, is that stocks are stronger, more
adaptable, and more genetically diverse. Every spawning stream, moreover, offers an environment that
differs from all others in the way it influences the natural selection process; fish stocks originating in a
particular stream will be genetically unique to that environment. Reduction in genetic diversity is thus
caused in two ways: (a) the uniform environment of hatchery rearing ponds removes or reduces selective
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ing new ideas-ones that integrate recent developments and refinements in natu-
ral resource law with what is now known about anadromous fish ecosystems.
B. The New Ideas.: The Era of Attempted Restoration
From this foregoing historical sketch of the Pacific Northwest salmon fishery,
it is apparent that recognition of the need to conserve and enhance stocks of
anadromous fish is by no means a recent development. From the beginning of
largescale commercial salmon fishing more than a century ago many attempts
have been made to protect the fishery from the effects of habitat degradation and
overfishing. Incremental advances in regulatory effectiveness have been made at
all management levels-state, federal, and international. Although often prelim-
inary and tentative in scope, these advances have sometimes proved surprisingly
effective. 348
Much of the inspiration for modern natural resource management practices
can be traced to the thoughts of Aldo Leopold, 349 or back even further to the
wilderness meditations of John Muir,350 or to the pragmatic environmentalism of
Frederick Law Olmsted.35 1 Modern precepts on the management and allocation
of anadromous fish are not new in the sense that nobody thought of them until
the last decade or so. Thus, the reader should remember that the following dis-
cussion contains few ideas that were not advocated many decades ago by some
progressive thinker. What is truly new in modern practices of anadromous fish
management is almost always the application of old but still radical ideas to new
challenges, and the relative suddenness with which this has been accomplished.
pressures; and (b) heavy exploitation reduces escapement level to the minimum maintenance level (or even
below), thus robbing a fish population of the genetic diversity afforded by surplus spawners.
The effects of reduction of genetic diversity are detrimental to the health of a stock and their value to
humans. In the long run this reduction may lead to lower survival rates, and to deterioration in the food
value of the fish. D. Poon & J. Garcia, supra note 222, at 13-14. As every veteran salmon fisher will attest,
wild fish taste better. This is due in part to the fact that upriver wild stocks must travel further upstream
than downriver hatchery fish; in preparation for the journey they are fatter when they return to the river
and their oil content is higher. In addition, wild juveniles, though smaller than hatchery fish of the same
age, are larger when they return to the river several years later. One reason for this tendency to dwarfism
among artificially reared fish is the high cost of prolonged retention of juvenile fish in hatcheries.
Hatchery fish are therefore raised on accelerated schedules and are released as soon as possible. The
accelerated early life cycle also reduces the length of successive life stages after release, which in turn results
in smaller fish at harvest. B. BROWN, MOUNTAIN IN THE CLOUDS: A SEARCH FOR THE WILD SALMON
102 (1982). Behavioral differences have also been detected in hatchery fish, which tend to be more aggres-
sive and possess a heightened sense of territoriality. When released they also may be deficient in the ability
to recognize and capture food. Id at 119. On the possible genetic and ecological effects of increased
reliance on artificially reared fish see H. HELLE, GENETIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR SALMONID AQUACUL-
TURE: BIOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON SALMON AQUACULTURE
AND THE ALASKAN FISHING COMMUNITY 171 (Alaska Sea Grant, 1976).
Thus, evidence exists that uncritical use of artificial propagation to supplement dwindling wild stocks
of salmon merely camouflages, defers, and compounds the problems of overfishing and habitat degrada-
tion. For these and other reasons, fish managers are increasingly recognizing that hatcheries are not pan-
aceas, but are merely "band-aid solutions"--to be used with caution when necessary, but with a long-term
commitment to eventual phaseout. For contrary views see infra note 361.
348 See, e.g., the discussion of the Fraser River Treaty, supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
349See, e.g., GAME MANAGEMENT (1933); see also A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1949); S. FLADER,
THINKING LIKE A MOUNTAIN: ALDO LEOPOLD AND THE EVOLUTION OF AN ECOLOGICAL ATTITUDE
(1974).
3
50°See generally S. Fox, JOHN MUIR AND HIS LEGACY: THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT
(1981).
351 See generally L. ROPER, FLO: A BIOGRAPHY OF FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED (1973).
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I. Recognition of Anadromous Fish as a Co-Equal Resource
As discussed above, 352 habitat needs of the anadromous fish runs of the Co-
lumbia River Basin have long occupied a position subordinate to other demands
on the use of river water, including hydropower generation and irrigation agri-
culture. Despite statutory353 and judicial 354 authority directing that fish and
wildlife be given "equal consideration" with other purposes of water project de-
velopment, that objective was rarely achieved. 35 5
Until the Northwest Power Act 3 56 was passed in 1980 and implementation
began in the 1982 adoption of the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Pro-
gram,357 the objective of affording protection to anadromous fish as a "co-equal
partner" with hydropower production 358 has remained elusive. Today, however,
after fifty years of attempts, that goal is firmly emplaced in law. Although refine-
ments in the law remain to be made, the salmon fishery of the Pacific Northwest
is at last achieving a position of parity. "Equality" for the salmon and steelhead
resource cannot be defined with precision, and the manner in which the principle
is applied will be repeatedly disputed when conflicts occur. The concept, how-
ever, is the essential cornerstone that will support most of the specific components
of modern river management in the Pacific Northwest in the future.
2. Enhancement of the Resource Through Habitat Management
a. Restoration of Wild Fish Runs
Recently, the eminent Canadian fishery biologist Peter Larkin told an as-
tounded audience, "Some of the current extravaganzas of hatchery construction
border on insanity. '359 Members of the audience were taken aback not so much
by the observation itself, but by its being voiced openly by such a distinguished
authority. Larkin went on to quip, "Some of our shiny new fish hatcheries may
have to be . . . converted into bowling alleys, but that's life. ' '360
Professor Larkin candidly expressed a sentiment that many in the auditorium
had shared for years. Yet to some that lecture seemed to be a breakthrough,
mainly because most fish managers had previously advocated more and bigger
hatcheries. Hatcheries are not yet on their way out as the dominant method of
restoring depleted anadromous fish runs. 36 1 Nevertheless, an institutional prefer-
352 See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
353 Fish & Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666i (1982). See supra note 206.
354 Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967). See supra note 138.
35 5 See supra note 206.
356 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1982).35 7 See supra text accompanying notes 214-17.35 8 See supra text accompanying notes 208-11.
359 P. LARKIN, PACIFIC SALMON: SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 7, Washington Sea Grant Pub. No. 80-
3 (1980).
360 Id. at 11.
361 The majority of professional fish managers, following the lead of Dr. Larkin, think decreased reliance
on artificial propagation is necessary in order to restore the health of the salmon fishery over the long run.
In recent years, however, backers of increased use of artificial propagation have been encouraged by scien-
tific studies demonstrating a surprising degree of adaptability in salmonid fish, and by preliminary results
in private enterprise experiments in ocean "ranching" of salmon.
Experiments in the selective breeding of salmonids show the fish to be far more adaptable than biolo-
gists previously suspected. (For an optimistic view of the prospects of restoring the anadromous fish re-
source by selective breeding see Donaldson & Joyner, The Salmonid Fishes as a Natural Livestock, Sci. AM.,
July 1983, at 51.) To the extent that this finding may be verified in large-scale future selective breeding
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projects, it bodes well for the continued use of artificial propagation to supplement natural salmon
stocks-with the proviso, however, that to be successful it must be accomplished in a more ecologically
sound manner than has been usual in the past. Summarizing the results of these experiments, Donaldson
and Joyner concluded:
The selective breeding of salmonids can in a relatively short time affect their form, size,
behavior, taste and food value as profoundly as 1,500 years of stock breeding have affected
dairy and beef cattle. The future evolution of salmonid species now lies chiefly in the hands
of the people who are beginning to breed them on a large scale. The task embodies chal-
lenges. One challenge is to maintain genetic diversity by providing appropriate sanctuaries
to ensure the survival of wild stocks. Another is to utilize the enormous adaptability of these
remarkable animals by selectively breeding stocks that will take hold both in new environ-
ments and in places where native stocks have been displaced by human activities.
Id. at 58. The genetic adaptability of the salmonids and the ability of fish breeders to turn that adaptabil-
ity to advantage is a prerequisite for success of another recent development in artificial propagation of
salmonids-private for-profit salmon culture, popularly called "salmon ranching," which many aquacul-
turists see as the beginning of a transition from "hunting" wild stocks to domestication. See generally John-
son, Salmon Ranching. Can Fish Be Branded at Birth?, OCEANS, Jan. 1982, at 38; Johnson, Salmon Ranching
(Pts. I & 2), PAC. FISHING, July 1982, at 39 and Aug. 1982, at 39; Nash, Ocean Ranchig-The Achievements,
the Problems, and the Possibilities, FISH FARMING INT'L, Sept. 1977, at 42; Netboy, Prwvate Salmon Ranching-
Operations Along Northern Pacif Coast, NAT'L FISHERMAN, Apr. 30, 1979, at 153. At present, Oregon is the
chief U.S. laboratory for large-scale experimentation in private salmon culture, largely because it is the
only west coast state that allows it. See generally D. Hornstein, Salmon Ranching in Oregon.- State and Federal
Regulations, OR. STATE U. MARINE ADVISORY PROGRAM SPEC. REP. No. 573 (Jan. 1980); OREGON DEP'T
OF FISH & WILDLIFE, INFORMATION ON PRIVATE SALMON HATCHERIES (Aug. 1979). California has al-
lowed one small-scale private test hatchery. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 6570-6576. Indian tribes in the
state of Washington operate small salmon hatcheries in accordance with that state's Cooperative Enhance-
ment Program. See infra text accompanying note 385. Similarly, Alaska permits and subsidizes nonprofit
salmon culture cooperatives. ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.10.375-.620. Neither the FCMA nor any other federal
law defines or implements policy on ocean ranching; control is left to individual states. For example, the
National Aquaculture Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-362, 94 Stat. 1198 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810),
exempts from its benefits private ocean ranching of Pacific salmon in those states where such ranching is
prohibited by law. Id § 3(1), 16 U.S.C. § 2802(1). See generally Berg, 1rivate Ocean Ranching of Pacifw Salmon
and Fishery Management A Problem of Federalism, 12 ENvTL. L. 81 (1981).
The Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife has issued 22 permits for 14 separate sites along the
Oregon coast-a different license for each species at each site. For a review of the permit process see D.
Hornstein,supra. See also Federation of Seafood Harvesters v. Fish and Wildlife Comm'n., 291 Or. 452, 632
P.2d 777 (1981) (a private hatchery permit cannot be issued without a finding that it would not have
detrimental effect on wildfish populations). As of September 1983 only two permit holders are actively
producing significant numbers of salmon fry, and none has yet turned a profit. A third permit holder was
a financial casualty of poor returns aggravated by the unusual ocean conditions of 1983. See Finley, Burnt
Hill Salmon Ranches Casualty of El Nino, THE FISHERMEN'S NEWS, Sept. 1983 (2d issue), at 28. In 1982
Oregon salmon ranchers sent fewer than 25 million fry into the estuaries, a drop-in-the-bucket when com-
pared to the more than 3 billion public hatchery fish released by Pacific rim fishing nations in the same
year. See supra text accompanying notes 345-46. Nevertheless, in 1980 the Oregon Fish and Game Com-
mission imposed a five-year moratorium on issuing new licenses in order to assess the impact of existing
operations.
Of the two private hatcheries operating under the close supervision of the Oregon Department of Fish
and Wildlife, the larger is Ore-Aqua Foods, a subsidiary of the Weyerhaeuser forest products company. In
its hatchery at Springfield, Oregon, Ore-Aqua applies time-tested aquaculture techniques in raising and
harvesting chinook, coho, chum, and pink salmon--but with important differences dictated by the migra-
tory nature of anadromous fish. The Ore-Aqua operation eliminates the river from the salmon's life cycle
and replaces it with tanker trucks and holding ponds before putting young fish out to "pasture." The
operation at the Springfield hatchery has been described thus:
There the heated discharge from a paper mill warms the icy water of the McKenzie River in
the winter to a temperature of 11 degrees C. (52 degrees F.) for incubating coho eggs and
rearing the fry. When the fry reach the smolt stage in the late spring, they are trucked to the
coast at Newport and put in ponds that receive salt water pumped from the ocean. After
from 10 to 14 days in the ponds the fish become adapted to full-strength ocean water. After
a final feeding they are released into the ocean. In about 18 months they home on the
artificial salt-water river that flows out of the ponds from which they were released, deliver-
ing themselves in prime condition for the harvest. Boats and nets are not needed. It is not
even necessary for the ranchers to round up their animals and herd them into a corral; the
fish go into the ponds on their own.
Donaldson & Joyner, supra at 56. For a more detailed description of the Ore-Aqua operation see Berg,
supra, at 82-95. The Ore-Aqua salmon ranch is the largest of its kind in the U.S. and perhaps in the world.
It is probably the most technologically sophisticated and capital-intensive. Even so, the operation is still in
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ence for natural over artificial means of enhancement is being established. 36
The most promising method of natural enhancement is increasingly seen to be
the restoration of a healthy freshwater habitat for fish.
A healthy freshwater habitat for anadromous salmonids is characterized by
accessibility, an abundance of clean spawning gravel, rearing ponds, instream
cover, and shaded and stabilized banks.363 When any of these components is
degraded or missing from a stream, juvenile salmon may decline in numbers or
disappear. Studies conducted by fishery biologists, however, have demonstrated
that depleted stocks respond well to carefully planned stream improvement
projects, and the numbers of fish in a restored stream can be dramatically
increased. 364
Programs to rehabilitate and enhance freshwater habitat for salmon date back
to the beginning of the hydropower era.365  Motivated in part by the seminal
its research and development phase and is not yet covering operating costs. Fish returns have been dis-
couraging. The 1981 return of 0.75% of the fish released was the highest ever. A return of about 3% is the
financial break-even point. Johnson, supra, at 40.
Advocates are fond of drawing an analogy between bison and wild salmon. Commercial fisheries may
evolve away from the hunting and gathering phase, from capture to culture, as have their land-based
counterparts. Indeed, this is a necessity if fish resources are to provide a larger share of the nutrition needs
of the world's population. But increasing agriculhuralization of the salmon fishery, inevitable as it might
be in the long term, will not in the meantime protect the livelihoods of the troller, the gill netter, or the
dipnetter. If public hatcheries are controversial because of their uncertain ecological effects, see supra note
347, then private hatcheries will be doubly so because of their anticipated socioeconomic impacts. Private
hatcheries are vigorously opposed by fishery biologists such as Dr. Larkin, who warns that "as a prospect
for the future, haphazard large scale [hatchery] enhancement is a high risk venture," Larkin, supra note
359, at 13; and by conservationists who fear the effects of genetic overspecialization, of artificial accelera-
tion of life cycles, and of release of millions of smolts on wild salmon populations and the ecological
integrity of estuaries. Even though salmon released from private facilities are public property while in
public waters, OR. REV. STAT. § 508.725, commercial salmon fishers almost unanimously oppose private
salmon ranching because they fear economic displacement by large corporations. For a summary of objec-
tions to large-scale private salmon culture and of industry responses see Berg, supra, at 91-95.
362 Some wags have predicted that the logical end point of the trend to "natural" enhancement will be a
return to the tried-and-true Indian method of enhancement-topray for the return of the salmon. As yet,
however, laws are mandating only that ecological soundness be considered in the construction of new
hatcheries, and that priority be given to improving existing facilities. Thus, for example, the Fish and
Wildlife Program adopted in 1982 by the Northwest Power Council provides: "Priority shall be given to
improving and reprogramming propagation at existing hatchery facilities over construction of new facili-
ties." FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, supra note 216, at § 704(h)(1). Similarly, the Salmon and Steelhead
Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-561, 94 Stat. 3275 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3345),see iifra
text accompanying notes 477-480, provides that future enhancement programs shall "minimize, to the
extent practicable, significant adverse interaction between naturally spawning and artificially propagated
stocks," 16 U.S.C. § 3321(d)(2), and that each program shall "ensure that all projects . . . are economi-
cally and biologically sound and supported by adequate scientific research." 16 U.S.C. § 332 1(d)(4). It
remains for future laws to firmly establish priority for natural methods of resource enhancement.
363 For a comprehensive list of environmental impacts on salmonid freshwater habitat see D. Poon & J.
Garcia, supra note 222, at app. A. See generally Reiser & Bjornn, Habitat Requirements ofAnadromous Salmonids,
U.S. FOREST SERVICE, GENERAL TECHNICAL REP. No. PNW-96 (1979); and Van Hyning, Factors Affecting
the Abundance of Fall Chinook Salmon in the Columbia River, 4 OREGON FISH COMM'N RESEARCH REP. No. 1
(1973).
364 For a useful summary and bibliography of studies, see Hall & Baker, Rehabilitating and Enhancing
Stream Habitat. . Review andEvaluation, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, GENERAL TECHNICAL REP. No. PNW-138
(1982). See also Nelson, Horak & Olson, Western Reservoir and Stream Habitat Improvements Handbook, U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service Pub. No. FWS/OBS-78/56 (1978).
365 Fishery biologists usually distinguish "rehabilitation" from "enhancement." Habitat rehabilitation
(or restoration) means repair of abused or degraded habitat by expending energy to accelerate natural
recovery. Habitat enhancement means creation of a habitat more suitable than would occur naturally, for
example, construction of a fishway around a natural obstruction. Reeves & Roelofs, Rehabilitating and
Enhancing Stream Habitat. 2. Feld Applications, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, GENERAL TECHNICAL REP. NO.
PNW-140 (1982) at 1.
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wildlife management ideas of Aldo Leopold 366 and also by the abundance of
manual labor supplied by the Civilian Conservation Corps in the 1930s large-
scale projects for the purpose of augmenting fish production were underway in
some regions of the United States by the late 1930s. 367  Many of these early
rehabilitation projects were unsuccessful, partly because project managers had an
imperfect understanding of the ecological concept of carrying capacity. The nat-
ural production of salmon in freshwater is limited by a combination of physical
variables. They include food supply, water temperatures and quality, quantity
and quality of spawning gravel and stream cover, and sediment contents of the
stream. The carrying capacity of a stream is the maximum number of individu-
als of a given species it can support within the boundaries of those physical limi-
tations. Attempted rehabilitation programs usually prove futile if the variables
that limit production are not first identified and evaluated.3 68 This explains the
so-called "bottleneck effect" of stream ecology. If, for example, lack of shade
cover restricts salmon production in a stream, nothing will be gained by increas-
ing the available spawning gravel. 369
At each freshwater stage of a juvenile salmon's life cycle the fish progressively
occupies different types of habitat, which fishery biologists classify as spawning,
rearing, or riparian habitat. Restoration or enhancement activities vary accord-
ing to the fish habitat to which they are applied. Until recently, emphasis has
been placed on restoring the spawning habitat, often to the detriment of other
types of habitats. Improving the quality of spawning gravel by removing fine
sediments, increasing the quantity of gravel, or improving access for spawning
fish across logjams or other natural barriers are all examples of spawning habitat
enhancement. 370  Rearing habitat may be improved by strategically placing
boulders, sunken logs, or similar structural devices in the water. These provide
cover, trap gravel, and create pools where young fish have an opportunity to rest.
Rearing habitat may also be improved by augmenting seasonal low streamflows,
by chemically fertilizing stream water, or by controlled blasting in pools and
stillwater back channels. 37' Riparian habitat may be improved by screening irri-
gation ditches, by stabilizing eroding river banks with vegetation that also pro-
vides needed shade and cover from predators, and perhaps most dramatically by
fencing out grazing animals and controlling logging practices.3 72 Significant im-
provement in fish populations has been reported where the watershed was pro-
tected by restricting livestock use 373 or where there was a logging moratorium on
11; See generally GAME MANAGEMENT, supra note 349.
367 Most of these experimental rehabilitation projects took place in the eastern or midwestern states of
the U.S. Until recently, few stream rehabilitation projects involved west coast salmonids. J. Hall & C.
Baker, supra note 322, at 2. The best-known example of a successful large-scale rehabilitation of a polluted
river in the West is Oregon's Willamette River. See generally Gleeson, The Return ofa River, the Willamette
River, Oregon, Or. State U. Water Resources Research Inst., June 1972.
: i8 Gleeson, supra note 367, at 3. See also Allen, Lmiations on Production in Salmonid Populations in Streams,
PROCEEDINGS: SYMPOSIUM ON SALMON AND TROUT IN STREAMS, University of British Columbia 1968
(J. Northcote ed. 1969).
3M0 Reeves & Roelofs, supra note 365, at 2.37 0J. Hall & C. Baker, supra note 364, at 6.
'171Id at 16.
'172 For a review of rehabilitation techniques see Reeves & Roelofs, supra note 365. See also Larkin, Play It
Again Sam-An Essay on Salmon Enhancement, 31 J. FISH. RES. BD. CAN. 1433 (1974); Parkinson & Slaney,A
Review of Enhancement Techniques Applhable to Anadromous Gamefihes, BRITISH COLUMBIA FISH & WILDLIFE
REP. No. 66 (1975).
373 J. Hall & C. Baker, supra note 364, at 18. See also Platts, Effects of Livestock Grazing Ion Anadromous
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adjacent land.3 74
Access improvement is usually the most obvious way of enhancing a stream's
salmon production potential, and it has been the type of restoration most often
undertaken. Typically, it involves removing debris or log jams from stream beds,
or removing or replacing improperly designed or installed culverts. 375 Log jams
in particular have often been removed with an abandon that is ecologically mis-
placed, for they are often useful in providing what ecologists call "habitat diver-
sity." In the 1950s and 1960s the California Department of Fish and Game
engaged in wholesale stream clearance under the mistaken belief that good
salmon habitat requires open stream beds. During those years ninety percent of
the Department's annual habitat improvement budget was spent in removing log
jams from virtually every important coastal salmon river in the state. 376 Fishery
biologists now know better: debris jams, if not extensive enough to impede fish
passage or disrupt stream configuration or gradient, can be a stabilizing influence
and may provide valuable cover for juvenile fish. In addition, log jams serve to
retard floodwaters, help filter out sediment, trap gravel on the upstream side, and
scour rearing pools on the downstream side. 377 Rivers that have been extensively
cleared tend to be less productive.
The idea of habitat restoration and enhancement for anadromous fish con-
tains nothing novel. As mentioned, the practice goes back to the 1930s. Two
manifestations of the enhancement concept, however, have arisen in the last dec-
ade or so: (1) the legal institutionalization of long-recognized restoration and en-
hancement precepts described above, and (2) the spirit of volunteerism with
which they are increasingly being carried out. Both are key features of the era of
salmon resource restoration. We will discuss the latter feature first.
In 1964 a coalition of California commercial and sport fishers from the Eureka
area met with fishery management officials of Humboldt County to ask what
could be done on an individual level to reverse the long decline in the yearly
salmon harvest. Perhaps they were tired of writing letters of protest about regu-
lations and quotas and of fighting for their livelihoods in endless hearings. A
small group of Humboldt County salmon fishers in that year decided to take a
more active role in restoring the source of their livelihood instead of passively
acquiescing to an ever-diminishing share of the salmon runs. By 1969 members
of the coalition were individually placing "hatchboxes"-a "low-tech" portable
hatchery-in California salmon streams. Here was something quite unprece-
dented: crusty California fishers were incubating salmon eggs for later release
into a stream with all the solicitude of weekend gardening enthusiasts. 378 The
reputed success of hatchbox salmon gardening in increasing the number of adult
Fish Habitat in Western North America], U.S. FOREST SERVICE, GENERAL TECHNICAL REPORT No.
PNBW-124 (1981).3 74 J. Hall & C. Baker, supra note 364, at 17. In the 1960s poor logging practices on Idaho's South Fork
of the Salmon River caused catastrophic sedimentation of summer chinook spawning and rearing areas,
burying holding pools under as much as 15 feet of fine sediment. After the Forest Service imposed a
logging moratorium, the river's recovery was gradual but nearly complete. E. Chancy, supra note 107, at
10.
375 Reeves & Roelofs, supra note 365, at 19, 23.3 7 6 Johnson, Salmon Enhancement (Part 1), PACIFIC FISHING, Feb. 1983, at 52.377 See generally C. Baker, The Impacts of Logjam Removal on Fish Populations and Stream Habitat in
Western Oregon (unpublished M.S. thesis, Oregon State University Library, Corvallis, 1979).
378 Johnson, Salmon Enhancement (Part 2), PACIFIC FISHING, Mar. 1983, at 64.
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salmon available for harvest a few years later caused the practice to spread up
and down the California coast, and it was endorsed and adopted by fishers' as-
sociations and civic organizations in one locality after another. Today, as a result
of a salmon trollers' lobby, California has enacted a law requiring the annual
purchase of a $55 salmon stamp, with proceeds used for private enhancement
purposes.3 79  Fishers' associations use self-assessed poundage fees to fund en-
hancement work, and salmon trollers can be found far upriver tending their
hatchboxes during the off-season. 380
If salmon ranching 38 ' is universally viewed with suspicion and hostility among
salmon fishers, salmon gardening is often practiced and widely applauded among
them. Not all fishers are sentimental about fish, and many of those who tend
hatchboxes are doing so because they foresee larger profits in the future. Yet this
spread of private nonprofit mini-hatcheries, as yet largely symbolic in its effect,
may mark a subtle shift of attitude. It represents a new feeling of solicitude
toward a fragile resource that stands in marked contrast to the rapacious atti-
tudes of resource users of the past. Instead of coldly regarding salmon as a crop
to be harvested, more fishers now see them as livestock to be nurtured.
Indeed, the very meaning of the term "enhancement" is shifting in focus. In
the past it has meant "mitigation," as fish managers placed primary reliance on
state and federal hatcheries to supplement depleted wild stocks. Today, however,
the term is coming to mean "restoration" of the historic wild fish runs together
with rehabilitation of the habitat necessary to accomplish that goal. More
salmon fishers are now asking what is perhaps the central question behind the
concept of fishery enhancement: should enhancement serve only to increase the
numbers of artificially reared fish to make up for the loss of natural habitat? Or
should it concentrate instead on regaining lost habitat so that self-sustaining runs
of wild salmon can rebuild naturally, with public hatcheries and private
hatchboxes used simply to give nature a nudge?382 Pondering that question has
apparently prompted some fishers to become as diligent in protecting the habitat
of their source of livelihood as in protecting their right to fish.
In the Puget Sound area the volunteer spirit caught on in 1977, when a coali-
tion of net fishers founded a local enhancement organization, again emphasizing
hatchboxes as aid to expanded fish production. Members who cannot themselves
tend a hatchbox are today asked to fund one, at an annual cost of about $150.383
In 1977 the Washington state legislature institutionalized volunteer enhancement
efforts by enacting the Cooperative Enhancement Program under the supervision
of the Washington Department of Fisheries. 38 4 As of early 1983 the Department
had authorized more than seventy small enhancement projects, from individual
hatchboxes to small tribal hatcheries. 385
Oregon institutionalized its own volunteer habitat enhancement activities in
1981 with the enactment of the Salmon and Trout Enhancement Program
379 CAL. Fisi & GAME CODE ANN. § 7860 (1983).
380 Johnson, supra note 378, at 64.
'181 See supra note 361.
382 Johnson, supra note 376, at 50.
'a8 Johnson, supra note 378, at 65.
184 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 75.18.100 - .110 (1982).
:05 Johnson, supra note 376, at 49.
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(STEP). 386 Partly modeled on British Columbia's pioneering program, 38 7 the
Oregon legislation funds a statewide coordinator and eight fishery biologists, who
operate under the supervision of the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife.
Greatly dependent on volunteers, Oregon's STEP provides training for labor-
intensive projects, attempting to harness the hatchbox volunteerism and place it
on a more sound ecological foundation. In addition, STEP provides tax credits
for certified fish habitat improvement projects. 38 8 Fishery biologists who have
often been more concerned with mitigating the effects of past problems than with
preventing future ones are now taking pains to explain carrying capacity-the
concept that natural ecosystems cannot sustain the peak salmon production
salmon fishers would like to see. Although more than five million fingerlings
were released coastwide from hatchboxes in 1982,389 fish and wildlife officials are
now explaining that the mere release of millions of extra fish into the streams is
not enough: the fry must first be adapted to the streams and the streams made
ready to receive them.
Resulting in part from public education efforts, a few years ago the focus of
volunteer enhancement activity shifted from the largely symbolic and sensitizing
function of the hatchboxes to the more demanding task of habitat improvement.
This shift has created an unlikely alliance of anglers, commercial fishers, and
environmentalists. Predictably, overly eager volunteers responded by seeking out
the most obvious obstacles in streambeds, cleaning up debris and removing log
jams with an enthusiasm that sometimes included the indiscriminate use of dyna-
mite and bulldozers. Oregon's fishery officials have since tempered the zeal of
volunteers and enticed them to gentler methods of creating habitat diversity,
such as planting alders on stream banks. Many individuals and civic organiza-
tions that formerly saw hatchboxes as an end in themselves are now trying the
recommended "adopt-a-stream approach" of nursing ailing salmon streams back
to health. 390
So far, the effect of volunteer salmon enhancement projects has been largely
inspirational and educational. The projects are useful mostly as means of build-
ing a constituency for costly but more effective large-scale programs. 39 1 Full res-
toration of the native salmon runs of the nineteenth century will, of course, take a
386 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 496.260, 496.430 - .460 (1981). Oregon's STEP legislation grew out of a
hatchbox program started in the Tillamook area in the late 1970s. When the Oregon Department of Fish
and Wildlife agreed to supply salmon eggs to nonprofit hatchbox operators, the movement spread rapidly
among civic groups and enhancement activists. It is now not uncommon for upriver hatchboxes to be
operated by Rotary clubs and similar civic organizations. Fishery management officials and legislators, at
first bemused by this sudden surge of activism on the part of individuals and organizations normally
antagonistic to any form of "environmentalism," decided to use it as a public education device and to
channel it to help accomplish programs more urgent and ecologically sound than hatchboxes. One of the
unexpected side effects of the program has been to bring together, in a common purpose, interests usually
hostile to each other.
387 British Columbia began its Salmonid Enhancement Program (SEP) in 1976 and to date has spent
$157 million (Canadian) on enhancement projects. An additional $44 million is budgeted for the next two
years. PACIFIC FIsHING, Aug. 1983, at 15.
388 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 316.984, 317.087, 318.080 (1981).
381 Johnson, supra note 378, at 69.
'31 Id at 68.
391 Asked whether some naive volunteers might not do more harm than good, one STEP fishery biolo-
gist explained, "I encourage the hell out of them. Anytime you do something positive, even if it doesn't
actually increase the fish, or even costs a few, it's all right with me, because it's a learning experience about




far greater commitment of resources than can be supplied by a handful of volun-
teers raising fish in a box or planting a few trees. Volunteer salmon enhancement
programs, however, have given many citizens of the Pacific Northwest a strong,
sense of having a personal stake in their own salmon streams. This is a small step
perhaps, but a step nevertheless.
b. Water Budget and Instream Flow Programs
From the beginning western water law has recognized the creation of vested
water rights for out-of-stream purposes such as agriculture, stock watering, min-
ing, and domestic and industrial uses. 39 2 Initially, no attention was given to the
appropriation of water for instream flow maintenance, for nonconsumptive
uses393 such as maintenance of aquatic and riparian ecosystems, esthetic enjoy-
ment, recreation, or for the dilution of pollutants. Instream uses slowly began to
receive recognition after the turn of the century. In Oregon, legislative with-
drawals of surface water from further appropriation date back to 1915. 3 04 Re-
cently, the concept of reserving a water right for rivers and streams themselves,
and for the creatures that inhabit or depend on them, has begun to gain promi-
nence in many states of the Ameridan West. 39 5
The water budget established for the Columbia and Snake River systems by
the Northwest Power Council pursuant to the Northwest Power Act of 1980 has
been described above.396 This water budget program for conserving fish is the
first attempt of its kind in the nation. During the critical spring runoff period of
April 15-June 15 the budgets provide a fixed volume of water to participating
fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes, in order to facilitate downstream
migration of juvenile salmon and steelhead. 397 The program gives tribes and
agencies control over the amount and timing of the river flow during this critical
period of fish migration, provided that existing "firm non-power commitments"
such as flood control are met. 398 Affected tribes and agencies may thus shape the
spillage of water over the dams to coincide with fish runs. The limitation on
39 2 See, e.g., I W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 1-20 (1971).
393 Nonconsumptive water uses, such as fish hatcheries or hydropower generation, are those that either
require no diversion of water from its natural channel or return it to the channel immediately after use,
undiminished in quantity. Return flows from consumptive uses, on the other hand, are not returned to the
natural channel, and may seep into groundwater, enter a different stream, or return a diminished quantity
to the same stream. L. SKURDAHL, PAST COMMITMENTS, CURRENT PROBLEMS, AND WATER CHOICES
FOR OREGON'S FUTURE 7 (1979).
394 Act of Feb. 9, 1915, 1915 Or. Laws, ch. 36, § 1. The withdrawal was for the esthetic purpose of
protecting scenic waterfalls visible from the Columbia River Gorge highway. The withdrawal, of course,
did not affect water rights already vested. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 538.160, 538.210 (1981). See generally Com-
ment, Preserving Instream Flows in Oregon's Rivers and Streams, II ENVTL. L. 379, 392 (1981).
'395 See generally Tarlock, Appropriation for Instream Flow Maintenance.- A Progress Report on "New" Pub/i West-
en Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211; COLUMBIA RIVER FISHERIES COUNCIL, RATIONALE FOR IN-
STREAM FLOWS FOR FISHERIES IN THE COLUMBIA AND SNAKE RIVERS (1979).396 See supra text accompanying notes 261-65.
397 FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, supra note 216, at § 300, discussed in 1 NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS
No. 5, Aug. 1982, at 3-4. For a critique of the water budget adopted by the Northwest Power Council, see
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO No. 19 at 8-9 (Sept. 1982).
398 FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, supra note 202, at § 304(a)(1). "The Water Budget may be used by
the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes to implement any flow schedule which provides maximum juvenile
salmon survival, within the limits of firm non-power requirements, physical conditions, and flows required
for firm loads." Id. The Northwest Power Council estimates a resulting average annual firm power loss of
550 megawatts, about three percent of the region's firm energy load carrying capacity. NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO No. 19, at 8 (Sept. 1982).
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absolute quantity of water available gives each entity incentive to use its allot-
ment in the most efficient manner possible.
The Fish and Wildlife Program adopted by the Northwest Power Council thus
provides a fixed amount of water available for the spring fish migration, subject
to emergency reduction and future revisions in quantity. 399 One limitation on
that program, however, is that neither the Council nor the federal agencies in-
volved in water management have authority to ensure that the minimum flow
requirements of the water budgets will be met; they cannot protect the Columbia
River or its tributaries from out-of-stream diversions of water. 4° ° Only the states
in the Columbia Basin have that authority.
40i
Under these circumstances, Columbia Basin state legislation that comple-
ments the water budget provisions of the Fish and Wildlife Program is essential.
Without legislation limiting future diversion of water from the Columbia and its
tributaries no assurance exists that the water budget or its goals will be met.
Washington was the first (and so far the only) state in the Columbia Basin to take
this step. In June 1980, after nearly two years of study and development, the
Washington Department of Ecology adopted rules limiting out-of-stream diver-
sions from the mainstream of the Columbia River.40 2 The Columbia River In-
stream Resources Protection Program imposes conservation and efficiency
requirements on future water diversions from the Washington side of the Colum-
bia River.403 It establishes a series of minimum instantaneous and daily average
399 FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, supra note 216, at § 303.
400Id at § 1500; see also section 10(h) of the Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839g(h) (1982).
401 Although the U.S. has power to preempt state water distribution law, Cappaert v. United States, 426
U.S. 128 (1976), United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), the authority has been sparingly
exercised. Section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way
interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use or
distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder ...
43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976). Similarly, section 27 of the 1920 Federal Power Act provides:
Nothing [in this Act] shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or in any way
to interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use,
or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right
acquired therein.
16 U.S.C. § 821 (1976). In California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), the Supreme Court ruled that
federal reclamation projects must comply with conditions imposed by state water laws that relate to the
"control, appropriation, use or distribution of water" when those conditions are not inconsistent with
explicit congressional directions authorizing the project in question. Id at 674-75. First Iowa Hydro-
Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946), reached the opposite result in construing the similar
language of the 1920 Federal Power Act. The continuing vitality of First Iowa is unclear.
402 WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. §§ 173-563-010 to -900 (1980), adopted pursuant to the Water Resources
Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.54.010 to -.910 (1980). See generall Blumm,supra note 109, at
290-95. No instream flow maintenance programs for the Columbia or Snake Rivers yet exist in Oregon or
Idaho, or for the Snake River within the boundaries of Washington. In 1982 Oregon briefly considered
adopting a program similar to Washington's for the mainstream Columbia, then deferred it pending adop-
tion of the Northwest Power Council's Fish and Wildlife Program. NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTI-
TUTE, ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO No. 19, at 20 (Sept. 1982); id. No. 20, at 15 (Jan. 1983). Oregon's
Water Policy Review Board has, however, adopted more than 300 minimum stream flows as part of its
stream review of unappropriated water in 15 of Oregon's 18 river basins. See generally Comment, Presering
Instream Flows, supra note 394, at 392-401; Rousseau, The Oregon Experience with a Minimum Streamlow Law, 2
INSTREAM FLOW NEEDS 78 (1976). The Oregon legislature has just directed the Water Policy Review
Board to study an additional 75 checkpoints for inclusion within the minimum stream flow system. The
specific checkpoints have not yet been identified. S.B. 225 (Aug. 8, 1983). The Oregonian, July 22, 1983,
at B8.
403 Future water diversions will be granted provided that they maintain specified flow levels, use "up-to-
date water conservation practices," and maintain "efficient water delivery systems." WASH. ADMIN. CODE
1983]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
flows for segments of the river below dams 40 4 and allows exceptions when "it is
clear that overriding considerations of the public interest will be served.
40 5
Substantial difficulties exist in implementing and enforcing the restrictions on
water diversions. For example, when a watershed lies within the boundaries of
several states, a state program unilaterally developed and enforced cannot ensure
long-term maintenance of minimum flows. The cooperation of the other states in
the watershed is needed.40 6 Hence, without similar legislation in Oregon and
Idaho, Washington will eventually abandon its pioneering program, since with-
out a regional commitment water users of neighboring states can reap most of the
benefits of one state's conservation efforts.
Thus, at this writing, one of the components most likely to be effective in pre-
serving stream flows for the protection of anadromous fish in the Pacific North-
west-the Northwest Power Act-is in place. Others, such as complementary
but essential state legislation restricting out-of-stream water diversion and the
federal court interpretation of whether Indian treaty fishing rights extend to
habitat quality,40 7 are in abeyance or pending.
40 8
3. Management of the Ocean Fishey
For domestic vessels, state and federal regulation of the ocean salmon fishery
was slight before enactment of the FCMA in 1976.409 Although states possessed
and occasionally exercised limited authority to manage fisheries beyond the
boundaries of their territorial waters, 4 10 they rarely used the authority to regulate
R. §§ 173-563-100, 173-563-060(2). In periods of low flow the rules seek to impose a pro rata sharing of the
water shortage burden among all water uses. Id. §§ 173-563-060(2), (3).40 4 1d § 173-563-040.
40 5 1d § 173-563-080. In October 1982 the Department of Ecology amended and relaxed some of its
requirements, alleging enforcement difficulties and hardships on some existing irrigators. NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO No. 19, at 18-20 (Sept. 1982); id No. 20, at 15
(Jan. 1983).
Although Washington could probably require that future federal projects be operated in accordance
with its instream flow program,seesupra note 401, it is unresolved whether existing dams must comply with
this aspect of Washington law. One authority has concluded that the Washington instrean flow program
would be held enforceable despite claims of federal preemption. See Blumm, supra note 109, at 290-95. In
part because of its inability to secure voluntary compliance with its regulations from federal agencies, the
Washington Department of Ecology suspended implementation of its instream flow program in late 1982
pending approval of the Northwest Power Council's Fish and Wildlife Program.
406 Blumm, supra note 109, at 290-91.
407 The Columbia Basin Indian tribes believe that their treaty rights entitle them to biologically opti-
mum stream flows. NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO No. 6, at 6
Dec. 1981. The issue is now before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See supra note 176.
406 Other federal and state statutes that might be applied to preserving instream flows in specific water-
ways include the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, see supra note 206; the Anadromous Fish
Conservation Act of 1965, see supra note 137; the Endangered Species Act of 1973, see supra note 7; the
National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1982); the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4344 (1976); the Oregon Scenic Rivers Act, OR. REV. STAT.§§ 390.805-.925 (1981); and the Washington Environmental Policy Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 43.21C.010 - .910 (1983).
4 09 See supra note 179. Exceptions have consisted largely of ad hoc regulations, such as the joint prohibi-
tion of offshore net fishing for salmon, see supra note 225.
410 Before 1976 federal and state courts routinely upheld the power of states to manage extraterritorial
fisheries provided that (1) state regulation did not conflict with applicable federal laws or regulations;
(2) the state regulation did not create an undue burden on interstate commerce; (3) the state had a legiti-
mate interest to justify extraterritorial fishery management, and (4) regulation of the activities of nonre-
sident fisheries would occur only when they had sufficient minimum contacts with the regulating state and
were not unfairly discriminated against. See, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265 (1977);
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Hjelle v. Brook, 377 F.
Supp. 430 (D. Alaska 1974); State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska), appeal dsmitsed sub noma. Uri v.
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the ocean harvest of the Pacific salmon. Before 1976 the west coast states usually
sought to regulate only the inside salmon fishery, leaving a regulatory vacuum in
the ocean.4 1  The hydropower era in the Columbia River-from the 1930s to the
1970s-was a golden age for ocean salmon trollers off the west coast of North
America. Domestic trolling vessels dominated the fishery, getting first chance at
the returning fish in their premium condition. Beyond the three-mile territorial
limit a troller could fish whenever weather or market conditions permitted, often
choosing to land his catch in the state with the least stringent landing laws. A
persistent plaintiff might even get a state law overturned by a federal court if the
law was discriminatory or interfered with interstate commerce. 41 2 The challenge
of developing comprehensive ocean management of Pacific salmon was not seri-
ously attempted until the Pacific Fishery Management Council adopted its first
salmon fishery plan in 1978.413
If the pre-1976 years were relatively idyllic for ocean salmon trollers, why were
they among the most vigorous supporters of the Magnuson Bill before it became
the FCMA? The story is told about a group of surly Alaska fishermen who
talked a reluctant President Ford into signing the Bill, after he had dismissed his
Secret Service guards at a reception in Anchorage. 4 14 The answer, of course, lies
in the threatened displacement of domestic fisheries by foreign fishing vessels
before the fishery conservation zone of the United States was extended to 200
miles. 4 15 Evidently, most salmon fishers, like their counterparts in other ocean
fisheries, were willing to accept the prospect of an increased regulatory burden if
they could be protected from foreign fishing competition.
It must not be supposed, however, that consolidation of management author-
ity over the ocean salmon fishery was accomplished at a single bold stroke, either
with the passage of the FCMA in 1976 or the adoption of the first Pacific salmon
fishery management plan two years later. Rather, it has been an incremental
and evolutionary process, an interplay between complementary developments in
domestic and international fisheries law, thus far accomplished in five stages.
The first event in this expansion was the 1937 ratification of the Fraser River
Treaty with Canada, in effect since 1946.416 The second step was the 1953 ratifi-
cation of the Trilateral Pacific Salmon Treaty between Japan, Canada, and the
United States.4 17 Third was the Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act of 1966-now
superseded-that created a contiguous fishery zone of twelve miles from the
coastline of the United States.41 8 Fourth was the 1976 enactment of the FCMA,
which extended United States authority over offshore fisheries to 200 miles (and
Alaska, 429 U.S. 806 (1976). To these progressively restrictive limitations on state authority to manage
extraterritorial fisheries, section 306(a) of the FCMA added a fifth condition allowing state regulation only
of those vessels registered under the laws of the state. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) (West Supp. 1982).
411 See supra note 179.
412 See supra note 410.
413See supra text accompanying note 188.
414 Remarks of Sen. Ted Stevens (R. Alaska) at National Fishery Law Symposium: "Fishing Law:
Management and Economic Stress," Seattle, Wash. (Oct. 22, 1983).
415 See supra note 178.
41 6 See supra text accompanying notes 224-27.
417 See supra text accompanying notes 273-78.
4 18 Seesupra note 181. The Bartlett Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-308, 78 Stat. 194 (19-) (repealed 1976),




even beyond in the case of anadromous fish). 4 19 Fifth, and most recent, is the
Presidential Proclamation of March 10, 1983, which arguably gives effect to the
Law of the Sea Convention provisions on the capture of anadromous fish on the
high seas.42
0
A sixth step is pending at this writing. Ratification of the proposed Pacific
Salmon Treaty with Canada 42 1 might well prove to be the last substantial miss-
ing piece of the Pacific salmon ocean management puzzle. If ratified, the treaty
might become the last major international management agreement concluded in
this century for the protection of the Pacific salmon of North American origin-a
fitting capstone on the sequence of legal events just described. 4 22
4. Interdisctplhnay Planning and Citzten Parleti'al'on
Legislative provisions and judicial decisions in United States administrative
law have long reflected the belief that citizen participation in government deci-
sionmaking is desirable. It is believed that widening the spectrum of participa-
tion helps offset the disproportionate power wielded by special interest groups,
and that soliciting viewpoints that would otherwise be poorly represented will
sensitize decisonmakers to the impacts of their decisions and help to uncover al-
ternate courses of action. 423 The need for broad-based participation is particu-
larly acute when single- or dominant-purpose agencies-such as the Corps of
Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, or the Bonneville Power Administra-
tion-are given control over multiple-use resources such as rivers or streams.4 24
Public participation in federal natural resource policy, however, has histori-
cally lagged behind other areas of law. In-house decisionmaking was fostered by
a provision in the Administrative Procedure Act that exempts matters involving
"public property" from rulemaking. 425 Thus, agencies such as the Bonneville
4 19See supra text accompanying notes 183-92.4 20 See supra text accompanying note 282.
421 See supra text accompanying notes 218-20.
4 22 See infia text accompanying notes 481-83.
423See, e.g., section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982) (agencies must give
notice of proposed rulemaking and provide an opportunity for interested persons to participate); Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (the FCC must
allow interested persons to participate in license renewal proceedings). On the efficacy of rulemaking
procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 142-43
(3d ed. 1972). Another leading scholar of administrative law summarized other advantages thus:
Public intervention can provide agencies with another dimension useful in assuring respon-
sive and responsible decisions; it can serve as a safety valve allowing interested persons and
groups to express their views before policies are announced and implemented; it can ease the
enforcement of administrative programs relying upon public cooperation; and it can satisfy
judicial demands that agencies observe the highest procedural standards, If agency hearings
were to become readily available to public participation, confidence in the performance of
government institutions and in the fairness of administrative hearings might be measurably
enhanced.
Gellhorn, Pubhc Participoaton in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L. J. 359, 361 (1972). See also, e.g., -Flar-
rington & Frick, Opportunttiesfor Public Participation in Administratlie Rulemaking, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW.
537 (1983).
424 Blumm & Johnson, supra note 206, at 551-53.
425 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1976) provides that one of the exceptions to the rulemaking requirement is "a
matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits or con-
tracts." "Public property" was defined by the Attorney General to embrace rules dealing with the federal
public lands. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON T1HE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE ACT 27 (1947). For a discussion of the application of this exemption, see Bonfield, Pubhc Partcipation
in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Pubh'c Properqy Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540,
557-61 (1970).
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Power Administration have not been required to make policy decisions through
rulemaking because the sale of electricity has been interpreted to fall under the
exemption. 426 A key feature of much of the recent environmental and natural
resource legislation-such as the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA),427 the reform statutes of 1976 dealing with the Forest Service and Bu-
reau of Land Management, 428 and the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air
Act 429 -has been Congressional emphasis on expanding opportunity for public
and interdisciplinary participation in the development and implementation of
administrative regulations. Some federal resources agencies even subsidize
outside comment by reimbursing members of the public for participation
costs.
4 3 0
The two landmark pieces of federal legislation in the modern era of
anadromous fish management-the FCMA and the Northwest Power Act-are
consistent with this movement. The FCMA directs each regional fishery council
to "conduct public hearings at appropriate times and in appropriate locations in
the geographical area concerned, so as to allow all interested persons an opportu-
nity to be heard in the development of fishery management plans and amend-
ments to such plans, and with respect to the administration and implementation
of the provisions of this [Act]." '43 I The Northwest Power Act goes even further
than the FCMA in assuring opportunity for public involvement prior to impor-
tant resource development and marketing decisions. It requires the Northwest
Power Planning Council and the Bonneville Power Administration to develop
and implement comprehensive public involvement programs, both on important
regional energy issues and in the development of the Fish and Wildlife Pro-
gram.432 One commentator has described both the lack of public participation
prior to these Acts and the rationale underlying the Northwest Power Act's pub-
lic participation requirements thus:
[Rlegional hydroelectric policymakers frequently sacrificed public in-
volvement in the name of administrative expertise. Unfortunately, the
practical effect of unfettered administrative discretion has been to empha-
size the short term at the expense of the long term, and to emphasize the
utility and industrial customers' access to decisionmakers at the expense
of the general. public. The Act's commitment to open processes is a recog-
nition that the region can no longer afford to make policies that are not
informed by public comment and which cannot withstand public chal-
lenges in the courts. Although public comment and judicial review have
been attacked as dilatory and inefficient, it seems clear that the benefits of
ensuring sound administrative decisionmaking far exceed the costs of de-
lays. The lessons of the past indicate that the long term costs of poor
426See, e.g., City of Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1978),cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982
(1980).
427 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4343 (1976).
428 National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1976); Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976).
429 Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 108, 123, 91 Stat. 685, 693, 724-25.
43
°See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 904.3 (1981), a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration regulation
that provides for financial compensation to individuals or groups if their representation substantially con-
tributes to a fair determination of the issues involved in the proceeding. The reimbursement of participa-
tion costs of concerned citizens may encourage broader participation. See generaly S. VERBA & N. NIE,
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (1972).
431 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(3) (1982).
432 16 U.S.C. §§ 839(3), 839b(g)(l), 839b(h)(4) (1982).
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decisions are simply too high for the region not to encourage active, vigor-
ous, and critical public debate on the region's electric future.433
Another feature of recent natural resource legislation in keeping with the pre-
cept of expanded opportunity for public involvement is the withdrawal of the
broad decisionmaking charters that federal administrators had enjoyed through-
out the hydropower era. Both of the major statutes dealing with the Pacific
salmon fishery have vested substantial authority in regional commissions ap-
pointed by state governments. The FCMA created the regional fishery manage-
ment councils out of what had previously been a power vacuum, 4 3 4 and the
Northwest Power Act transfers management and planning responsibilities previ-
ously vested in federal agencies to a regional commission. 435 While it is prema-
ture to forecast widespread divestiture of federal agency planning responsibilities,
a trend toward reducing the power of single- or dominant-purpose agencies to
decide the fate of multiple-use resources nevertheless seems clear.
5. Recognition of Indian Fishing Rights
The recognition of the enforceability of Indian fishing rights after long years of
neglect came with the suddenness and decisiveness that only major court deci-
sions can manage. After Judge Belloni's 1969 decision that treaty tribes have a
right to a "fair share" of Columbia River salmon, Judge Boldt's fifty percent
allocation ruling in 1974 fundamentally rearranged priorities among user groups
and brought new participants into anadromous fish management. 436 A leading
example is the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, which has gained
considerable respect for its research and advocacy on behalf of the tribes and the
salmon.
4 3 7
The tribal share of the salmon harvest has shown a steady and marked in-
crease as a result of the fishing rights decisions. 438  This is not to say, however,
that any permanent reconciliation of Indian fishing rights with the rights of other
users and the needs of the resource has yet been achieved. The allocation issues
are enormously complex and need continuing refinement. 439 The complexity is a
fertile ground for litigation. Attorneys for the tribes, the United States, the
states, and private user groups are in and out of federal courtrooms on a regular
433 Blumm, The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage Prologue to the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175, 243-44 (1983).
434See supra note 193.
435 See supra text accompanying note 212. The Bonneville Power Administration, however, believes that
it is not bound by the directives of the Northwest Power Planning Council. It finds no "clear and unam-
biguous waiver of federal supremacy" in the Act, even though 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (1982) directs
the BPA to use its funding and other authorities in a manner consistent with the Fish and Wildlife Pro-
gram developed by the Council. Blumm, supra note 433, at 235 n.348.436 See supra text accompanying notes 162-71.
437 The CRITFC, with offices in Portland, represents the four Columbia River treaty tribes on
anadromous fish issues. The Commission's substantial staff conducts biological research, develops plans
for enhancement of the runs, prepares management regimes, and represents tribal interests. See supra note
299.
438 Recent statistics are contained in PFMC 1983 Plan, supra note 297. In 1971, 1972, and 1973 (the last
three full years before the Boldt decision), for example, Indians harvested 5%, 7.5%, and 6.5%, respectively,
of all fish taken in Puget Sound. Id. at 81-1I. In 1980 and 1981 (the last years for which final figures are
available), Indians took 55% and 39%, respectively. Id The Indian share of fish harvested on the Colum-
bia has also increased substantially. See, e.g. , id. at 65-I for annual harvest statistics for the fall chinook,
commercially the most important run. The Columbia River tribes allege, however, that the substantial
offshore harvest of Columbia River salmon in Alaska has violated Indian treaty rights. See nfira note 441.
439 See supra note 306.
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basis. One judge has lamented that the district court must now be a "perpetual
fishmaster. ' ' 440 An extreme example of the potential reach of these Indian trea-
ties, as construed by the courts, is pending litigation brought by the Columbia
River tribes over the extent of the harvest of Pacific salmon of Columbia River
origin off the coast of Alaska.
44 1
6 Limited Enty
Limited entry is the term applied to a category of related management tech-
niques that seek to control the number of participants in a fishery, so that those
permitted to fish will harvest the biologically optimum catch while expending
the economically optimum degree of effort. 442 Limited entry thus restricts the
right of access to the common-pool resource. The goal of biological and eco-
nomic optimization is usually sought by any one or a combination of four basic
methods: (1) outright restrictions on the number of individuals or (2) the number
of vessels participating in a fishery; (3) economic disincentives to participation,
such as licensing fees, vessel taxation, or tax per unit of catch; or (4) financial
incentives for a participant to abandon a fishery, often through government
"buy-back" of vessels and gear.443 Since limited entry has been the topic of a vast
body of literature, we discuss it only briefly here.
The concept of limited entry as a conservation technique is ancient, but its
enactment into statutory law is a recent phenomenon. Among certain Indian
tribes its practice was firmly established in customary law, which allowed fishers
to take the quantity of fish needed for immediate consumption and whatever
could be prepared for one season's storage and trade. Fishing beyond need was
not tolerated, and among some tribes access to the fishery was strictly controlled
440 United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976)
(Burns, J., concurring).
441 Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldridge, No. C80-342 T (W.D.
Wash., amended complaint filed June 4, 1982). The Columbia River tribes allege that their harvest of
Columbia River bright fall chinook has been restricted because of overfishing by the Alaska troll fishery.
The suit seeks relief against the Secretary of Commerce for failing to adopt regulations pursuant to the
FCMA, that would protect escapement goals and plaintiffs' treaty rights on federal waters. Similar allega-
tions are made against State of Alaska fisheries officials concerning the harvest within the three-mile limit.
Proceedings in court were suspended during the summer of 1983, while the parties sought to obtain
favorable provisions in the Pacific Salmon Treaty negotiations with Canada. See supra text accompanying
notes 218-21.
442 The term is often used to encompass all methods of limiting fishing, including individual or vessel
quotas, bag limits, or gear restrictions. We use a more restrictive definition under which participation, but
not necessarily effort, is limited. Limitation of fishing effort can be accomplished in a variety of ways, such
as limiting the number of charterboats or their capacity in recreational fishing, limiting the number of
privately owned recreational vessels, limiting the number of fishing days or the areas fished, limiting the
total annual recreational catch, limiting the daily or annual catch per angler, limiting the minimum size of
fish taken, limiting fishing methods and gear used, increasing access fees, using a tag system for fish caught,
or using a lottery system for permits. F. Hester & P. Sorenson, A Comparative Analysi of Altematives for
Limiting Access to Ocean Recreational Salmon Fishing 2, PACIFIC MARINE FISHERIES COMM'N (April 1978).44 3 See generally LIMITED ENTRY AS A FISHERY MANAGEMENT TOOL (R. Rettig & J. Ginter eds. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as LIMITED ENTRY]. On the methods and practice of limiting access to a fishery see L.
ANDERSON, A COMPARISON OF LIMITED ENTRY FISHERIES MANAGEMENT SCHEMES, in REPORT OF THE
ACMRR WORKING PARTY ON THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF DETERMINING MANAGEMENT MEASURES 47
(Food & Agricultural Organization Fisheries No. 23, 1980); F. CHRISTY, ALTERNATIVE ENTRY CONTROLS
FOR FISHERIES, IN LIMITED ENTRY INTO THE COMMERCIAL FISHERIES 85 (Institute for Marine Studies
No. IMS-UW-75-1, J. Mundt ed. 1975); F. Hester & P. Sorenson, supra note 442; McConnell & Norton, An
Evaluation of Limited Entry and Alternative Fishery Management Schemes, in LIMITED ENTRY, supra, at 188; R.
PORTER, A REVIEW OF LIMITED ENTRY ALTERNATIVES FOR COMMERCIAL SALMON FISHERIES, PACIFIC
MARINE FISHERIES COMM'N (June 1978); Young, Fishing By Permit: Restricted Common Proper in tactice, 13
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 171 (1983).
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by customary property rights. 444 For obvious reasons, limited entry by custom is
no longer a workable conservation strategy, and determination of optimum fish-
ing effort is now more a question of sophisticated calculations in population dy-
namics and econometrics than of custom or morality.
Discussions of how to limit entry into the Columbia River commercial salmon
fishery can be dated back at least to 1884, when canners met to propose methods
of reducing the number of vessels to match more closely the capacity of the can-
neries. 445 The problems created by too many fishers chasing too few fish have
long been recognized as amenable to economic solution, and for many years
economists have recommended some form of limited entry as a means of enhanc-
ing economic efficiency.446 The salmon fishery, according to the argument ad-
vanced by many economists, is heavily overcapitalized, resulting in low incomes
for too many competing participants and in strong political pressure to place the
long-term health of the resource at risk in order to reduce short-term economic
impacts on participants. The state of affairs in the salmon fishery is such that the
cost of harvesting the fish may approach-and in some cases exceed-the value
of the catch. Economic efficiency requires that the fishery be made more profita-
ble for a smaller number of participants, so that harvest capacity will more
closely match the quantity of fish available for harvest.44
7
In order to increase harvest efficiency and profitability, to reduce the cost per
unit of fishing effort, and to ease the burden of regulation on participants, mod-
ern limited entry programs seek to hold constant or to reduce the number of
individuals or vessels participating in a fishery. In determining an equitable
method of allocating fishing rights among present and future participants in a
fishery, serious constitutional questions may arise.448 This is particularly true
when a regulatory body seeks to eliminate vessels or individuals that have histori-
cally participated in a fishery. In order to minimize social and legal problems,
most limited entry programs now include "grandfather" clauses or "buy-back"
provisions. A grandfather clause in a limited entry law typically provides that an
444See supra text accompanying note 56. For an early account of Indian fishermen's impatience with
freeloaders, see supra note 49.
445 C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 3-4.4 46 See generally L. ANDERSON, THE ECONOMICS OF FISHERY MANAGEMENT (1977).
447 See generally Christy, The Costs of Uncontrolled Access in Fisheries, in LIMITED ENTRY, supra note 443, at
201; Crutchfield, The Fiheqv. Economic Maximization, PACIFIC SALMON: MANAGEMENT FOR PEOPLE I (D.
Ellis ed. 1977); Donaldson & Pontecorvo, Economic Rationahzation ofFisheries, 8 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 149
(1980); Orbach, Social and Cultural Aspects of Limited Entry, in LIMITED ENTRY, supra note 443, at 211; Smith,
Fishing Success in a Regulated Commons, I OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 369 (1974); Stokes, Limitaton ofFthing
Effort. An Economic Analysis ofptions, 3 MARINE POL. 289 (1979). Ironically, an early effect of imposing a
limited entry program has been an increase in the number of vessels actively participating in a fishery.
Initially, imposition of participation restrictions will draw dormant but historically active vessels back into
the fishery, as inactive fishers seek to preserve licenses that will become increasingly valuable. Speculators
otherwise inactive in the fishery may also rush to establish their rights to fish before the number of licenses
is permanently capped. For figures illustrating the sudden inflationary effect of new entry restrictions on
the size of the fishing fleet in Oregon see PFMC 1983 PLAN, supra note 297, at 15-V. For figures on the rise
in license values after the imposition of the Alaska limited entry law, see R. HIGGS, PRELIMINARY REPORT
ON THE PROBABLE SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A MORATORIUM ON THE ISSUANCE OF NEW VESSEL
LICENSES IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN COMMERCIAL SALMON FISHERY 18-19, Pacific Fishery Management
Council (Aug. 1978).448 See generally Koch, A Constitutional Analysts ofLimited Entry, LIMITED ENTRY, supra note 443, at 251.
See also Cameron, Constitutional Impediments to Limited Entry Fisheries Legislation, University of Rhode
Island Marine Affairs Program (1973); Note, Legal Dimensions ofEntry Fishery Management, 17 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 757 (1976); G. KNIGHT &J. LAMBERT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF LIMITED ENTRY FOR COMMERCIAL
MARINE FISHERIES 908 (Nat'l Marine Fisheries Service Rep. No. PB-247, 1975).
THE LAW OF THE PACIFIC SALMON FISHERY
already established participant in a fishery may continue to participate until
death, voluntary relinquishment, revocation for violation of regulations, or gov-
ernment repurchase of the grandfathered permit. A buy-back program may ac-
complish a phased and long-term reduction of fishing effort by government
purchase of a vessel and its gear or of an outstanding permit. 449
The west coast's first comprehensive limited entry regulations took effect in
British Columbia in 1969.450 Alaska enacted a complex limited entry law in
1973.451 Spurred by the impact of the Boldt decision, 45 2 the state of Washington
in 1974 imposed a moratorium on further licensing of commercial salmon vessels,
adding charterboat vessels to the moratorium in 1977. 4 5 3
The FCMA, 454 as enacted in 1976, authorized regional fishery management
councils to establish limited entry programs in order to achieve optimum yields
for each fishery under their jurisdiction. 455 Accordingly, in 1978 the Pacific Fish-
449 To reduce the level of fishing effort in the non-Indian commercial and charterboat salmon fleets,
Washington State has been implementing a buy-back program with federal funds since 1975. PFMC 1983
Plan, supra note 297, at 17-V. One purpose of the buy-back program is to provide an opportunity "for the
commercial and charter salmon fishermen who have been economically dislocated as a result of the Boldt
decision [see supra text accompanying note 164] to sell . . . their licenses, vessels, and gear and leave the
fishery." S. REP. No. 567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980). Since the passage of the Salmon ana Steelhead
Enhancement Act of 1980, see infra note 477, the federal government has funded up to 75% of the cost of
buy-backs. Salmon and Steelhead Enhancement Act, § 130(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3331(a) (1982). On the Wash-
ington fleet adjustment program in general, see NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, ANADROMOUS
FISH LAW MEMO No. 15, 11-12 (Aug. 1981). Oregon is presently negotiating with the federal government
and the State of Washington to secure funds and establish procedures to implement a buy-back program
for permits held by non-Indian Columbia River gill netters. PFMC 1983 Plan, supra note 297, at 14-V.
Even when compensatory provisions such as grandfather clauses and buy-back programs exist, they may
not be sufficient to allow a limited entry program to withstand constitutional attack. In 1973 Alaska
enacted a comprehensive and complicated limited entry law, giving effect to a public referendum amend-
ing the state constitution to allow passage of such a program. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.260(a) (1982). The
law had a considerable social impact on resident Alaska fishers. See S. LANGDON, TRANSFER PATTERNS IN
ALASKA LIMITED ENTRY FISHERIES, FINAL REPORT FOR THE LIMITED ENTRY STUDY GROUP OF THE
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE (Jan. 1980). In Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976), the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the limited entry law violated the equal protection provision of the state consti-
tution. But see Rose v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 647 P.2d 154 (Alaska 1982) (holding that the
method of calculating the award of limited entry permits did not violate the equal protection clause of the
state constitution). In general, limited entry programs have successfully withstood constitutional attack.
Care must be taken, however, to prevent windfalls to license holders who use their licenses to speculate
rather than to fish. See generaly Koch, supra note 448.
450 The Canadian government had experimented with various license limitation programs since the late
nineteenth century. Higgs, supra note 447, at 12. The regulations were promulgated under the authority
of the Fisheries Act of 1932, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. F-14, C 119.5.7 (1970). On federal control over marine
fisheries in Canada, see supra note 221. On the British Columbia law see generally B. CAMPBELL, LIMITED
ENTRY IN THE SALMON FISHERY: THE BRITISH COLUMBIA EXPERIENCE, (PASGAP Paper No. 6, May
1972); G. Fraser, Liense Limitation in British Columbia Salmon Fisheiy, in LIMITED ENTRY, supra note 443, at
358; Higgs, supra note 447, at 12-16; LIMITED ENTRY INTO THE COMMERCIAL FISHERIES, supra note 443,
at 25-34, 135-43; B. Mitchell, Hindsig/t Revtws. The B.C License Programme, in PACIFIC SALMON: MANAGE-
MENT FOR PEOPLE 148 (D. Ellis ed. 1977); and C. Newton, Experience with Limited Entry in British Colum/a
Fisheries, in LIMITED ENTRY, supra note 443, at 382.
451 ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.43.010-.990 (1982). On the Alaska statute, see generally A. ADASIAK, EXPERI-
ENCE WITH LIMITED ENTRY: ALASKA, Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n (1977); Adasiak, Lim-
ited Entry in Alaska PACIFIC SALMON: MANAGEMENT FOR PEOPLE 187 (D. Ellis ed. 1977); Adasiak, The
Alaskan Experience with Limited Ent, LIMITED ENTRY, supra note 384B, at 271; Gorelick, Exploitation of the
Alaska Salmon Fishery, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 391 (1975); R. Higgs, supra note 447, at 16-21;supra note 443, at 5-
16. On the constitutionality of Alaska's law, see supra note 449.45 2 See supra text accompanying note 164.
453 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 75.28.450-.540 (Supp. 1983). See also R. Higgs, supra note 447, at 21-26;
Benson & Longman, The Washigton Experience with Limited Eni, in LIMITED ENTRY, supra note 443, at
333; on Washington's license reduction program see supra note 449.45 4 See supra text accompanying notes 177-201.
455 Section 303(b) of the FCMA provides:
Any fishery management plan which is prepared by any council . . . may-
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ery Management Council declared its intent to take action to limit access to the
ocean salmon fishery, if its constituent states of California, Oregon, and Washing-
ton failed to develop their own programs according to specified standards by the
1980 fishing season.456 A two-year license moratorium was planned for the ocean
salmon troll and charterboat fisheries. The affected states, however, enacted or
modified their own programs before the Council's deadline, and the Council de-
clined to take further action. In 1979 the Oregon legislature imposed a morato-
rium on new licenses for commercial salmon vessels.457 That same year
California enacted a provisional moratorium on new licenses to individuals,
amending the law in 1982 to set up a limited entry system based on non-transfer-
able fishing vessel permits.45
8
The political passions aroused by limited entry schemes are strong, and many
legal issues remain to be resolved. 459 Yet it seems safe to predict that although
social and economic dislocations will occur and refinements in the operation of
limited entry laws will be required, some form of limited entry will stand as a
permanent feature in the law of salmon fishery management in the Pacific
Northwest. License moratoriums will ripen into license reduction programs, and
with careful planning over a period of decades the size of the salmon fishing fleet
may come to approximate what the biological needs of the fishery and the eco-
nomic needs of the fishers can sustain.
7. Interjurzsdictional Management
Before the legal events of the past decade, states were the chief regulators of
the Pacific salmon fishery. In rivers where salmon were caught, states regulated
the harvest by state law, or by interstate compact as in the case of the Columbia
River.460 In addition, state authority encompassed the offshore territorial waters
and even beyond if certain conditions were met.46 1 Involvement of the federal
government in allocation of the resource was typically slight, although federal
agencies-the Corps of Engineers, the Bonneville Power Administration, and the
Bureau of Reclamation-exercised paramount authority over the habitat by
controlling the flow of the water.
(6) establish a system for limiting access to the fishery in order to achieve optimum yield if,
in developing such system, the Council and the Secretary take into account-
(A) present participation in the fishery,
(B) historical fishing practices in, and dependence on, the fishery,
(C) the economics of the fishery,
(D) the capability of fishing vessels used in the fishery to engage in other fisheries,
(E) the cultural and social framework relevant to the fishery, and
(F) any other relevant considerations.
16 U.S.C. § 1853(b) (1982). See generally Christy, Limted Access Systems under t Fishe ry Conservation and Man-
agement Act of 1976, in ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EXTENDED FISHERIES JURISDICTION (L. Anderson ed.
1977).
456 1979 GAO Report, supra note 96, at 48.
457 OR. REV. STAT. § 508.745 (Note: Restricted Vessel Permit Systems). Oregon is currently negotiat-
ing a license reduction program to supplement its moratorium. See supra note 449.
458 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 8230-8249 (West Supp. 1983).
459 An informal poll of Oregon salmon fishers in the late 1970s disclosed about 40% opposed to limiting
entry. Some of those polled summarized their colleagues' views thus: "If you have a big boat, you favor it.
If you have a small boat, you're against it." Quotedin C. SMITH,supra note 41, at 3. For more formal public
opinion surveys, see Higgs, supra note 447,passtn and appendices 1-2.46 0 See supra note 301.
461 See supra note 410.
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The Indian fishing rights decisions, 462 the FCMA,463 and the Northwest
Power Act 4 6 4 all dramatically altered this balance. In harvest allocation-where
formerly the states reigned supreme-federal authority has been enlarged, and
now dominates the ocean fishery. Conversely, in habitat management-where
formerly federal water resource agencies with single- or dominant-purpose mis-
sions reigned supreme--state authority has been augmented and institutional-
ized in the form of a regional planning council.
465
In order to make resource decisions that transcend jurisdictional boundaries,
new management bodies have been created by statute, by court order, and by
voluntary association. Some exist to further the interests of specific user groups;
others have been given a statutory mandate to identify and implement broader
public interests by devising conservation programs that simultaneously blunt the
mission-oriented exercise of power by federal agencies and counteract the ten-
dency of all user groups and jurisdictions to increase their own share of the har-
vest at the expense of all others. This interjurisdictional responsibility has been
exercised by the Secretary of Commerce with his or her power to preempt state
fishery laws, 46 6 and has been given by statute to the regional fishery councils on
the ocean 4 6 7 and to the Northwest Power Council in the Columbia Basin.46 8 In
the international arena, interjurisdictional agreements on the conservation and
harvest of Pacific salmon continue to be negotiated and concluded, 469 although
the pace of international progress at times seems glacial in comparison to the
rapid tempo of national developments in anadromous fish law.
By identifying the central importance of, and beginning a movement toward,
comprehensive and coordinated management in furtherance of the public inter-
est, the era of restoration has made an essential contribution to the conservation
of anadromous fish. It is a fitting conclusion to our list of precepts that have
revolutionized the law of salmon and steelhead management in the past decade.
Yet interjurisdictional management is also a concept that contains within itself
the germ of a new set of challenges. As the final section will show, the modern
search for management solutions has generated its own array of problems, and in
the long run these new problems may prove as intractable as any that have yet
been discussed in this article.
V. AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE: COORDINATING AND CONSOLIDATING
JURISDICTIONS
Section III of this Article followed the life journey of a representative chinook.
salmon through an extreme though illustrative example of the fragmentation of
regulatory authority that today characterizes salmon and steelhead management
in the Pacific Northwest. As pointed out above, 470 this institutional balkaniza-
tion is perhaps a natural consequence of the characteristically wayward habits of
46 2 See supra text accompanying notes 163-68.
463 See supra text accompanying notes 177-201.
464 See supra text accompanying notes 202-17.
465 See supra text accompanying note 212.
466 See supra note 304.
467 See supra text accompanying notes 193-95.
468See supra text accompanying notes 212-15.
469See supra text accompanying notes 218, 224, & 273.4 70 See supra text accompanying note 152.
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anadromous fish and the historical development of the Northwest's salmon
fishery.
But the reforms of the past decade have arguably played an even greater role
in creating the dilemmas that face today's salmon manager. Congress and the
courts, in their determined efforts to extend a measure of protection to a
threatened resource and to allocate its harvest more fairly, have unwittingly mul-
tiplied management authority to the point where the very institutions designed
to protect the resource have now, by virtue of their numbers and their unwieldi-
ness, become an additional threat. Like the sorceror's apprentice of Goethe's
fable, today's salmon managers are perhaps more in peril of being overwhelmed
by the "solution" than by the remaining problems. Far-flung and uncoordinated
authority over a common-stock resource exacts high economic and biological
costs. These costs are without a doubt one of the contributing causes of the de-
pressed state of the wild chinook salmon.4 7 1
Long-term planning in such a situation requires lengthy and difficult negotia-
tions among governmental bodies and interest groups whose goals inevitably con-
flict. In the management regimes described above, for example, unless
agreement on escapement goals and harvest strategies can be achieved among
every one of seventeen management jurisdictions, authorities in each potentially
have the power to jeopardize conservation gains made at great cost in any of the
others. Conservation gains in one jurisdiction may easily be lost as the benefits
accrue not to the health of the resource itself, but rather to user groups in other
management regimes where regulation is less strict. Thus, the greatest economic
benefits of conserving a migratory common property resource under fragmented
management accrue to those user groups that are least conscientious about con-
serving the resource.
Furthermore, without integrated management it is virtually impossible to pre-
vent overfishing in some areas or to distribute equitably economic hardship
caused by differential fishing restrictions. Salmon fishers share with the fish upon
which they depend an understandable instinct for self-preservation, and the
salmon fleet is highly mobile. In a disjointed management regime, salmon fishers
will be deflected to areas where fishing restrictions are less stringent, and they
will quickly overfish that area. At other times it may be less easy to predict how
salmon fishers will respond to various management measures, and it is accord-
ingly difficult to devise ocean fishing regulations to accomplish specific and pre-
dictable objectives. 472
When institutional insularity thus results in differential levels of resource pro-
tection, regulations often appear arbitrary. Inequities and contradictions are
made plain to all, and they further divide and infuriate the fishing public and
exact an unacceptably high toll on the health of the resource. They iake en-
hancement efforts futile or reduce their effectiveness. They degrade lofty scien-
tific and economic issues to the level of partisan squabbling and they confuse
nearly everyone. The degree of cooperation and coordination required among
regulatory bodies to prevent all these from happening may verge on the heroic.
Thus, with the gradual refinement of scientific data and of existing methods of
471 FRAMEWORK PLAN, supra note 252, at 33.
472 PFMC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 35, at 24.
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regulation and enforcement, the chief obstacles to effective salmon management
are now institutional. The key weakness of the prevailing system can be summed
up thus: control over the harvest and control over the environment and produc-
tion of anadromous fish are not now united in any single management entity, nor
even in any alliance of entities, and incentives to produce and to conserve are
weak when the interests of producers and harvesters differ. In order to minimize
these unfortunate consequences, consolidation of regulatory authority is needed.
Without it there can be no ultimately effective plan for the management of Pa-
cific salmon.
Fortunately, there is some cause for cautious optimism. While total manage-
ment integration may not be possible (nor even desirable) so long as nations re-
fuse to surrender any significant degree of sovereignty over their natural
resources, or so long as the federalist system on which the United States govern-
ment is based persists, it may nevertheless be possible to achieve effective linkage
among management authorities. Component parts of a fragmented management
regime perhaps need not forego their separate identities and powers in order to
be effectively cemented together into a working unit. The "super-agency" advo-
cated by some to resolve the management problems of the Pacific salmon fishery
may be not only unachievable, but also unnecessary.
A few such efforts at interjurisdictional coordination have already been men-
tioned. The Inter-Council Salmon Coordinating Committee, which cross-repre-
sents the NPFMC and the PFMC in order to achieve greater compatibility
between their respective ocean salmon management plans, continues to seek con-
sistency in both development and implementation.4 7 3 On the Columbia River
and its tributaries coordinated policies are gradually being forged among the
eleven separate jurisdictions. The vehicle for this coordination is the adoption of
a framework management plan and the appointment of a conflict resolution
board-a promising development, although the treaty Indian tribes have yet to
be fully accommodated into the plan.4 74 The 1980 Northwest Power Act, when
fully implemented, will provide an avenue to improve and expand coordination
among responsible agencies and treaty tribes and to provide linkage between
agencies with responsibility for habitat management and those with authority
over the fish harvest. 475
With linkage refinement underway between the two involved regional fishery
management councils and also among the eleven fishery management jurisdic-
tions of the Columbia River Basin, there remain, however, two important weak
links in the salmon management chain. The first lies in persistently faulty coor-
dination between the ocean and the inland sectors of salmon management-
more specifically, between the PFMC and the Columbia River agencies and
tribes. The PFMC has been harshly criticized for its repeated failure to set limits
on ocean harvest of salmon in conformity with the escapement needs of certain
depleted fish stocks of the Columbia River Basin and of Washington coastal
4 73 See supra note 297.
474 FRAMEWORK PLAN, supra note 252, at 34-35. Because of objections to certain provisions of the
adopted Columbia River Basin Framework Plan, treaty Indian tribes have so far abstained from full
participation. Id




This is one problem addressed by the Salmon and Steelhead Conservation and
Enhancement Act of 1980.477 In an attempt to bridge the gap between inland
and ocean salmon management, the Act includes a provision that establishes a
Salmon and Steelhead Advisory Commission, which is charged with the task of
developing and submitting to the Secretary of Commerce a plan for an adminis-
trative framework "for the effective coordination of research, enhancement, man-
agement, and enforcement policies. . .and for the resolution of disputes between
management entities that are concerned with stocks of common interest.
' 4 78
Although arguably a step in the right direction, the Salmon and Steelhead
Conservation and Enhancement Act has been criticized as fundamentally flawed
in addition to being uncertain in its funding commitment. 479 For these reasons it
is seen as too limited in scope to accomplish the necessary degree of coordination
between ocean and inland salmon management agencies. The Act goes only so
far as to authorize measures to strengthen coordination among the various tribal,
state, regional, and federal interests involved in Pacific salmon management. It
stops short of mandating these measures. In addition, critics have faulted the Act
for failing to provide mechanisms, incentives, or funds adequate for that
purpose.4
80
The second weak link in the comprehensive management chain is potentially
more serious in its effect on the health of the salmon fishery. The parties are the
United States and Canada and there is no court of law with the power to compell
resolution their differences. The weak link is the lack of a ratified salmon inter-
ception agreement. 48 ' Of all politically possible measures that might now be
taken to improve coordinated management over the Pacific salmon fishery, ratifi-
cation of the proposed Pacific Salmon Treaty between the United States and
476Se, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1243, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1980) (noting that salmon management today
"is largely a product of political rather than biological realities" and that the establishment of the PFMC
only complicated that problem). See also Confederated Tribes v. Kreps, No. 79-541 (D. Or. 1979) (criticiz-
ing and invalidating Commerce Department regulations designed to implement the PFMC's 1979 salmon
management plan on the ground that the regulations allowed an excessive ocean harvest of salmon,
thereby jeopardizing escapement levels needed to fulfill Indian treaty obligations).
477 16 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3345 (1982).
478 16 U.S.C. § 3311 (c). Recently, the Commission published a summary of its findings and recommen-
dations for public review. See Salmon & Steelhead Advisory Comm'n, Publi Review Draf:. A New Management
Structure for Anadromous Salmon and Steelhead Resources and Fisheries of the Washington and Columbia Rivet Conserva-
ttbn Areas (Oct. 1983). The draft presents a list of options designed to improve management coordination
over Columbia River salmon and steelhead. It rejects some options and offers others for public comment.
(The "super-agency" solution to fragmented management, for example, is rejected. Id at 7.) The Com-
mission's final report, to be presented to Congress and the Secretary of Commerce, is due January 1, 1984.
479J For an analysis and critique of the Act and a summary of other provisions not mentioned here, see
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO No. 15 (Aug. 1981). The Act,
for example, contains no express provision for resolving conflicts among the voting members of the constit-
uent management bodies, and it makes no attempt to coordinate the interests and responsibilities of fishery
managers with those of water managers. The Act places a high degree of reliance on the cooperation of
state agencies and Indian tribes to achieve its goals, yet these are the very interests that in the past have
been ansong the most acrimonious in their disagreement about management and allocation of salmon. Id.
at 14. No mandate and only slight incentive is provided for the PFMC to reach agreement with the Indian
tribes and state agencies on institutional restructuring, and the PFMC retains full power to obstruct any
proposal. Id at 6-7. No representatives of Canada, Alaska, or California are on the Salmon and Steelhead
Advisory Commission, and the provisions of the Act inexplicably exclude Idaho state and tribal salmon
fishery interests from its coverage. The United States Supreme Court has so far declined to extend cover-
age to these disenfranchised interests. See supra note 301.
400o NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO No. 15, at 14 (Aug. 1981).
41 See supra text accompanying notes 218-20.
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Canada is the most urgent. Without a permanent cooperative agreement, the
economic and political realities of a common property resource that is also highly
migratory will compel both nations to engage in competitive over-fishing of each
other's salmon stocks, and perhaps even to wage a full-fledged salmon war.482
The lack of a permanent interception agreement constitutes the biggest remain-
ing gap in the effective management of Pacific salmon, and rejection of the pro-
posed treaty by either side, instead of returning both parties to the status quo,
may ignite a frenzied state of "mutual poaching"-the salmon fishers of each
nation sniping at the other's salmon stocks to the detriment of all. 4 3
What, then, are the prospects of achieving the degree of management integra-
tion necessary for the optimum protection of depressed wild stocks of Pacific
salmon? At the present time we are witnessing a race between further deteriora-
tion of wild salmon stocks of the Pacific coast of North America and the improve-
ment of their habitat and of the institutions designed to protect them. The
outcome of that race at this moment is uncertain.
The next few years will represent a critical juncture in the future of the wild
salmon. Ratification, rejection, or delay of the proposed treaty will perhaps be
the best barometer to measure whether the salmon fishing interests of the Pacific
Northwest and their elected representatives have the will to preserve wild salmon
stocks for the benefit of future generations. If these times reveal a failure of will
on the part of those concerned with the future of Pacific salmon, then the ques-
tion may be not whether management authority can eventually be integrated or
coordinated, but whether there will be any important stocks of wild salmon left
to manage.
VI. CONCLUSION
The health of a fishery is determined by the interaction of three variables: the
biology of the fish, the degree of fishing pressure upon them, and the condition of
their physical environment. During the past ten years important advances have
been made in understanding the effects of these variables and how each bears
upon the state of the Pacific salmon fishery.
Today, many of these advances are being successfully applied to the manage-
ment of the anadromous fish resource, and some have inspired the institutional
accomplishments of the era of attempted restoration. Increased understanding of
salmonid biology, for example, has lent a cautionary tone to the widespread
hopes of a former time that adequate compensation for depleted fish runs could
be achieved merely by increasing hatchery production.4 8 4 In addition, fuller
comprehension of the biological, economic, and social effects of resource over-
exploitation has led to tentative attempts to reduce fishing effort by limiting en-
try into the salmon fishery. 48 5 Further, a sharpened perception of the habitat
needs of salmonid fish has led to determined (though yet dispersed) efforts to
482 For an analysis of the probable effects of the U.S. rejection of the proposed treaty or delay in ratifica-
tion, see Conner, The Paific Salmon Treaty: Why it Must be Ratified, Ocean Law Memo No. 24, Ocean &
Coastal Law Center, University of Oregon School of Law (Sept. 1983).
483 Sabella, Mutual Poaching: US. and Canada Eye Each Other's Salmon, OCEANS, May-June 1983, at 68.
4 64 See supra note 347.
485 See supra text accompanying notes 442-59.
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upgrade the spawning and rearing habitats of anadromous fish. 48 6
These are important accomplishments, greater perhaps than even the most
rosy optimist could have predicted as recently as ten years ago. To point out that
much remains to be done in no way minimizes these achievements.
This is not, however, a time for self-congratulation. Many wild salmon runs
are still in grave danger of irreversible depletion, and their fate may depend upon
tasks that remain undone. The gains of recent years must not be lost by failure to
carry through on the commitments already made on behalf of the wild salmon.
With the exception of one unratified international agreement regarding the
interception of Pacific salmon, 4 7 major laws necessary for the full protection of
the Pacific Northwest's anadromous fish resource are now in place. Full protec-
tion of the salmon resource, however, requires enhancement of laws as well as of
habitat. Many connections between the existing laws remain to be forged; con-
solidation and coordinated enforcement of the law of the Pacific salmon fishery
are still an unrealized goal.
As the preceding section of this Article attempts to show, the remaining
problems of managing the Pacific salmon fishery are international in scope and
institutional in nature. They are large problems, perhaps more unmanageable
than any that have yet been dealt with. Any solution must go to the heart both
of our federalist system of shared power and of the intricate network of national
sovereignties on which our world order is now based. When an over-exploited
living resource respects no boundaries, the boundaries themselves must be treated
in a way that respects the realities of nature. At a minimum, full protection of
the Pacific salmon runs requires that the law be applied over the entire migratory
range of the fish, and that it be applied with consistency over the entire network
of responsible management bodies.
Otherwise, the salmon runs will remain caught in a trap that the law itself has
set-the creation of so many autonomous jurisdictions that none has sufficient
incentive to conserve for fear that the fish will only be harvested in some other
jurisdiction. If the fish are to be sprung from the trap of balkanized manage-
ment, the rest of the era of attempted restoration will have to be devoted to the
consolidation of management authority, just as the previous decade has been
characterized by its proliferation.
Many questions regarding the future of the Pacific salmon runs remain to be
asked, and all will require answers before the turn of the century. Is it possible to
restore fish habitats in the Columbia River Basin and elsewhere to the point
where the wild fish runs can regain the abundance of those legendary days when
the resource perpetually renewed itself without the encumbrances of manage-
ment plans, seasons, gear restrictions, quotas, limited entry, and the politics of
allocation? Will future wild salmon runs still be fair game to gill netters, com-
mercial trollers, and charterboat operators, as well as to anglers and to Indian
fishers with an historic right that antedates all others? Or will the commercial
market for Pacific salmon have to be met almost entirely by hatchery-raised fish,
either publicly or privately reared? Or even more drastic: will the wild salmon
of the Columbia River Basin go the way of the Bowhead whales, once hunted by
48 6 See supra text accompanying notes 363-91.
48 7 Ste supra text accompanying notes 218-44.
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all whaling nations, but now taken exclusively by a small band of Inuit hunters
with a documented historic reliance on subsistence whaling?488
We have come very far in our societal and personal commitments to bring
these magnificent wild salmon runs up to their historic levels of abundance. To
lose them now by default would be a major defeat not only to those of us who
depend upon them for a livelihood, but also to those of us who are now privileged
to dine upon the incomparable flesh of upriver wild chinook, to feel their pulse at
the other end of a line, or simply to marvel at them as they leap over mountain
waterfalls.
488 See generally Michie, Alaskan Natives: Eskmos and Bowhead Whales. An Inqutir into Cultural and Environ-
mental Values That Clash in Courts of Law, 7 AMER. IND. L. REV. 79 (1979); and Reeves, The Bowhead Whale
Controversy: A Crtssfor US. Whale Plicy, Ocean Law Memo No. 16, Ocean & Coastal Law Center Univer-
sity of Oregon School of Law (Nov. 1979).
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